UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-3-2014

Kantor v. Kantor Clerk's Record v. 3 Dckt. 41946

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Kantor v. Kantor Clerk's Record v. 3 Dckt. 41946" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5569.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5569

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)

ROBERT KANTOR,

)

Supreme Court No.

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,

41~6

r
)

SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,

)

VOLUME30F5

)

DefendanVAppellant

)

)

0 RECORD

EAUG

______________

)
)

RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine.
HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE, DISTRICT JUDGE

MARTY R. ANDERSON
PO Box 50160
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Attorney for DefendanVAppellanV

SCOT M. LUDWIG
209 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

FILED· COP
r' .

om

for Plaintiff/Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Affidavit of Scot M. Ludwig
I Motion for Award of Costs and Attorney Fees
Affidavit of Scot M. Ludwig
Order Granting Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for
Leave to Amend
Amended Answer and Counterclaim
Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction
Defendant/Counterclaimant's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Affidavit of Sondra Kantor in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction
Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Defendant/Counterclaimant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion
for Award of Costs and Attorney Fees
Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Costs and
Attorney Fees
Affidavit of Mitchel J. August
Bench Brief, Re: Motions for Injunctive Relief
[ Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Re: Amended Counterclaim
! Motion to Compel Recording of Quitclaim Deed
Affidavit of Robert Aron Kantor in Support of Motion to
Compel Recording of Quitclaim Deed
Order
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel
Recordinq of Quitclaim Deed
Affidavit of Sondra Kantor in Response to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and in Objection to Motion to Compel
Recordinq of Quitclaim Deed
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judqment Re: Amended Counterclaim

TABLE OF CONTENTS--1

7/18/2013
7/18/2013
7/31/2013
8/07/2013

490
492
494
558

8/09/2013
8/09/2013

560
575

8/09/2013

577

8/09/2013

587

8/09/2013
8/12/2013

600
602

8/21/2013

606

8/22/2013
9/12/2013
10/09/2013

628
644

10/09/2013
10/09/2013

608

I

653
655

10/16/2013
11/01/2014

659
662

11/01/2013

666

11/01/2013

719

INDEX
Affidavit of Mitchel J. August

8/22/2013
10/09/2013

I Affidavit of Robert Aron Kantor in Support of Motion to
Compel Recording of Quitclaim Deed
Affidavit of Scot M. Ludwig
Affidavit of Scot M. Ludwig
Affidavit of Sondra Kantor in Response to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and in Objection to Motion to Compel
1 Recording of Quitclaim Deed
I Affidavit of Sondra Kantor in Support of Motion for
I Preliminary Injunction
Amended Answer and Counterclaim
Bench Brief, Re: Motions for Injunctive Relief
Defendant/Counterclaimant's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction
Defendant/Counterclaimant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion
for Award of Costs and Attorney Fees
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel
Recording of Quitclaim Deed
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
, Summarv Judgment Re: Amended Counterclaim
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Re: Amended Counterclaim
Motion for Award of Costs and Attorney Fees
Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Motion to Compel Recording of Quitclaim Deed
Order
I Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Costs and
Attorney Fees
Order Granting Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for
Leave to Amend
1

INDEX--1

I

II

608 I
655 \
!

7/18/2013
7/31/2013
11/01/2013

494

490

8/09/2013

587

8/09/2013
9/12/2013
8/09/2013

560
628 I
577'

8/09/2013

575

8/12/2013

6021

666

i

11/01/2014

6621

11/01/2013

719 \

r

I

10/09/2013
7/18/2013
8/09/2013
10/09/2013
10/16/2013
8/21/2013
8/07/2013

6441
'

492
600
653
659
606
558

I

Ff LED ~:· - ,

SCOT M. LUDWIG

--,
/

(
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Plaintiff,
vs.

SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2012-734
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOT M. LUDWIG

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss
County of Ada
)
SCOT M. LUDWIG, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
l.

Affiant is an attorney, duly licensed to practice law before all courts of the state of

Idaho, United States District Court for the District ofidaho and the United States Court of Appeals
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I hereby certify that on this
ofJuly, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated:

Daniel E. Williams
Thomas, Williams & Park LLP
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, Idaho 83701

U.S. Mail
~dDelivery
_Overnight Courier
Facsimile Transm·
(208)3 - 894
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

CASE NO. CV-2012-734

vs.

)

SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,

)
)

MOTION FOR A WARD OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

Defendant.

)
)

COMES NOW The Plaintiff, ROBERT ARON KANTOR, by and through his attorney of
record Scot M. Ludwig of the firm Ludwig Shoufler Miller, LLP, and hereby moves this Court to
award Plaintiff his reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred herein pursuant to Idaho Code § 1212 l, paragraph 29 (designated as paragraph 28.03) of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement,
and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e )( 5) and as further set forth in the Affidavit of Scot M.
MOTION FOR AW ARD OF COSTS AND A TTOR.i~EY FEES - 1
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and the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees filed contemporaneously herewith.

DATED thisj._t-{

fay

of July, 2013.

ILLER+ JOHNSON, LLP

thid1./1aay

I hereby certify that on
f July, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated:

Daniel E. Williams
Thomas, Williams & Park LLP
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, Idaho 83701

~)J.S. Mail
~dDelivery
_ Overnight Courier
Facsimile Transmission
(208)
- 94
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Attorneys at Law
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2012-734

vs.

)

AFFIDAVIT OF SCOT M. LUDWIG

SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,

)
)
)

)

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss
)

SCOT M. LUDWIG, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

1.

I am the one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff in this matter and I make this affidavit
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based upon my own personal knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Reporter's Transcript

with respect to the Hearing held on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Monday,
the 24th day of June, 2013.
DATED This

3@..J1aay of July, 2013.
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I hereby certify that on this.~@~ of July, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated:

Daniel E. Williams
Thomas, Williams & Park LLP
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, Idaho 83701

~Mail
_ Hand Delivery
_Overnight Courier
Facsimile Transmis ·
(208)3454.
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,

2

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

3

4

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Plaintiff,

5

6

)

vs.

7

SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,

8

_________________
Defendant.

Case No. CV-2012-734

)
)
)
)
)

9

10
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
11
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the

12
13

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Monday,

14

June 24, 2013, at the hour of 11:24 a.m., at the Blaine County

15

Courthouse, Hailey,

16

BEFORE:

Idaho.
The Honorable Robert J. Elgee

17
18

APPEARANCES:

19

For the Plaintiff:

SCOT M. LUDWIG, ESQ.
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson,
Attorneys at Law
209 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

20
21

LLP

22
DANIELE. WILLIAMS, ESQ.
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP
Attorneys at Law
121 N. 9th Street, Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, Idaho 83701

For the Defendant:
23
24
25

Susan P. Israel, CSR No. 244
P. 0. Box 1379
Ketchum, ID 83340
r
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MONDAY,

JUNE 24,

2013

11:24 A.M.

2
3

4
5

THE COURT:

6

MR.

7

MR. WILLIAMS:

8

THE COURT:

9

I

Good morning.

This is Kantor versus Kantor.

know who you are,

MR. LUDWIG:

This

but would you introduce

Good morning.

Scot Ludwig here on

behalf of the plaintiff.
MR. WILLIAMS:

14
15

Good morning.

yourselves for the record and for the court reporter.

12
13

LUDWIG:

gentlemen.

is 2012-734.

10
11

Good morning,

Dan Williams on behalf of

defendant and counterclaimant Sondra Kantor.

16

THE COURT:

We are before the Court for a

17

motion for partial summary judgment and a motion for leave

18

to amend.

The motion for partial summary judgment is

19

yours,

Ludwig,

20

Mr. Williams'.

21

you have another preference?

22
23

Mr.

MR.

and the motion for leave to amend is

Let's take them up in that order,

LUDWIG:

I think that makes sense,

unless

Your

Honor.

24

THE COURT:

25

I've read the briefs.

Okay.

Go ahead.
I've read the motion for

3
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leave to amend.

familiar with the issues.

I'm

I have read Ms. Kantor's deposition.
3

don't need to repeat what's in your briefs I guess is my point.
MR. LUDWIG:

4

5

So you

Go ahead.

Okay.

I'll summarize, maybe,

just

some highlights, but I won't go into each and every item.
Your Honor,

6

right now I want to address that

7

fraud claim in the allegation because that's a significant

8

claim that's been litigated extensively.
THE COURT:

The fraud claim in the

10

MR. LUDWIG:

In the counterclaim.

11

that that be dismissed.

9

12

THE COURT:

13

these up in two parts,

14

claims,

15

go first on his motion to amend,

Okay.

MR. LUDWIG:

17

THE COURT:

Let me -- I want to take

I think, the breach of contract

so you argue those,

16

We've asked

and then I'll let Mr. Williams
and then you can respond.

Okay.
Because the basis of your objection

18

to the fraud claim is he is seeking to amend to continue to

19

add the fraud claim, and isn't the basis of your argument

20

that he should not be allowed to amend and include this new

21

fraud claim?

22

Were the old fraud claims dismissed?

23

MR. LUDWIG:

Not yet.

That's what we're here

24

for today.

25

fraud claim on summary judgment and why an amendment are

So the discussion about dismissing the existing

4
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real

the same argument in a lot of respects.
THE COURT:

2

You're do

both.

Okay.

Somehow

3

I was thinking -- I read these about last Thursday or so,

4

and I was thinking that the fraud issue came in on his

5

motion to amend the counterclaim.
MR. LUDWIG:

6

Currently,

Your Honor,

there's a

7

motion for summary judgment on our original contract claim

8

for the breach that created this case, and then a

9

counterclaim was filed by Stan Welsh's successor,

Ed Simon,

10

alleging three -- four items.

The one that's not before

11

the Court today is the breach of fiduciary duty for not

12

providing financial records.

13

the summary judgment proceeding.

14

allegation of fraud by Mr. Kantor.

That hasn't been included in
What has is the

15

No. 2, that miles weren't transferred pursuant

16

to an agreement that was executed post-property settlement

17

agreement, and that credit card obligations,

18

thereof,

19

have been breached.
So those are what the summary judgment pertain

20

to,

21

the counterclaim.

four items; one in the original complaint and three in

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. LUDWIG:

24
25

the payment

Okay.
So in light of that,

can I address

all of them at the same time?
THE COURT:

Sure,

sure.

Yes.

5

500

MR. LUDWIG:
though,

Okay.

I will go to the breach of

first.

I was going to address the

2

contract claim,

3

fraud claim, but I ' l l do that shortly hereafter real

4

quickly.
On the breach of contract claim there was a

5
6

Property Settlement Agreement in this case.

And,

Your

7

Honor,

8

litigated comprehensively and extensively and very

9

expensively over the course of a year by Stan Welsh and

the history of that was that this divorce was

10

myself.

11

abilities to represent clients in the area of family law.

12

The Court is very aware of Stan Welsh and his

In addition -- and this is all in the

13

deposition under oath,

14

on it,

15

background of this case.

16

so I don't want to be too belaboring

but I do want to hit on a couple high points on the

Ms. Kantor hired a CPA in Twin Falls and hired

17

a CPA in Boise,

18

reviewing this somewhat complex financial structure that

19

these parties have.

20

consultant to give her a second set of eyes.

21

lots of people on board over on the other side.

22

Idaho.

So she had two CPAs on board

So she had two experts and a
So there are

That culminated in a Property Settlement

23

Agreement that the parties laid out and the Court has had

24

an opportunity to see.

25

covers a lot of things.

That's an extensive document and it
And the Court can probably surmise

6
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1

that these people had a lot of money at one time.

2

recession was been difficult on this sort of real estate

3

activity.
But, nevertheless,

4

The

Paragraph 28.02 of the

5

Property Settlement Agreement states -- and the document

6

was signed under oath by Ms. Kantor,

7

represented by Stan to finish this case -- that there was

8

no undue influence,

g·

misrepresentation in executing that document and finishing

10

and she was

there was no fraud,

and no

this divorce case.
So ten months later, after an original count to

11
12

have the breach of contract case and an order allowing us

13

to sign documents so we could sell this house, which the

14

PSA requires Mr.

15

of time, we take her deposition.

16
17

Kantor to sell within a reasonable period

THE COURT:

Let me jump in just because you

mentioned a point I do want to address.

18

MR. LUDWIG:

19

THE COURT:

Yes.
I think a party can put in a

20

written contract there's been no undue influence because

21

they know whether they've been unduly influenced or

22

pressured,

and that's difficult to contradict later.

23

But a statement that I haven't been defrauded

24

is -- to me,

25

know that you've been defrauded.

that's the essence of fraud is that you don't
So,

to me, putting that

7
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1

cular representation in a written contract is -- it

2

doesn t

3

been defrauded,

4

their knowledge, and that's something that even with -- to

5

me, even with that language in there,

6

come back and say,

7

was cheated or defrauded because I have found out facts I

8

didn't know.

9

10

carry much weight, because if a person has actually
that means they've been cheated without

they could always

well, now I have found out that,

yes,

I

I just don't think that that particular
contractual provision about fraud carries much weight.

11

MR. LUDWIG:

12

carried all the weight,

13

is a darn good starting point when you have a negotiated

14

divorce with competent counsel and two experts on board and

15

a set of eyes looking at all the documents,

16

document that says that.

17

suggest to the Court.

18

certainly after that is very -- and the information that's

19

not been obtained in this process is very dispositive.

20

21
22

Your Honor,

I agree,

and if it

we wouldn't be here today.

But it

that you sign a

It bears some weight I would

But, nevertheless,

So, with that background,

what happened

I'll go through the

contract claim real quick.
Your Honor,

the original complaint was filed to

23

get a court order to get a document signed on the sale of

24

this house, and that culminated after the Property

25

Settlement Agreement where they talked about the parties

8

503

1

sel ing this house.
On September 26th there was another agreement,

2
3

because prior to that on September 24th,

and this is all in

4

the record,

5

want some SLuff for it.

6

acknowledged that in her deposition as you saw.

7

document comes out that addresses some different issues,

8

like the miles and a Mercedes, and it's not part of this,

9

and then the sale of this house.

Ms. Kantor says I'll sign your document, but I
So it was a leverage play, and she
So a new

And in that document

10

prepared by Stan Welsh it said that Sondra Kantor would

11

execute any documents necessary.

12

that's in that agreement.

13

So, here we go,

It was a "shall," and

several weeks later and the

14

same leverage play comes up and a document is necessary to

15

be signed by Ms. Kantor regarding the sale.

16

time they didn't know the sale was going to fail.

17

Ultimately, B of A unilaterally canceled the sale because

18

they had an appraisal issue.

And at that

19

But at that point in time there was a contract,

20

and to keep the sale going because of a potential loss here

21

in the value of that home and there's a big second for a

22

million 1, and all kinds of issues,

23

million, we needed that mandatory document that she would

24

sign any sale contract so we wouldn't lose the deal.

25

the first was 3.4

So two weeks later, after we get this agreement

9
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r 26, 2012,

on

the leverage play again,

she

2

calls it that in her deposition, where she tried to get

3

some more things before she would sign a document.

4

didn't have time, we needed that document signed, so we

5

filed a breach of contract action and a request for a TRO

6

allowing Mr. Kantor to execute documents on her behalf if

7

she wouldn't so this deal could move forward.

8

happens,

9

necessary to be signed.

We

What

she immediately signs the document that was

10

So that breach of contract has been unrefuted.

11

And so we're asking the Court on that issue that there be a

12

breach of contract order with regard to that particular item.

13

Now, moving on to the counterclaim -- and, by

14

the way,

15

ultimately canceled, ~ill be a request for fees that

16

related to that filing of the complaint and forcing her to

17

sign the document.

18

obviously,

19

it is unrefuted she breached the contract, and hopefully

20

avoid a trial with a request for fees on that item, along

21

with some of these other items.

22
23

24
25

the damages there, because that sale was

So that's the damage phase.

on summary judgment we will follow-up,

THE COURT:

And,
because

That case was never dismissed.

That's morphed into this?
MR. LUDWIG:

It's still pending.

summary judgment on that breach today,

We have a

right now.

10
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THE COURT:
attorney's fees,

Okay.

then,

But on the issue of

is that a question for the jury?

3

Is there an attorney's fees provision in the Property

4

Settlement Agreement?
In the Property Settlement

MR. LUDWIG:

5
6'

Agreement I believe there is, but that won't be a question

7

for the jury.

8

this Court could give fees today, obviously, but we'll be

9

asking for those fees after summary judgment on that item

We'll be asking for fees from this Court, or

10

today.

11

uncovers this case,

12

unrefuted.

13

defense.

So that will go away.

14

That won't be as this cloud

in our opinion, because the breach was

It's clear she breached, and there's no
That will not be something that's heard by the

This Court will address that in a subsequent
if you can see procedurally how we're moving

15

motion,

16

through this.

17

THE COURT:

Well,

yeah,

that's where I have a

And I may be making some of Mr. Williams'

18

problem.

19

arguments for him -- or I guess he's already made these,

20

but I

just want to kick this around.

21

You're saying, well,

22

Mr. Williams' position is she wouldn't sign,

23

court,

24

that one died, that deal died, and then they revived it

25

with the Augusts later, and then there was a subsequent

she signed.

They,

she wouldn't sign.

I think,

And

you came to

revived the -- or maybe

11
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the bank to go forward because Mr. Kantor had

refusal
2

while he was seeking a short sale,

3

some facts indicating that he had -- was also seeking a

4

loan modification.

5

argue,

6

material breach,

So I think Mr. Williams is going to

well, whatever we did didn't cause or it wasn't a
it didn't cause those.

Now I see, ah, no,

7

8

to go to court and seek her

9

sign,

10

the true damages are we had
and seek to force her to

so wouldn't that be a claim you make to the Court as

attorney's fees?
MR. LUDWIG:

11
12

apparently there are

Yes, absolutely, and that's what I

was saying.

13

This subsequent discussion about the

14

transaction being revived down the road,

15

well grant leave on that particular item today because it

16

is a subsequent occurrence.

17

refute that there was any breach by Mr. Kantor.

18

Court knows,

19

complaint doesn't have to have a factual basis to support

20

that necessarily versus if you're defending a summary

21

judgment.

22

And,

the Court may very

obviously, we're going to
But as the

a motion for leave to file an amended

So if the Court ultimately allows that,

that's

23

a count that's going to be included in the counterclaim and

24

we'll defend that vigorously.

25

Just because it's the same buyer and it happened down the

But they're separate items.

12
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1

road

2

hasn'

there are lots of defenses to why that transaction
happened yet.

But, again, that's a separate matter.

We're talking about a breach, a clear breach,

3

4

an unrefuted breach of the PSA and subsequent agreement

5

that she would sign any documents necessary immediately to

6

keep that sale rolling, and we were forced to come to court

7

and deal with that.
So, again, that's the breach of contract claim

8
9

that originated this case, and we would ask the Court

10

ultimately for summary judgment on that because it is clear

11

there was that breach.

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

And I'm trying to part out

13

breach from attorney's fees.

14

breach the contract, now there's damages, damages in the

15

form of a

16

complaint or somebody did -- in the form of now I'm exposed

17

to a deficiency judgment or the short sale didn't go

18

through and I'm exposed to a bank loan on the second,

19

whatever,

20

seeking a modification.

21
22

and I think she said this in her amended

that I wouldn't have had Mr. Kantor not been

Both sides are claiming that there's a breach
of contract over the sale of the house.

23

MR. LUDWIG:

24

THE COURT:

25

Breach is -- ordinarily you

Right.
But if I deny your motion for

summary judgment on the issue of causation -- because

13
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1

that's going to be,

2

she didn't cause a breach of the sale argument.

3

seems to me you're after is, no,

4

adjudication or an order from the Court saying she

5

breached.

6

to get her signature and our damages are for attorney's

7

fees.

10

Well

What it

judge, we want an

That's what caused us to have to come to court

Is that -- am I right?
MR. LUDWIG:

8
9

I think, Mr. Williams' argument.

That's correct, Your Honor.

She

agreed in that contract that she would sign any documents
immediately, and she didn't.

11

The whole issue about whether or not Mr. Kantor

12

has used reasonable efforts to get the sale of this

13

property is a whole separate matter that we have very

14

strong defenses to, and that's going to potentially be

15

included in this motion for leave to amend the complaint,

16

but it's separate from this breach of the agreement to sign

17

these documents.

18

we had a deal pending, and force her to sign the deal in a

19

timely fashion,

20

do that that are the damages.

21

awards fees,

22

aren't additional damages.

23
24

25

We were forced to come forward,

because

and it's those fees incurred in having to
If this Court follows up and

that part of the case is done because there

THE COURT:

Okay.

understand until just now.
MR. LUDWIG:

It's the fees.
That's something I did not

Okay.

Go ahead.

And I would love to give you a

14

509

It mi

be beneficial

1

little history of this house sale.

2

to you to see where we are today, but maybe that's another

3

day, because it's what's going on.

4

impact my motion for summary judgment, but maybe when I

5

have a chance to reply,

6

says,

7

an issue for down the road if the motion for leave to amend

8

the complaint on this one item is permitted today.

depending on what Mr. Williams

I ' l l have to address that.

But, nevertheless, that's

I ' l l leave this issue if the Court is ready to

9

10

It doesn't really

leave the breach of contract claim.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. LUDWIG:

Yes,

I am.

Your Honor,

I want to talk about

13

the fraud allegation now that was in the counterclaim

14

because that is significant,

15

recorder's office right here in a small community against

16

somebody who does business,

17

That's what summary judgments are for,

18

doesn't have to defend frivolous allegations at trial.

19

It's the perfect situation, and I would like to go through

20

it really quickly.

21

it was filed in the county

and it needs to end today.
so an individual

And you've read the briefs on it and referred

22

to the depositions,

23

was filed,

24

the Court has read the pertinent parts, but she could not

25

point to one penny that she had not received pursuant to

but ten months after the divorce case

we took Ms. Kantor's deposition under oath, and

15
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this divorce settlement, nor could she

to one

2

document that supported her =raud claim or one piece of

3

information or statement or occurrence that supported a

4

fraud claim.

5

attorney made me do it."

6

allegation, and it's in the transcript.

Instead, what did she do?

She said,

She blamed Ed Simon for the

And as Exhibit 3 to her deposition,

7

"My

she had an

8

email that she sent to a family friend, Marshall Bennett,

9

and in that she said,

"I need to tell you--" I'm

10

summarizing, but it's actually pretty close to what I'm

11

saying here.

12

this allegation of fraud against Bob.

13

my -- this is where she said,

14

in effect.

15
16
4

"I need to tell you that I'm sorry I've made
It's not true."

And

"My attorney made me do it,"

So there is nothing, and there hasn't been
anything.

...,

Now,

.LI

we've put off the summary judgment as the

18

Court remembered because Sondra wasn't -- she changed

19

attorneys,

20

attorney, and he hasn't been able to come up with one iota.

21

They've taken this opportunity, it's been several months,

22

and there was a deposition,

23

Kantor by the way,

24

supports the elements of a fraud case.

25

let's just leave it at that, and a very talented

the third deposition of Bob

and not one piece of information

If you look at Ms. Kantor's deposition -- or

16
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her affidavit she filed in opposition to this motion for

2

surrunary judgment on the fraud case,

3

about it.

4

like that.

she doesn't even talk

She talks about some mileage issues and things

So calling it something different,

5

inducement

6

for fraud,

the elements are all the same, Your Honor, and

7

there's been nothing to support that there's been fraud in

8

this matter and this part needs to end.

9

shouldn't have to continue to defend these allegations when

Mr. Kantor

10

here we are at the end of June and this was a divorce from

11

April of 2012, and these continued paranoias and

12

allegations and things are being made, but there's nothing

13

in the record, absolutely nothing, that would support a

14

fraud claim.

15

This is not a day when you throw that final

16

rabbit out of the hat and try to file leave to amend the

17

complaint and allege fraud.

18

to defend with refuted factual information.

19

allegations here don't exist, and some motion for leave to

20

allege fraud in a different fashion where the elements are

21

the same isn't going to cut it.

22

On summary judgment you have
The

And even if the Court said, well,

they called

23

it inducement instead, there's no factual information that

24

meets the elements of the allegation of fraud.

25

time to end that allegation.

So it's

17
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The other two I'll

ust touch on real

2

Your Honor.

One is the miles.

3

the counterclaim.

4

that.

5

in that subsequent agreement on September 26th.

kly,

The miles were a part of

We've asked for summary judgment on

The miles issue were handled in that -- was handled

And the payment of debts,

6

in the counterclaim

7

i t was alleged that Mr. Kantor had failed to pay A,

B, C,

8

E, and F, which were debts -- well, at the deposition A, E,

9

and F were withdrawn saying that was mistake, that was

10

Ms. Kantor's deposition, so that Band C, which were credit

11

card obligations, were alleged to not be paid.

12

has paid those.

Mr. Kantor

I just see a recent affidavit saying, well, the

13
14

April payment hasn't been made.

15

April and that allegation,

16

wants to handle it.

17

paid, but we haven't had an opportunity to do that.

18

So I guess up through

the Court has to decide how it

We would refute that it hasn't been

But the Property Settlement Agreement says,

19

Mr. Kantor,

20

say in what fashion.

21

enforcement,

22

failure to pay an obligation,

23

Judge Israel, the property settlement allows that,

24

can go over and say we want to hold him in contempt because

25

he's not complying with the Property Settlement Agreement

you're going to pay these debts.

It doesn't

So if there's some issue regarding

that a contempt proceeding is necessary for
they can register this with
and they

18
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in

ome fashion.

We disagree that's occurring.

And in

28 of the PSA it talks about in the event a

2

Parag

3

refinance occurs of these debts that Mr. Kantor is paying,

4

then Ms.

5

!

Kantor will cooperate.
So there are four items here that summary

6

judg~ent should be granted,

Your Honor,

with regard to the

7

motibn for leave because a lot of this argument pertains to

8

that'.

9

failed to sell the house within a reasonable period of

r

10

I understand the allegation that Mr. Kantor has

We understand, and if the Court allows that count to

11

go f~rward along with the existing fiduciary duty count on

12

prov:iding documentation,

13

that's what this case should look like after today.

l

we will contest both of those,

but

i

'

14

Thank you.

15

THE COURT:

16

Mr. Williams?

17

MR. WILLIAMS:

18

I think my colleague, Mr. Ludwig, mixed

i

Thank you, Mr.

Thank you,

Ludwig.

Your Honor.

19

together an awful lot of things that we need to separate

20

analytically in order to come to a correct resolution.

21

First of all, let's talk about the original

22

cla~m that brought Sondra Kantor as a defendant into this

23

court.

24

apparently on the allegation that she had refused to sign

25

an extension agreement on the very first house sale.

!

That was a purported breach of contract claim based

And

19
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Court will remember from the submissions, there was

1

as

2

a

3

the bank, Bank of America, didn't order an appraisal, and

4

so based on their own failure to order an appraisal,

5

refuked to approve that contract, and that original fall

6

deal· fell through.

7

contract.

l house sale that fell out of contract.

The whole deal fell out of the

It was revived again in February with a brand

8
9

Apparently

new real estate purchase and sale agreement, brand new

10

documents.

11

approval.

12

Mr. Kantor's deposition recently that he was always all

13

along seeking a loan modification, that the bank

14

subsequently canceled their approval saying we don't allow

15

you to seek a loan modification and a short sale at the

16

same time.

17

And so that's the 2013 sale.

That got bank

And it's only because we found out during

And so the February deal is canceled due to

18

what Robert Kantor,

19

fell out of contract because it didn't get bank approval.

20

And so the very first claim that the plaintiff brought

21

regards a nullity, a contract that has no legal

22

significance anymore.

23

Now,

the plaintiff, is doing.

first,

The fall deal

we -- Mr. Ludwig kept saying over

24

and over this is unrefuted, but that's not correct.

25

look at Exhibit A to Sondra Kantor's affidavit, that is

If you

20
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1

s

the document in which she's outl

her

2

posi ion, and nowhere in that document does she say I

3

refuse to sign this extension unless you give me money.

4

Nowhere is anything like that said or implied.

5

understand we need to do this; I also want you to do this.
Now,

6

She says I

I don't think as a matter of law this

7

Court can find that that constitutes a breach.

I think

8

there are at least genuine issues of material fact as to

9

what's going on, and it's our opinion, Your Honor, that

10

rather than the version of reality that you just heard from

11

Mr. Ludwig, what in fact happened was the plaintiff filed

12

this case ,precipitously based solely on Exhibit A in an

13

effort -- in a power play, an effort to make this claim and

14

then hold attorney fees over the head of Sondra Kantor.

15

So,

first of all,

it's our position there was

16

no refusal to sign.

17

breach.

18

have to complete on a full record as to what the parties

19

were saying and doing and meaning.

20

She did sign.

At the very least,

Secondly,

And there was no

there's a factual inquiry we

I don't think it's correct that a

21

party can claim a breach of contract and then skip the

22

element of damages unless they have a contract that says

23

they can, and the plaintiff doesn't point to any specific

24

language in the Property Settlement Agreement or the

25

parties' subsequent agreement that allows them to skip the

21
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and go straight to attorney fees and say,

element of
2

well, that's our damage,

because as the Court is aware

3

you've got to make a complete claim.

4

complete claim in order to prevail and then be awarded

5

attorney's fees.

6

get over that problem, either, and jump directly to

7

attorney fees and say, well, that's our damages because we

8

had 'to file suit we thought.

You've got to make a

And so I don't think the plaintiff can

And as the Court is aware from the other things

9

10

we raised,

and I won't go into great length, we believe

11

there are some other legal defenses to the breach of

12

contract claim.
The second agreement in February superseded

13

14

that earlier agreement.

15

bring a breach of contract claim on the fall agreement when

16

the parties entered into a brand new one in February, and

17

there's no allegation that there were any delays or

18

refusals to sign any necessary documents in the 2013 spring

19

agreement.

20

the whole fall agreement and any allegations of breach are

21

moot at this point because the only operative agreement was

22

the subsequent superseding spring agreement.

We don't think that plaintiff can

And so the whole -- in my analysis,

Your Honor,

23

Finally, we think that there is a relationship

24

between the two deals because we think that the actions of

25

Mr. Kantor in causing the 2013 deal not to go forward

22
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raises an estoppel defense, and that is how can he claim a
2

breach on Sondra Kantor's

in an alleged delay in

3

obtaining her signature on a deal that fell through anyway,

4

not because of anything she did, but solely because of the

5

bank's actions.

6

operative.

7

gets bank approval,

8

then suddenly the bank finds out that all along Mr. Kantor,

9

according to his own testimony, all along he's been seeking

It fell out of contract, no longer

But then in a February subsequent agreement it
it's headed downstream to close, and

10

a loan modification, which the Property Settlement

11

Agreement does not allow him to do.

12

the bank says, whoops,

13

loan modification at the same time,

14

this short sale.

15
16

And because of that,

you can't pursue a short sale and a

THE COURT:

so we do not approve

The Property Settlement Agreement

does not allow him to pursue a loan modification?

17

MR. WILLIAMS:

18

THE COURT:

In no way,

shape or form.

Does it say -- are you getting to

19

that conclusion because you're saying it doesn't say that

20

he is allowed to seek a loan modification agreement or are

21

you saying it prohibits?

22

MR. WILLIAMS:

There is not specific language

23

prohibiting loan modification, but the only language that

24

exists is language that requires the house to be sold as

25

soon as reasonably possible.

And so I think the clear

23
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cation is nowhere is he empowered by the Property
Settlement Agreement to seek a loan modification, instead
3

he must do a sale as w,as reasonably possible and a sale

4

schedule.

5

forward.

A sale is approved'by the bank,

THE COURT:

6

it's ready to go

So how is she harmed if Mr. Kantor

7

pursues a loan modification agreement and the bank says we

8

won't do a short sale?
I mean,

9

I think part of your claim assumes that

10

he knows that by pursuing a loan modification agreement,

11

he's, quote,

12

my question is,

13

assume that he knows that that's wrong or that that's going

14

to torpedo the short sale.

15

is it -- why would he be causing her damages if he pursued

16

a loan modification where he went to the bank and said,

17

look,

18

you're underwater any way you cut it,

19

second and I'll just pay the first and why don't we just

20

modify the loan instead of me trying to find some other

21

buyer to do that.

22

unquote, doing something wrong.

And I guess

let's set that aside for a moment.

short sale,

Let's

But just in the abstract,

why

loan modification, what's the difference,
let's forget the

How does that cause her damages?

MR. WILLIAMS:

Because under a loan

23

modification she is still subject to exposure for the

24

entire loan amount should Mr. Kantor be unable -- which is

25

part of this whole proceeding in the magistrate court,

24
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1

should he be unable to pay his bills.
THE COURT:

2

Why would -- how do you know that?

3

I'm saying -- you're saying, well, the result of a loan

4

modification is she's still on the hook for the -- let's

5

call it the second deed of trust.

6

Why ~ouldn't he pursue a loan modification where he says to

7

the bank let's skip the second deed of trust,

8

already underwater,

9

do a short sale,

How do you know that?

you're

no different than a short sale.

you're out that money.

If we

What's the

10

difference?

11

somebody goes to the bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy

12

court says you're under-secured at the bank, they get to

13

modify the loan.

14

mean, why does it -- it doesn't necessarily result in her

15

being on the hook for the second, does it?

16

I'll pay the first at this level.

Similar if

Why does that harm the other party?

MR. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor,

I

the second is no

17

longer at issue.

If you look at what's going on in the

18

February sale, by the time the February sale is rocking

19

along,

20

second transaction to deal with is Bank of America's, first.

the second is already gone.

All we have in the

21

So there's the original underlying obligation

22

of $3.4 million on the house and that -- Sondra Kantor is

23

still a co-signer on that original indebtedness.

24

plaintiff has done has caused her to continue to be in

25

jeopardy for that deficiency when there was a short sale

What the

25
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1

that had been approved,

and they would have had

2

acco

3

bank had approved it with zero deficiency to either party.

to the documents that we cited to the Court, the

So we had a deal where there's zero deficiency,

4

5

it's torpedoed by the actions of Mr. Kantor,

6

have a remaining liability on the part of Ms. Kantor.

7

a liability is a liability regardless of what may happen in

8

the future.

9

do, but that requires Ms. Kantor to be part of the

And

And who knows what a bankruptcy proceeding may

10

bankruptcy proceeding.

11

that is a damage.

12

and then we

THE COURT:

And so it remains a liability and

Is it?

That's a big question in my

13

mind.

14

you didn't get relieved of, how does that cause you

15

damages?

A remaining liability that you always had and that

16

You were on the hook.
MR. WILLIAMS:

You're still on the hook.

You have to carry it on any

17

financial information that you provide to anyone.

18

damage and -- a potential exposure is damage.

19

lay it to the world,

20

potential liability.

21

yes,

THE COURT:

It is

You have to

I'm still subject to this

I agree, but her position never

22

changed.

23

he did,

24

succeeded in relieving her of reliability -- or of

25

liability, but it didn't cause her damages because she

She was always on the hook for that.

So anything

it might not have relieved -- he might not have

26
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1

was -- her position never changed.

2

that debt and is still on the hook.
See,

3
4

She's on the hook for

I guess that's my point.

Causation,

whatever changed?
MR. WILLIAMS:

5

What changed is it was his

6

actions in breach of the Property Settlement Agreement that

7

caused the short sale not to occur, which would have

8

relieved this liability.
THE COORT:

9

Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS:

10
11

combined, I think,

12

summary judgment, also.

13

Okay.

All right.

And so that really -- we just

the motion to amend along with the

But I tried to make clear that none of this

14

this is not an unrefuted breach on the part of Sondra

15

Kantor.

16

pretend.

17

the house as it relates to either summary judgment or the

18

motion to amend,

It's not nearly as simple as Mr. Ludwig wants to
And unless the Court has other questions about

I can turn to some other issues.

19

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

20

MR. WILLIAMS:

21

Now,

Okay.

if the Court grants our motion for leave

22

to amend, which I think it should do,

23

stage of the proceedings, we're well within the time frame.

24

These allegations that are set forth in our proposed

25

amended complaint resulted from the deposition this Court

obviously, at this
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allowed us

take pursuant to Rule 56(f)

and they did ~ot

2

exis

to our knowledge at the time that the original

3

counterclaim was filed.

4

general principle, be granting this kind of leave to amend.

5

And if it does,

6

the things that Mr. Ludwig kind of mishmashed together are

7

quite distinct.

So I think the Court should, as a

the fraud allegations change entirely,

and

8

The original counterclaim on fraud was based on

9

entities that Mr. Kantor had set up, and the allegation was

10

that they're so confusing and so difficult to follow that

11

there was fraud involved.

Once this Court grants our

12

motion for leave to amend,

those allegations become moot,

13

and I don't think there's any further action required by

14

the Court.

15

Instead, the allegations specific to fraud in

16

the counterclaim in the amended complaint have entirely to

17

do with the execution of the Property Settlement Agreement

18

and what we have subsequently found out about what

19

Mr. Kantor was thinking and doing.

20

Property Settlement Agreement required the house -- the

21

parties to sell the house,

22

but sell the house as soon as reasonably possible.

23

had buyers in hand.

24
25

As we said, the

not go seek loan modifications
They

We found out that Mr. Kantor all along,
according to his deposition testimony, all along had been
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1

see

a loan modification.

2

represents a present intent at the ~ime the Prope

3

Settlement Agreement was signed,

4

fulfill the obligation as to the sale of the house as soon

5

as reasonably possible.
THE COURT:

6

It's our contention that that

a present intent not to

Now, do you have any evidence that

7

he knew if he pursued a loan modification, that would

8

torpedo any effort to complete a short sale?
MR. WILLIAMS:

9

We don't, but the distinction I

10

would draw,

Your Honor, is he may not have known about what

11

all the subsequent effects of that present intent not to

12

fulfill the Property Settlement Agreement provision might

13

have down the road, but he, nevertheless, still had the

14

present intent not to fulfill that specific provision with

15

regard to the sale of the house as soon as reasonably

16

possible.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. WILLIAMS:

Okay.
And so that's the way I think it

19

pieces together.

20

today is that as far as the summary judgment motion is

21

concerned,

22

counterclaims as originally stated are moot.

And so -- but the point,

here

the points about the entities and the existing

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. WILLIAMS:

25

I think,

Okay.
Now, with regard to the credit

cards, as we pointed out to the Court,

I don't think the
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1

plaintiff can say,

2

look

we can never be in breach of the

rty Settlement Agreement because theres no time frame

3

for us to pay off these things.

4

they're asking this Court to rule, that because there's no

5

specific time frame in the Property Settlement Agreement

-6

And that's basically what

for the credit card debt to be paid by Mr. Kantor,
then he can never be in breach,

that,

7

well,

and he can keep

8

paying for 30, 38, years at the current minimum payment

9

schedule to get these things paid off.

And as we pointed

10

out, Mr. Kantor will be about 108 years old at that time,

11

and that can't possibly be considered reasonable.

12

In Idaho, as in every state, when there's a

13

silent term as to the period of time or the term in which

14

performance is required,

15

I think that there will be a genuine issue of material fact

16

as to what that material time frame should be given what

17

the parties intended at the time of signing the Property

18

Settlement Agreement as well as any sense of reasonableness

19

as applied by this Court.

20

a reasonable time is implied.

The air miles,

And

Your Honor, we've set forth

21

there was a failure on the plaintiff's part to do what he

22

was obligated to do and cooperate reasonably in

23

Ms. Kantor's use of those miles so as to defeat her ability

24

to enjoy that benefit under the Property Settlement

25

Agreement and the parties' subsequent agreement.

So there
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1

has been a breach.

2

j

Plaintiff is not entitled to summary

ton that claim.

3

And so I probably just did exactly whai I

4

accused Mr. Ludwig of doing and I talked about both motions

5

at the same time, but I tried to keep them at least

6

distinct to keep the standards that this Court should

7

consider distinct.
THE COURT:

8
9

same time.

I'm happy to consider them at the

They run together.

10

Any other comments you want to make?

11

MR. WILLIAMS:

12

THE COURT:

13

Mr. Ludwig?

14

MR. LUDWIG:

15

I would refer you to Page 33, Line 7, through

I don't believe so, Your Honor.

All right.

Thank you, Mr. Williams.

Just a brief reply, Your Honor.

16

Page 36, Line 5, of Ms. Kantor's deposition testimony

17

attached to my affidavit where she clearly says both times

18

she held up signing an agreement to sell the property was

19

as a result of her trying to gain leverage for something.

20

The second time, time was out, it was time to get it done,

21

so that's why the action was filed.

22

And just a real quick history, Mr. Kantor's

23

deposition, Mr. Williams through the whole thing didn't

24

point to anything in particular but is trying to find

25

something and still hasn't ciced anything in that
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1

deposition that benefits.
What happened subsequent to the divorce was

2
3

there was a 3.4 million

4

$3.4 million first to B of A.

5

second, also.

6

Well,

7

facing huge liability, and convinced B of A to release the

8

second entirely.

9

of liability.

Fortunately, B of A was the

And we all know how goofy B of A has been.

after the divorce, Mr. Kantor rolled up his sleeves,

10
11

this is all in the record --

That's in the record, $1.1 million, poof,

And we know seconds don't go away.

THE COURT:

Was that done?

That did,

in fact,

happen?

12

MR. LUDWIG:

Yes.

I know, it's amazing, but he

13

did this subsequent to the divorce, and that saved her

14

$550,000 of potential liability.

15

Now

16

THE COURT:

17

That's a fact I was not -- do you agree that

Wait, wait.

18

happened?

19

didn't know what that referred to.

20

I think you made a reference to that,

MR. WILLIAMS:

and I

It is our understanding that the

21

second -- the deed under -- the obligation under the second

22

deed of trust has been forgiven.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

I'm taking that to the bank,

24

Mr. Williams, so when you say it's your understanding,

25

you're saying we agree with Mr. Ludwig that the second
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1

the second deed of trust is gone

shed,

B of A

it or walked away from it.

has fo

MR. WILLIAMS:

3

it's ext

Your Honor, all we can do is

4

look at the documents that have been provided to us by the

5

plaintiffs, and that's what they seem to indicate.
THE COURT:

6

Okay.

And so the only argument

7

here is a refinance or a short sale on the first,

8

million?
MR. LUDWIG:

9

the 3.4

The only -- by the way, all of

10

this information is unrefuted in the deposition of Bob

11

Kantor over 10 months post-litigation starting, and even

12

longer post-divorce, and there's nothing in the record that

13

says anything other than Bob Kantor's representation the

14

second is gone and that he negotiated with B of A to

15

release that.

16

And I want to address what's happened since,

17

but,

18

this subsequent issue he's trying to amend the complaint on

19

has nothing to do with this breach that started this

20

litigation, and that is, has Bob Kantor violated the

21

provision of 5.01 of the PSA that said the real property

22

shall be sold as soon as reasonably possible.

23

Judge,

the issue that was argued by Mr. Williams was

That's different than our breach here where she

24

was supposed to sign documents immediately.

25

you the deposition transcript where you'll see she twice

And I cited
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1

says I was trying to use leverage 1

2

documents.

that's why I didn't sign

So back to this B of A.

3

So these are

4

different.

He's trying to mesh them together.

They're

5

different.

And the record will have all this information.

6

It's not refuted by anything.
The $3.4 million, Mr. Kantor was trying to

7

8

do -- his defense is he's trying to do everything he can to

9

get them out of liability.

Okay.

That's what you're going

10

to see down the road.

11

re-generated in I think February, I can't remember,

12

that's what Mr. Williams said,

13

and he had a loan mod going.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. LUDWIG:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. LUDWIG:

18

THE COURT:

And he had a short sale that was

that might be about right,
And you do anything --

How much was the short sale for?
Two point four million.
And the obligation was 3.4?
Three point four.
Okay.

I

just

-- in my view of the

19

facts,

20

intent was to just get rid of the second.

21

that's different.

22

deed of trust obligation.

23

I think

I somehow thought that the short sale -- the whole
Okay.

I see

The short sale also ate into the first

MR. LUDWIG:

That's the goal.

And as those two

24

were going along -- and Mr. Kantor has done all of this,

25

110 percent of all of this.
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So along the way,

1

the right arm of B of A

2

discovered, and i t s in the deposition transcript, ~hat the

3

left arm was a short sale.

4

didn't know.

5

that he's working with that there's a short sale,

6

probably shouldn't have done that if he would have known

7

that B of A would have had a policy against that -- they

8

canceled the short sale.

There's a loan mod, and they

And so when he informed the loan mod person
too -- he

And that was a short sale that was approved

9

with conditions.

11

couldn't have woke up one morning and somebody say we're

12

not interested in a short sale anymore.

13

Don't get the belief, Judge,

that B of A

10

So he's been trying to mitigate this by virtue

14

of a loan mod, in fact,

15

to get a substantial reduction in the $3.4 million from B

16

of A.

17

sure is aware of, and they're saying we think we might get

18

a $2 million reduction on that mortgage potentially.

reasonably believes that he's going

They've had all these class actions the Court I'm

19

So this cause of action --

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. LUDWIG:

By virtue of the loan modification?
By virtue of the loan mod and

22

bringing this thing down to less than $2 million, and the

23

parties ultimately will make some money on this house,

24

believe it or not.

25

So that's aside.

That's for the future.

And
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this is their amended complaint.

They want to allege that

2

he's breached 5.01 of the PSA that he hasn't sold the

3

property within a reasonable time period.

4

amended counterclaim.

5

support it.

6

don't have to have facts to support your allegation.

That's an

There's no factual information to

But in an amended counterclaim allegation you

To defend a summary judgment -- now to flip

7

8

hats over to this fraud claim -- you do,

9

cited anything that refutes the fact that she received

10

every penny from the divorce.

11

to support the fraud.

12

the fraud,

13

that there's been no fraud in February.

14

happened since then, either.

15

needs to be dismissed, Your Honor.

and they haven't

They have no documentation

There's no information to support

there's nothing, and her statement under oath

Anyway,

So nothing has

that fraud claim

16

The miles, the credit card, he's complied with

17

the document that's involved in this matter and the breach

18

of contract claim.

19

them to allege a breach of the Property Settlement

20

Agreement regarding the sale of the house within a

21

reasonable period of time, nothing we can do about that

22

right now probably because that's not somethi0g that's

23

before the Court in a factual scenario.

24

25

And then if the Court is going to allow

THE COURT:

What's not before the Court on a

factual scenario?
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1

MR. LUDWIG:

This whole discussion about the

2

breach of the Prope

3

failing to sell the house within a reasonable period of

4

time.

5

to be alleged.

6

of a summary judgment, obviously.

7

THE COURT:

8

Settlement Agreement by Mr. Kantor

They've asked to amend their complaint to allow that
That's a different standard than a defense

they can do that,

9

MR.

Okay.

You're saying,

yeah, maybe

I can't get that out at this time.

LUDWIG:

Right.

That's down the road, and

10

it's separate than the breach that you'll read about in the

11

deposition transcript that I cited to you.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. LUDWIG:

14

THE COURT:

15

I

16

and I don't want to --

Okay.
Thank you.
Any other comments, Mr. Williams?

know you have motions in and Mr. Ludwig has motions in,

17

MR. WILLIAMS:

18

Ms. Kantor wanted me to make sure the Court

Just very briefly.

19

understood that despite the characterization of Mr. Ludwig,

20

if we really do grant all inferences to the defense as we

21

must do -- this wasn't a leverage play,

22

blackmail,

23

of contract that initiated this proceeding by plaintiff

24

this Court can't find,

25

correctly, that this was leverage or blackmail or anything

this wasn't

I'm.talking about the original count for breach

if it applies the standard
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1

else like that if you look at the exact language of Exhibit

2

A to Sondra Kantor's affidavit, which is what they

3

complained about and came rushing to court.

4

THE COURT:

Okay.

5

Is there -- this is a question for you,

6

Mr. Williams.

7

failed to provide her a password for the Exclusive Resorts,

8

and where can you point to that she has sworn under oath

9

that he would provide her a password?

10
11

MR. WILLIAMS:

THE COURT:

Okay.

So I'll grant summary

judgment -- or that will be removed from -MR. WILLIAMS:

14
15

Your Honor, my understanding is

that issue is not in dispute between the parties anymore.

12
13

One of the allegations here is that he has

And I don't believe it appears

in my amended complaint.

16

THE COURT:

17

doesn't,

18

to kill it.

19

again.

Okay.

And whether it does or

I want to deal with it so that it won't -- I want
I want to make sure it's not going to rise

20

So I'll grant summary judgment on that issue

21

or the order -- I'm going to ask you to prepare an order

22

here, Mr. Ludwig,

23

the failure to provide a password is no longer in dispute,

24

that allegation or that claim.

25

Okay.

and so I'm going to want it to say that

Now,

I wrote out -- I've got several
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1

pages here I'm going to go through with regard to my

2

ruling

3

bit today by some things that maybe are in the record.

4

didn't read Mr. Kantor's deposition during the course of

5

these proceedings, but some of these rulings might be

6

twisted, and I'll address them when I get to them.

7

they might be twisted because of these,

8

additional things that

9

that the second deed of trust had been taken care of, and I

and some of this might have been twisted a l ttle

r-

And

like I say,

found out today.

I didn't know

10

thought that was the primary thrust of the short sale or

11

the loan modification.

12

I

First of all, as to -- the other thing that I

13

didn't know,

14

fraud claim.

15

motion was directed more -- from Mr. Kantor's side was

16

directed more at don't let them file this amended claim for

17

fraud in the amended counterclaim.

18

still directed at the initial fraud claim.

19

I guess, was that there is still an existing
I thought the fraud claim was -- or the

I didn't know we were

The initial fraud claim, if it is still alive,

20

I would grant summary judgment on that,

21

one pending in the existing pleadings, because Ms. Kantor

22

has admitted that she has no basis for it.

23

letters to the -- I don't know whether he was a CPA or a

24

friend,

25

apologize.

if there is still

She has written

maybe Mr. Bennett, if that was his name, and said I
And I tend to agree with Mr. Ludwig that her
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comments were, well,

it was at the lawyer's suggestion, but

2

I really don't have any basis for fraud.

3

that.

4

So I'll

And I may cover that in more detail as we go here.
A third thing that I would say that I have

5

learned today is that there is a different claim for

6

damages -- or a different claim,

7

for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim,

8

would characterize this as one facet of the breach of

9

contract claim because he says we're not after damages for

excuse me, by Mr. Ludwig
and I

10

causing a breach of a short sale agreement or for causing a

11

breach of the Property Settlement Agreement except for the

12

obligation that Ms. Kantor had an obligation to sign.
I guess what you're saying is we're not suing

13
14

for breach of contract damages,

15

suing for is attorney's fees for not signing.

16

there?
MR. LUDWIG:

17

Your Honor,

18

contract by failing to sign.

19

fees,

20

fees.

21

you're saying what we're
Am I

correct

it was a breach of

The damages are attorney's

and there's a provision in the PSA that allows for

THE COURT:

Okay.

That's what I'm getting at.

22

There's no independent,

23

damages aside from a claim for attorney's fees; correct?

24

MR. LUDWIG:

25

THE COURT:

quote, unquote, breach of contract

Correct.
Okay.

And I didn't understand that
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1
2

today.
So, with that in mind,

the question is not so

3

much whether Ms. -- whether Sondra Kantor breached the

4

Property Settlement Agreement by refusing to sign and then

5

caused damages in the sense that the short sale wouldn't go

6

through or it delayed it.

7

damages that are being sought.

8

attorney's fees that are being sought for requiring

9

Mr. Kantor to come to court to procure her signature.

It isn't breach of contract
It is an award of

That

10

is a claim that has to be made to the Court.

11

go to the jury.

12

issue depends on who is a prevailing party.

13

or may not be a prevailing party, but the -- but a claim

14

for contract breach of damages and an award of attorney's

15

fees are two different things and they proceed in two

16

different directions.

17

So,

That will not

That is an attorney's fees issue.

refusing to sign,

That

Mr. Kantor may

I would say that that is

18

what provoked the claim by Mr. Kantor.

19

sign for whatever reasons, which provoked a filing by

20

Mr. Kantor to force her signature.

21

Now,

She declined to

who is or who is not a prevailing party is

22

an open issue, but there is no reason for that breach of

23

contract claim to continue.

24

refused to sign, there was an extension agreement with the

25

Augusts in order to obtain short sale approval, which she

The way it looks to me is she
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1

did sign, then Bank of America canceled because there was

2

no appraisal.

3

I think that's an undisputed fact.

February 13 there was another purchase and sale

4

agreement with the Augusts.

5

29th, 2013, Bank of America approved a short sale.

6

few days later, on April 4th,

7

disapproved a short sale because Mr. Kantor was seeking a

8

modification.

9

And on March

2013,

yes, March
Just a

Bank of America

Mr. Williams has admitted that he has no

10

evidence that Mr. Kantor knew -- and this is going to come

11

in under the fraud claim

12

he has no evidence that Mr. Kantor knew at the time he was

13

seeking a loan modification that that was a violation of

14

Bank of America's policies.

15

fraud claim, he has to know and intend to torpedo a sale of

16

the house by knowledge.

17

short sale and I seek a loan modification at the same time,

18

one will cancel the other and I am, therefore,

19

or preventing myself from doing what I have promised to do.

20

Mr. Williams has admitted that

In order to proceed with a

He has to know that if I seek a

That's not what happened.

torpedoing

There is no evidence

21

that he knew by pursuing a loan modification he would be

22

torpedoing a short sale.

23

And I'm going to get to that.

So, I am not going to rule that

and this is

I am not going to

24

another facet of the breach of contract.

25

rule that she, because of the issue of causation,

that
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-·
I

1

Ms. Kantor breached the contract for purposes of general

2

contract damages.

3

to rule that she breached the contract for purposes of

4

general contract damages because there is an issue of

5

causation.

6

it didn't cause any harm except for it provoked a claim for

7

attorney's fees.

I'm not going

She didn't sign that document right away, but

So plaintiff's claim -- I will deny the motion

8
9

I want to be very clear.

for summary judgment insofar as it seeks any contract

10

damages because there's an issue of fact as to whether

11

anything she did, quote, unquote,

12

contract.

13

of materiality by not signing.

14

That contract fell apart because there wasn't an appraisal.

15

There was a subsequent purchase and sale agreement.

16

caused a breach of the

There's an issue of causation.

There's an issue

It didn't harm anything.

So her not signing did not cause the

17

contract

18

contract damages.

19

rule on that, but that's a judge issue,

20

issue,

21

for the Court to determine who the prevailing party is and

22

whether someone gets fees under a contract, under the

23

divorce contract, or by statute or for some other reason.

and I want that underlined, did not cause
It did provoke a claim for fees,

it's not a jury

so this issue won't go to the jury.

24

So,

25

claim for ~ees,

I'll

That's an issue

I will rule that she may have provoked a
and plaintiff can apply for fees -- you're
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1

ntiff, Mr. Kantor?

the

2

MR. KANTOR:

Yes.

3

MR. LUDWIG:

Yes.

4

THE COURT:

That Mr. Kantor can apply for fees,

5

but whether he gets them we'll see.

He may or may not be

6

the prevailing party.

7

on that point.

8

her refusal to sign caused any breach of contract damages.

There may be a number of arguments

But there is an issue of fact over whether

The second part of the motion is Robert seeks

9

10

surrunary judgment against Sondra on Count One of the

11

existing counterclaim, and in that counterclaim she alleges

12

breach of the Property Settlement Agreement and breach of

13

the second contract between the parties in three

14

particulars; that she has been damaged -- this is

15

she has been damaged by failure of Robert to pay Exhibits

16

A,

17

things, A,

18

That's the debt on the credit cards.

19

B,

C,

E, and F.
B,

C,

(B),

(A), that

Dis intentionally omitted here.

E, and F,

in the amount of $49,731.

she alleges under Paragraph 11.02 under

20

the Property Settlement Agreement that Robert was to

21

provide her with the password to Exclusive Resorts.

22

has been taken care of.

23

Five

And paragraph

excuse me,

Part

(C),

That

she

24

alleges that he was required to transfer half of the

25

airline miles to her and failed to do so.

That's in
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1

Para

21.
Just a couple points I want to address.

2

Her --

3

or neither parties'

rights -- and that's one of the things

4

that I saw in Mr. Ludwig's briefs a couple times is that

5

the rights are fixed as of the filing of the complaint.

6

And now maybe I understand your claim a little bit better.

7

You're saying the requirement that she had to sign was

8

fixed at the time of the complaint.
I would rule -- I'll rule on that as a matter

9

10

of law that the time for her -- or that the obligation for

11

her to sign in order to sell the property did exist and it

12

existed as a matter of law at the time Mr.

13

force her signature.

Kantor filed to

Another sidecar issue here, unclean hands,

14
15

whether that's an equitable defense.

16

defense to an equitable claim.

17

claim for money damages.

18

That's an equitable

That will not work on a

Third observation here is that the answer and

19

counterclaim were not verified.

20

this is -- this has to do with the password information,

21

but it might also have to do with the airline miles,

22

those allegations are not under oath.

23

She alleges -- and I think

With regard to that Part

(C),

that

the airline

24

miles,

25

required to transfer half of the airline miles to her and

the allegations are not sworn to that Mr. Kantor was
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Her answer under oath in the

1

that he failed to do so.

2

deposition is that he has no such obligation.

3

asked her specifically where does it say he has to do that,

4

and she says I can't point to a part.

5

of that where he is obligated to do that.

Mr. Ludwig

There isn't any part

Then the allegation in her affidavit switched

6
7

and says he agreed to cooperate with me in the use of,

8

which is much different than he has an obligation to

9

transfer these miles to me.

She says in her deposition he

10

agreed to cooperate with me in the use of $250,000 award

11

points,

12

restrictions,

13

me,

and she says, quote, he placed unreasonable
close quote,

that's a conclusion.

14

on her ability to use those.
That won't fly.

And she says that he refused to assist me in

15

making travel arrangements.

16

contract.

17

arrangements.

18

To

To me, that's not in the

He has not agreed to assist her in making travel

So Parts

(B)

and

(C),

the Exclusive Resorts and

19

the airline miles,

20

those facets of your breach of contract claim -- or I'll

21

grant summary judgment to Mr. Kantor on both of those

22

facets of the breach of contract claim asserted against him

23

is what I mean.

24
25

I'll grant summary judgment on both of

The failure to pay A, B, C, E, and F; A, E, and
F admittedly should not be in there.

Band Care the
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1

credit card debts to Visa, and -- which is apparently

2

18,000, and approximate

$40,-000 to American Express.

The Property Settlement Agreement says, quote,

3

4

Robert shall pay the following debts,

5

doesn't say when.

close quote.

It

The -- there is a rule of law in Idaho,

6
7

courts have -- or it's an observation,

8

appellate courts that they make from time to time,

9

courts cannot make better contracts for parties than they

10

I guess,

the

of the
is that

make for themselves.
There is no allegation of default.

11

There is no

12

allegation that the creditors have pursued Sondra.

13

is no allegation that Sondra has paid these debts in order

14

to keep the creditors from coming after her or in order to

15

enhance her credit.

16

There

My ruling will be that she is not entitled to a

17

money judgment,

18

credit card debts unless she pays them.

19

the claim,

20

judgment against Mr. Kantor for $49,000,

21

certainly not entitled to a money judgment against him.

22

Theoretically,

23

owe her $49,000 that she could do whatever she wanted with

24

that still doesn't apply to the credit card debts.

25

not really what she's after.

certainly,

against Mr. Kantor for these
She does seek in

I think filed by Mr. Simon, she seeks a money
and she's

if she got a judgment against him,

he would

That's

But she's not entitled to a
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1

money judgment against him for those unless she discharges

2

those debts or pays them.
What she really wants from reading her

3
4

deposition is a,

quote,

determination or agreement as to

5

when these should be paid in full,

6

require the Court to impose a new term into their contract,

7

into the Kantors'

8

Agreement,

contract,

close quote.

That would

the Property Settlement
I cannot do that.

that does not exist.

As to the allegation that it affects her

9

10

credit,

11

equally.

12

contract term into the Property Settlement Agreement.

I'm sure it does.

13

I'm sure it affects his credit

That is not a basis for me to impose a new

And if it, quote, affects her credit,

close

14

quote,

15

Settlement Agreement, how do we know her credit was not

16

affected by the existing $4.5 million debt on the house

17

with a loan value -- with a loan value that might be less

18

than the

19

than the house value.

20

affected simply by the size of these credit card amounts,

21

not necessarily how or why they are being paid.

22

no allegation that I have seen that he is in default and

23

the creditors are coming after her for those debts.

24
25

even if that was a basis to alter the Property

excuse me,

a loan amount that might be less
Or how do we know her credit is not

There is

The size of these debts was existing at the
time of the Property Settlement Agreement.

Her argument is
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that I should make Robert reduce the size of the debts or
make those debts go away sooner than she bargained for.

3

That is not my obligation as a judge to change the contract

4

of the parties.

5

get that in the Property Settlement Agreement.

She did not bargain for that,

nor did she

In my view what she got out of the Property

6

7

Settlement Agreement was a promise from Mr. Kantor to

8

and this is my term, quote,

9

me,

you pay them.

keep those creditors away from

And although she might not like how he's

10

paying them, unless or until it affects her in a new or

11

different way than what it might have affected her simply

12

by their existence at ~he time they signed the Property

13

Settlement Agreement, she has no complaint against

14

Mr. Kantor.

15

In other words, these debts existed at the time

16

of the divorce.

17

credit occurred because of something Mr. Kantor has done or

18

failed to do with regard to these debts,

19

remedy that's envisioned by the Property Settlement

20

Agreement and that might give her some claim.

21

Mr. Kantor,

22

example,

23

this Property Settlement Agreement,

24

happened with regard to these credit card debts,

25

I have a claim,

If the refusal or some effect of her

for example, defaulted.

that might be a

If

If she could show, for

that something new has happened since we signed
something new has

that might state a claim.

therefore,

But simply by
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l

saying my credit is not good because he is not paying these

2

sooner doesn't give her any cause for -- no cause of action

3

against Mr. Kantor.

4

She is trying to impress upon a contract, also,

5

that she is not a party to.

She is trying to impress new

6

conditions on that contract.

7

Mr. Kantor and Visa and Mr. Kantor and/or American Express.

8

She is trying to impress now a condition that he only has a

9

reasonable time to pay those.

That is the contract between

That is not a condition of

10

Mr. Kantor's contracts with Visa or American Express.

11

is trying to imply that into her contract, the Property

12

Settlement Agreement, with Mr. Kantor.

13

She

This is not an unexecuted or unfulfilled

14

contract between Sondra and Robert that she is trying to

15

impress with a new time for payment, meaning if Sondra and

16

Robert had an agreement to,

17

Chevy between them,

18

$5,000 for that car, and the other side said done,

19

contract didn't specify a time for delivery,

20

would imply -- and I'm with you there, Mr. Williams -- a

21

reasonable time for performance,

and the Court would say as

22

between you two,

I can do that.

I can say,

23

reasonable time,

you have to deliver the car or you have to

24

tender payment.

Somebody has to close up this deal.

25

say,

for example, buy or sell a

and the agreement was I'll give you
and the

then the law

yes,

you have a

That is not what this allegation is in their
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1

contract.

Here she is t

2

third party she is point

3

closed-up deal, but I want to imply new conditions on that

4

contract either between Mr. Kantor and Visa and American

5

Express or I want to imply a new condition in our contract,

6

in our Property Settlement Agreement, which is also a

7

closed, completed contract.

to and say

this is a

they have a

So this isn't a case where a Court gets in and

8
9

to say they have -

says this is an unexecuted contract and it needs to get

10

closed up within a reasonable time.

11

executed contracts where the new condition is corning along.

12

Being sought to be impressed is now I want a reasonable

13

time impressed upon what I envision to be closed-up,

14

completed, executed contracts.

15

facet of these that distinguishes them from those contracts

16

where courts get to imply a reasonable time for

17

performance.

18

These are all fully

That's another -- that's a

The property settlement is complete.

19

Mr. Kantor is complying.

20

quickly as Ms. Kantor would like, but there is no act

21

needed to complete any of these contracts.

22

series of events by which Mr. Kantor performs, and they can

23

be performed over a long period of time.

24

that and no one bargained for anything different.

25

bargained for,

Now, he might not be complying as

This is a

There's no bar to
What she

in my view, was a performance by Mr. Kantor
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those creditors away from her,

and unless or until

2

there's some showing that his failure to pay is affect

3

her in a new way, something that was not present at the

4

time of the Property Settlement Agreement,

So I will grant summary judgment to Robert on

5

6

she has no claim.

the existing counterclaim Count One.
Fraud, the amended counterclaim

7

'have

8

already granted summary judgment on the existing fraud

9

claim.

10
11

I'm looking now at the proposed amended

counterclaim,

third claim for relief.

The motion is to bar the filing of the amended

12

counterclaim, the third claim for relief as to fraud,

13

the basis that any amendment is futile or fails to state a

14

claim or on the basis of the clear existing facts,

15

unopposed facts,

16

in the record.

17

this fraud claim,

even if you allow a filing,

18

right back here.

This claim won't fly.

19

on

the

the uncontroverted facts that are already
The claim from Mr.

Kantor's perspective is
we'll be

The allegation in the counterclaim is that

20

Robert made, quote,

certain representations as to his

21

intent regarding the sale, that Sondra relied on his

22

representations and intent,

23

to sell, and that she was induced to go forward with the

24

marriage settlement agreement, the fraud -- excuse me,

25

Property Settlement Agreement, and conclude the marriage.

that he had no present intent

the
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No.

l,

fraud must be pled with particulari

2

There is no false statement alleged with regard to

3

Paragraph 63,

4

activities outside of Rokan Partners.

5

a claim with regard to Rokan Partners.

6

made a false statement or representation to me, which is

7

the very essence,

8

misrepresentation.

just that he intended to conduct his

in my view,

That fails to state
She doesn't say he

of fraud or

There has to be a false statement.

What she is saying is that he intended to

9

10

conduct his activities after we signed this Property

11

Settlement Agreement in a way that's going to benefit him

12

and not me, and that doesn't constitute a basis of fraud.

13

~here has to be a false statement or representation.

14

No. 2,

there has to be a false statement or

15

representation that induces reliance.

16

claim

17

claim or be pled with particularity with regard to the

18

allegation regarding his intent to sell the Golden Eagle

19

property.

20

Property Settlement Agreement.

21

Mr. Williams alluded to this

22

by later conduct or because things didn't work out.

23

It fails to state a

the proposed amended counterclaim fails to state a

Fraud has to exist at the time of entry into the

In other words,

--

You can't show fraud

and

you can't show fraud simply

Sondra has to plead and prove

24

that at the time Robert entered into the property

25

settlement he had an intent to deceive her, and he had to
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1

know then that at a minimum he could not pursue a

2

modification and a short sale at the same time and that

3

this deception caused her damages.
I have already made the determination that he

4
5

did not know or there is no evidence that he knew that

6

pursuing a modification and a short sale at the same time

7

would result in a denial of the allowance of a short sale

8

by Bank of America.

9

There is a -- there is no evidence that his

10

intent to pursue a modification caused her any damages,

11

either.

12

the marriage.

13

a worse position?

She signed the property settlement and got out of

14

Did it cause her any damages?

How is she in

The fraud in the inducement, the claim that I

15

was induced to enter a contract because of a fraudulent

16

statement or misrepresentation doesn't generally give rise

17

to a claim for damages.

18

undoing of a contract.

19

contract but for that statement I relied on, which was

20

false;

21

would mean that the whole Property Settlement Agreement

22

would be undone.

23

damages.

24

part.

25

What it gives rise to is an
I would not have entered this

I want out of this ·deal.

Fraud in the inducement

It wouldn't necessarily give rise to

That's really -- that's just an observation on my

But the allegation is that his alleged
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l

de

ion and his intent to sell caused her to sign the
y Settlement Agreement

And, again,

usually the

3

remedy for that is not that you get to claim money damages,

4

but that you get to undo the contract and start over,

5

that -- I don't see that that's pled as a remedy.

6

know that anyone wants that.
But there is no evidence that Mr.

7

and

I don't

Kantor's

8

intent to pursue a modification caused her any damages.

9

worst,

At

she signed the Property Settlement Agreement and got

10

out of the marriage.

11

don't see how she was in a worse position.

12

fact,

13

negotiated the second deed of trust

14

America to simply eat that.

15

how she is in a worse position by Mr.

16

unquote, not having intent to sell the property.

now I

17

Did it cause her any damages?

I

As a matter of

learn today that Mr. Kantor apparently

--

negotiated Bank of

So it is very difficult to see
Kantor,

quote,

How did the bank's refusal to go through with

18

the short sale harm her?

19

with Mr. Williams.

20

trust apparently at the time of the Property Settlement

21

Agreement and she was exposed to the first deed of trust in

22

the event the property was insufficient to cover the first

23

deed of trust, and that never changed.

24

possibility with regard to the bank and the Golden Eagle

25

property.

And that's the question I raised

She was exposed to the second deed of

The Kantors'

There is not a

interests were joined.

They were
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They are in the same boat.

They both succeed or

1

aligned

2

both fail

3

Mr. Kantor to sell, and that cuts into her fraud claim, also.

any refusal -- or

excuse me, any inability of

It is virtually impossible with regard to

4
5

selling the property for Mr. Kantor to harm Mrs. Kantor

6

without harming himself.

7

difficult for me to see,

8

a claim, how Mr. Kantor could have harmed her if he tried

9

to,

10

So it is extraordinarily
in looking at whether this states

1, avoid a short sale; or, 2,

if he tried to negotiate,

even secretly, a loan modification.

He could not do either

of those things.
12

If he was successful -- let me put it this way.

1 ~
.L.)

It had to benefit Mr. Kantor.

14

those things successfully without benefiting her.

15

my view,

16

in the inception, you get the contract undone, and the

17

parties would be going back to Square 1.

18

He could not do either of

it fails to state a claim.

Again,

So,

in

if it's fraud

Finally, she is saying in her new proposed

19

counterclaim that he had no intention to do what he agreed

20

to do and factually that he tried to do.

In fact,

21

her to get her contract -- or, excuse me,

to get her to

22

sign her contract to perform her end of the same contract.

23

So the facts belie any assertion that Mr. Kantor was not

24

interested in selling.

25

The facts,

in fact,

he sued

looking the other way point
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to sell the prope

to Mr. Kantor t
2

against Ms. Kantor t

3

sell the property.

4

fraud.
Again,

5

'

suit

fil

to get her signature in order to
The facts belie her assertions of

fraud has to be proven by clear and

6

convincing evidence.

7

particularity.

8

what's alleged.

9

sell and that a non-sale was not in his interest.

10

It has to be alleged with

And the evidence shows to the contrary of
It shows,

in fact,

he made every effort to

A modification might also have been in his

11

interest, but that modification had to be and,

12

would have been in her interest as well if he succeeded.

13

So there is just no way that Robert's pursuit of a

14

modification could be fraudulent as to her.

15

his intent was to go through with the sale as he promised

16

to do.

17

in fact,

The facts show

I'm going to deny the motion to amend the claim

18

of fraud.

19

I'm going to deny the motion to amend the claim of fraud as

20

to the proposed amended counterclaim.

If filed,

it would simply be dismissed again.

21

I hope I've covered it.

22

Do either of you have any questions?

23

24
25

Is there

anything I left uncovered?
MR. LUDWIG:

I think the last allegation in the

amended counterclaim regarding breach of Paragraph 5.01 as
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1

to whether Mr
sel

Kantor had failed to use a reasonab e -

within a reasonable time,

or

I don't know whether that's

3

still alive or not, Mr. Williams can answer that, because

4

the Court hadn't addressed that.
THE COURT:

5

Well,

I thought that was the last

6

thing you said when you sat down was, no,

7

can file that.
MR. LUDWIG:

8
9

10

Right.

I apologize.

I

didn't hear that, but I can assume that the Court would
grant that part of the motion to amend.

11
12

Okay.

I concede, they

THE COURT:

He can make that claim and we'll go

from there.

13

A reasonable time is a jury question.

It's a

14

question of fact ordinarily.

15

susceptible to summary judgment ordinari

16

doesn't mean you can't get here on summary judgment, but

17

that's not one I'm prepared to address at this point.

18

MR. LUDWIG:

Judge,

just one point of

clarification that may matter, it may not matter.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. WILLIAMS:

Go ahead.
The -- well,

23

inquire,

24

counterclaim except as to fraud?

25

I mean, that

Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS:

20

It's not something that's

first,

if I can

so the Court is allowing the amended answer and

THE COURT:

Yes.

That's what your motion was;
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1

am I correct?
MR. LUDWIG:

2
3

fraud,

4

was.

His motion was pertaining to the

which wasn't granted, and the contract claim, which

5

Is there another third part to that?

6

MR. WILLIAMS:

Well,

the reason I ask,

7

Honor,

8

to its finding on the air miles,

9

relying on the language of the Property Settlement

10

Your

is as I understood what the Court was explaining as
for instance,

it was

Agreement.

11

The amended complaint includes a claim for

12

breach of contract regarding the air miles,

13

relate to the Property Settlement Agreement.

14

the parties' subsequent agreement,

15

Mr.

but it doesn't
It relates to

which changed

Kantor's obligations with regard to the air miles.

16

THE COURT:

Okay.

What I've said with regard

17

to the air miles is going to stick insofar as what I've

18

looked at.

19

to transfer the miles to her.

20

obligation or fair dealing requirement that he assist in

21

that,

22

my -- or he's frustrated my ability to use them,

23

that stand.

She said in her deposition he had no obligation
Whether there's a good faith

if that's your claim, that he hasn't assisted in

24

Is that what you're --

25

MR. WILLIAMS:

Well,

yeah,

I ' l l let

because the new
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r 26th agreement

which

s

1

claim related to the S

2

several times in the record but also at the beginning of

3

the case, Exhibit D to Mr. Kantor's affidavit in support of

4

motion for temporary restraining order.

5

there had already been a dispute over these air miles, and

6

the parties tried to work it out through this -- or tried

7

at least to modify it in this September 26, 2012,

8

subsequent agreement.
THE COURT:

9

That agreement --

Let me put it this way.

Paragraph

10

49 of your amended answer and counterclaim says,

11

to the agreement, counterdefendant has placed unreasonable

12

restrictions on the ability of counterplaintiff to utilize

13

these award points."
That will stand.

14
15

You can file that.

MR. WILLIAMS:

17

THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

Thank you.

But insofar as I have ruled

18

on things like some of these points,

19

change my rulings.
MR. LUDWIG:

20

THE COURT:

23

MR. LUDWIG:

25

I'm not going to

I understand the difference, Your

Honor --

22

24

We'll

take that up at a time later time.

16

21

"Contrary

Okay.
between the summary judgment on

the miles allegation in the counterclaim and the new -THE COURT:

If you need to, you can get a
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or review what I've said.

I hope that it's

1

transc

2

clear.

3

say the Court granted A motion or B motion for the reasons

4

stated by the Court on the record, and then I ' l l leave it

5

to you two to keep in mind what that was.

S

y,

if you need to,

6

MR. LUDWIG:

7

MR. WILLIAMS:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. LUDWIG:

you can keep it short and

All right.

Thank you.

Thank you.

Anything else?
That's it.

10

MR. WILLIAMS:

11

THE COURT:

12

We'll be in recess.

13

(WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded at

14

I don't believe so.

Okay.

Thank you.

12:52 p.m.)

15
16

17
18

19
20
21
22
23

24
25
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Jolynn Drage, Cieri< District
Court BlairJ51~ty, ldah£.__

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Case No. CV-2012-734

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

VS.

SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/
COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO AMEND

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

The Court, having before it Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for Leave to Amend its
Answer and Counterclaim, having considered the briefs and submissions of the parties and
having heard oral argument on June 24, 2013, and for the reasons explained by the Court on the
record at hearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for Leave to
Amend is granted, with the exception of the Third Claim for Relief of Defendant/
Counterclaimant's proposed Counterclaim for fraud.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO AMEND - Page l
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JUDGE ROBERT J. ELGEE
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I hereby certify that on this
day of
2013, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served upon opposing counsel as indicated below:
Scot M. Ludwig
Daniel A. Miller
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP
209 Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

_ _ Via Hand Delivery
Via Facsimile: 208-387-1999
Via U.S. Mail

Daniel E. Williams
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP
121 N. 9th Street, Suite 300
Boise, Idaho 83702

Via Hand Delivery
Via Facsimile: 208-345-7894
Via U.S. Mail

Deputy Clerk of the Court

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND - Page 2
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Boise, ID
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208)345-7894
danw(@,thomaswilliamslaw.com

Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine Coun Idaho

Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,

Case No. CV-2012-734
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

AMENDED ANSWER
AND COUNTERCLAIM

vs.
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

Defendant, by and through her attorney of record, for her Amended Answer and
Counterclaim, answers Plaintiffs Complaint as follows:
1.

Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiffs Complaint not

specifically admitted herein.
2.

Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs I, and 3-6, of Plaintiff's

Complaint.

AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 1
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the allegations

3.

9, 10, l, l

I3, 5, I

8
4.

Defendant admits that the parties acquired a home at 265 Golden Eagle Drive, that

Bank of America has secured liens against said property, that the underlying indebtedness is in
default, that the property has been on the market, that there have been contract offers to purchase,
but is without sufficient knowledge as to the balance of the allegations set forth in paragraph 2 of
Plaintiffs Complaint, and therefore denies the same.
5.

Defendant is without sufficient knowledge as to the allegations set forth in

paragraph 7 and therefore denies the same.
6.

Defendant admits that said property was under contract with prospective buyers as

alleged in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint, but the specific sale referenced in paragraph 8
was not approved by Bank of America.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted against
Defendant.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That, by reason of the conduct of Plaintiff, his agents and/or employees, Plaintiff has
failed to mitigate damages.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That, by reason of the conduct of Plaintiff, his agents and/or employees, Plaintiff is
estopped to complain of any of the acts or omissions on the part of Defendant.
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FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
his agents

reason
waived any rights or claims against Defendant.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That, by reason of the conduct of Plaintiff, his claims are barred by the doctrines oflaches
and "unclean hands."

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That, by reason of the conduct of Plaintiff, his claims are barred by misrepresentation and
fraud.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That Plaintiff's claims are barred in whole or in part by novation.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That Plaintiff's claims are barred in whole or in part by accord and satisfaction.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That Plaintiff has not suffered any economic loss or other damages by reason of any
conduct on the part of Defendant.

JURY DEMAND
Defendant demands a trial by jury on all appropriate issues.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff take nothing by reason of his Complaint;

2.

That Defendant have judgment for costs of suit incurred herein;

AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 3
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pursuant

be

2I,

as

as on

of the

Settlement Agreement (if28.03);

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNTERCLAIM
Defendant/Counterclaimant Sondra Louise Kantor, by and through her attorney of record,
for her Counterclaim against Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Robert Aron Kantor, hereby complains
and alleges as follows:
1.

All jurisdictional requirements for filing in the District Court are satisfied.

2.

That, at all relevant times, the parties both have been residents of Blaine County,

3.

That the parties own multiple parcels ofreal property within Blaine County,

Idaho.

Idaho, including without limitation by specification, parcels as set forth in the attached Schedule
of Real Estate attached hereto and incorporated by reference as "Exhibit A."
4.

That those parcels ofreaLproperty in Blaine County, Idaho, as set forth in "Exhibit

A" are owned, either in whole or part, by the parties herein, and held in a variety of different
entities, including without limitation by specification, and upon information and belief the
following: individually as tenants in common, limited liability companies, corporations, joint
ventures, general and limited partnerships, and trusts.
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5.

directly

That
of

parcel

located in Blaine County, Idaho, as set forth in "Exhibit A".
6.

That the Counterdefendant herein was integrally involved in, structured, formed,

operated, and participated in the management of each and every entity which owns and operates
the parcels of real property listed in "Exhibit A" herein.
7.

That the Counterdefendant has a law degree, a tax background, and has an

extensive background and experience in real estate development, sales, operation, and
management.
8.

That the Counterdefendant has intrinsic knowledge of the operation, management,

cash flow, expenses, balance sheets, general ledgers, profit and loss statements, net earnings
and/or losses of each parcel of real property listed in "Exhibit A."
9.

That, on or about April 24, 2012, the parties hereto entered into a Property

Settlement Agreement ("PSA" Exhibit B to Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of TRO), which
agreement sets forth the rights and obligations of the parties hereto in respect to all real property
and the entities holding title to the same.
10.

That the parties hereto have an interest in numerous business enterprises, some of

which have an ownership interest in the real property as set forth in Exhibit A, and those entities
include, without limitation by specification the following: KF, LLC; Rokan Partners; Century
Trust; Rokan Corporation; Rokan Ventures; Rokan Park Group; Rokan Property Services MIP,
LLC; Kantor Family, LLC (CO); Sage Cliff, LLC; HK Marine, LLC, Eastman Investors, LP; RV
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L,

1.

·RV

That all of the incorporations, formations, preparations, and negotiations of all

entities in which the parties herein have an ownership interest, and all agreements between
numerous known and unknown entities is within the actual knowledge of the Counterdefendant
12.

That all of the entities were created by the Counterdefendant, or upon his

instructions and request, and inclusion, including Rokan Partners, which is a major holder andior
operator of the parties real estate holdings, and business entities.
13.

That Rokan Partners is managed by Rokan Corporation, that the Counterdefendant

is the President of Rokan Corporation (12.11 PSA), and that Rokan Partners and/or the
Counterdefendant is integrally involved in the management, and operation of all of the entities
that have some ownership interest in the parcels of real property set forth in Exhibit A, as well as
the other business interests identified in the "PSA."
14.

That in accordance with the "PSA" (12.11) Counterclaimant was to be paid the

first $6,000.00 available, with the next $6,000.00 available to the Counterdefcndant, and
thereafter the next $4,000.00 available was to be paid to the Counterclaimant and
Countcrdefendant respectively.
15.

That in accordance with the "PSA" (if2. l 5) Counterclaimant is to be provided with

all "reports, monthly ledgers, or general ledgers of Rokan Partners."
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16.

not

same as

the parties' "PSA."
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Contract/Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)

17.

Counterclaimant incorporates paragraphs 1 through 16 above.

I 8.

That the parties entered into the Property Settlement Agreement or PSA

referenced above for valuable consideration and the PSA set forth the rights, duties and
obligations of the parties.
265 Golden Eagle Drive

19.

As set forth in Defendant's Amended Answer above, pursuant to the PSA the

parties' property at 265 Golden Eagle Drive in Blaine County, Idaho, was to be "sold as soon as
reasonably possible" (if5.01).
20.

In September, 2012, the parties entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement

(Exhibit C to Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of TRO) with prospective buyers ("the Augusts")
for a short-sale transaction with a purchase price of $2.4 million.
21.

The September, 2012, short-sale agreement between the parties and the Augusts

was contingent on approval by Bank of America, as the lender to the parties.
22.

In October, 2012, the parties entered into an extension agreement with the

Augusts, which, inter alia, provided more time for the parties to obtain "written short sale lender
approval."
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it would
2

24.

In February, 2013, the parties entered into another Purchase and Sale Agreement

with the Augusts (Exhibit B attached hereto) with a closing date of June 15, 2013 or sooner. The
purchase price was $2.4 million. Short-sale approval by the lender was also required. According
to an Addendum to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the purchase price was raised to
$2,402,700.00 (Exhibit C attached hereto).
25.

On or about March 29, 2013, Bank of America notified the parties that the

February short-sale transaction with the Augusts was approved, based on certain conditions
including a sales price of $2,402,700.00 (Exhibit D attached hereto). Bank of America indicated
that the estimated amount of the parties' deficiency was $1,438,263.41, but that entire amount
would be waived and the "estimated amount of this deficiency you will be responsible for is
$0.00."
26.

On April 4, 2013, however, Bank of America notified the parties' agent that the

previously approved short-sale transaction with the Augusts was declined, for the reason that
"Homeowner Wants Modification" (Exhibit E attached hereto).
27.

Bank of America indicated that it would not simultaneously pursue a short sale

and a loan modification.
28.

All along, despite the language of the PSA requiring the house to be sold,

Counterdefendant had been attempting to obtain a loan modification from Bank of America,
which would allow him to retain ownership of the property.
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not pursue a loan
a

sale

f'ASntllrllJF>/'i

to

and continues to seek a loan modification.
30.

Counterdefendant's efforts to pursue a loan modification, which caused Bank of

America to cancel the previously approved short-sale to the Augusts, constitute a breach of the
PSA's requirement that the property be sold.
31.

As a direct and proximate result of Counterdefendant' s breach, Counterclaimant is

left exposed to the deficiency estimated by Bank of America to be $1,438,263.41 and is damaged
in a similar way as to that alleged by Plaintiff/Counterdefendant in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 16, 18,
and 20 of his original Complaint in this action.
Rokan Ventures
32.

Counterclaimant incorporates paragraphs 1 through 31 above.

33.

When the PSA was entered into, Rokan Partners was the principal entity by which

Counterclaimant would realize any benefit from her community interest in the parties' business
activities during their marriage through her 44% ownership in Rokan Partners.
34.

When the PSA was entered into, Rokan Partners owned 25% of another entity

called Rokan Ventures.
35.

The PSA required of Counterdefendant that "[a]ny new commercial real estate

syndications or other commercial real estate activities that Robert intends to, or does, become
involved in shall be done in Rokan Ventures" (f/16.02).
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36.
estate

37.

On or about January I, 2013, Counterdefendant caused Rokan Partner's interest in

Rokan Ventures to be sold for $41,675.48 in cash, along with other consideration.
38.

Counterdefendant continues to pursue commercial real estate activities for

compensation, but together with the sale ofRokan Partner's interest in Rokan Ventures, he does
so in such a way as to defeat the purposes of paragraph 16.02 of the PSA. Counterdefendant's
conduct includes, but is not limited to characterizing his ongoing commercial real estate activities
as personal consulting, for which Rokan Partners receives no benefit.
39.

Counterdefendant's conduct constitutes a breach of the PSA and/or a breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
40.

As a direct and proximate result of Counterdefendant' s breaches, Counterclaimant

is damaged in amounts to be proven at trial.
Credit Cards
41.

Counterclaimant incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40 above.

42.

Pursuant to the parties' PSA, Counterdefendant was assigned debts representing

two credit cards that were in Counterclaimant's name: a Bank of America Visa with a balance of
$18,000 and a Bank of America AmEx with a balance of$40,000.
43.

Since the PSA was entere? into, Counterdefendant has made only minimum

interest payments on the two debts and did not provide even that payment for April, 2013.
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PSA may

44 .
to pay
45.

full,

as to

Counterdefendant is

a

Counterdefendant has breached the PSA by not paying these credit card debts

within a reasonable time, by not providing the April, 2013 payment and by not providing any
assurances of when these debts might reasonably be paid in full. In the alternative,
Counterdefendant's actions and omissions constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
46.

As a direct result of Counterdefendant's actions and omissions, Counterclaimant

has been damaged in her credit and remains liable for the current total amounts on both credit
card debts. As a further direct result, she is unable to use these credit cards and unable to obtain
other forms of credit, including but not limited to other credit cards, store credit accounts or lines
of credit
Air Miles

4 7.

Counterclaimant incorporates paragraphs 1 through 46 above.

48.

Pursuant to a subsequent agreement between the parties after entering the PSA

(Exhibit D to Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support ofTRO), Counterdefendant was required to
cooperate with Counterclaimant in the use of 250,000 points from a Wells Fargo account in
Counterdefendant's name(, 3).
49.

Contrary to the agreement, Counterdefendant has placed unreasonable restrictions

on the ability of Counterplaintiff to utilize these award points in breach of the agreement and the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
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50.
uses

assets.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty/Accounting)
5 I.

Counterclaimant incorporates paragraphs 1 through 50 above.

52.

That, based upon the operation and management of Rokan Partners and the other

entities set forth in the parties' PSA, there exists a fidiciary relationship between
Counterclaimant and Counterdefendant.
53.

That Counterdefendant's fiduciary duty includes the duty of good faith and fair

dealing, to hold as trustee any property, profit or benefit derived by Counterdefendant, and to
account to the company and its members, as set forth in, inter alia, Sections 30-6-409 and 30-6410, Idaho Code.
54.

That Counterdefendant also has a duty based upon the parties' PSA to disclose to

Counterdefendant the finances of their jointly held assets, including but not limited to the cash
flow, expenses, balance sheets, general ledgers, profit and loss statements, net earning and/or
losses, tax returns, and such other financial information, which will verify the.disbursements, or
lack thereof, to Counterclaimant and the financial status of the various entities.
55.

That Counterclaimant is entitled to a reasonable accounting from Rokan Partners,

and all of the entities set forth in the PSA.

56.

That Counterdefendant has access to all financial information of the entities set

forth in the PSA.
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many

accounts
at

are

direction, supervision and control of Counterdefendant.
58.

That, based on the foregoing, Counterdefendant should be required to account to

Counterclaimant and provide all relevant information.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Fraud in the inducement)
(Denied by order of the Court dated August 8, 2013)

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
59.

Defendant/Counterclaimant has been required to retain legal counsel to prosecute

her claims and is entitled to recover her reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred in this
matter pursuant to Rule 54, I.R.C.P., as well as Sections 12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Code, as well
as on the basis of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement (ri28.03).

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimant prays for judgment on all counts as follows:
I.

For an Order compelling Counterdefendant to provide a full and complete
accounting;

2.

For injunctive relief from this Court requiring Counterdefendant to abandon his
ongoing efforts to pursue a loan modification with Bank of America and take all
necessary steps to close on the previously approved short-sale with the Augusts,
as well as any further appropriate injunctive relief;
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money

4.

amounts

any enrian,cea

For costs of suit and reasonable attorneys fees, based on the provisions stated
above;

5.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

JURY DEMAND

Counterclaimant..t-ands a trial by jury on all appropriate issues.
DATED this~ day of August, 2

3.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

0,

on this
~ y of August,
3, a true
correct
"l","'"'f', instrument was served upon opposing counsel as indicated below:
Scot M. Ludwig
Daniel A. Miller
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP
209 Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

v<.

Hand Delivery
Via Facsimile: 208-387-1999
Via U.S. Mail

\

Daniel E. Williams
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I

ORIGINAL

Boise, ID 83701-1776
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw(althornaswilliamslaw.corn

AUG O9 2013
JoLynn Drags, Clerlc District
Court Blaine Coun Idaho

Attorneys for Defendant/
Counterclaimant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
VS.

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV- 2012-734

)

SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,
Defendant/Counterclairnant.

)
)
)
)

DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

Defendant/Counterclairnant Sondra Louise Kantor, by and through her counsel of record,
pursuant to Rule 65( e ), l.R.C.P ., hereby moves this Court for its order enjoining Plaintiff/
Counterdefendant from taking any further actions with regard to a loan modification on the
parties' real property located in Blaine County, Idaho, and to require him to cooperate fully in
consummating an already-agreed short-sale by the end of 2013.
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Motion, Sondra Kantor

on

Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Affidavit of Daniel

Williams in Support of

Motion for Preliminary Injunction, all filed concurrently.
()~
DATED this .:::.L day of August, 2013.

Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant

C~~CA
OF
TSERVICE
~E
I hereby certify that on this 1_ day of
the foregoing instrument was served upon opposing c

, 2013, a true and correct copy of
nsel as indicated below:

Scot M. Ludwig
Daniel A. Miller
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP
209 Main Streeet
Boise, ID 83702

~Hand Delivery
Via Facsimile: 208-387-1999
Via U.S. Mail

Daniel E. Williams
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ORIGINAL

FILED ~·:: u.~. ~

Boise, ID 83701-1776
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

t....

AUG O9 2013
JoLynn D~ge, Cieri. District
Court Blaine Countv. Idaho

Attorneys for Defendant/
Counterclaimant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT; ARON Ki\NTOR,

)

l

J

)

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

)

Case No. CV- 2012-734

)

vs.
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

INTRODUCTION
By her Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Sondra Kantor asks this Court to require
Robert Kantor to perform a contractual obligation he freely agreed to. During the parties'
divorce proceedings, Mr. Kantor agreed that their substantial residence in Blaine County would
"be sold as soon as reasonably possible." Such a sale was negotiated, scheduled to close and
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resulting

almost $1.5

with no

tax cor1sec:me:nci::s
continued to seek a loan modification that would allow him to remain in the house and sell it at
some future, undetermined date. While Mr. Kantor remains in the house and fails to make any
payments, the deficiency owed by Sondra Kantor jointly and severally continues to grow. For
several reasons outlined below, she is entitled to injunctive relief from this Court to compel
Robert Kantor to fulfill his obligations.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
On or about April 25, 2012, the parties entered into a Property Settlement Agreement 1
("PSA") as part of their divorce proceedings. Among other things, the PSA provided that the
parties' property at 265 Golden Eagle Drive in Blaine County, Idaho ("the Golden Eagle
property"), was to be "sold as soon as reasonably possible"(, 5.01). In September, 2012 the
parties entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with prospective buyers ("the Augusts") for a
short-sale transaction with a purchase price of $2.4 million (Robert Kantor Affidavit: Exhibit C).
In October, 2012, the parties entered into an extension agreement with the Augusts, which
provided more time for the parties to obtain "written short sale lender approval." 2 In November,
2012, however, the parties' lender, Bank of America "cancelled" the short-sale with the Augusts,
based on the lack of an appraisal (Robert Kantor Deposition: Exhibit A) and the September

Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Robert Kantor of October 11, 2012.
2

Exhibit C to the Deposition of Robert Aron Kantor of May 15, 2013 ("Robert
Kantor Deposition"), which is attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Daniel E. Williams in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of June 11, 2013.
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and Sale Agreement expired.
13,

a

new

with the Augusts (Robert Kantor Deposition: Exhibit D). According to an Addendum to this
Purchase and Sale Agreement with the Augusts, the sales price was $2,402,700.00 (Robert
Kantor Deposition: Exhibit G). On or about March 29, 2013, Bank of America notified the
parties that the short-sale set forth in the February Purchase and Sale Agreement was approved
(Robert Kantor Deposition: Exhibit E). Bank of America indicated that the estimated amount of
the parties' deficiency was $1,438,263.4'1, but that the entire amount would be waived: the
"estimated amount of this deficiency you will be responsible for is $0.00." Id.
Previously, a second Home Equity indebtedness of approximately $1,000,000.00 secured

by the Golden Eagle property, also with Bank of America, had been forgiven. At the last hearing
in this matter, Mr. Kantor's counsel tried to assert that Mr. Kantor was somehow responsible for
this development:
Well, after the divorce, Mr. Kantor rolled up his sleeves,
facing huge liability, and convinced B of A to release the
second entirely. That's in the record, $1.l million, poof,
of liability. And we know seconds don't go away.
THE COURT: Was that done? That did, in fact,
happen?
MR. LUDWIG: Yes. I know, it's amazing, but he
did this subsequent to the divorce, and that saved her
$550,000 of potential liability. 3

3

See, Transcript of Hearing held June 24, 2013, p. 32, 11. 6-14, attached as Exhibit
A to the Affidavit of Daniel E. Williams in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed
concurrently.
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according to the relevant form letter provided to Robert and Sondra Kantor by Bank of America, 4
was that the Home Equity loan qualified "for participation in a principal forgiveness program
offered as a result of the Department of Justice and State Attorneys General national settlement
with major mortgage servicers, including Bank of America, N.A." Acceptance of this
forgiveness was automatic. Id.
Thus, because of the forgiveness of the second Horne Equity debt of $1,000,000.00,
together with Bank of America's approval of the short-sale without seeking any deficiency, the
transaction with the Augusts would fulfill the PSA's requirement that the Golden Eagle property
be sold as soon as reasonably possible and assure zero continuing exposure to the Kantors for a
deficiency.
On or about April 4, 2013, however, Bank of America notified the parties' agent that the
previously approved February short-sale transaction with the Augusts was declined, for the
reason that "Homeowner Wants Modification" (Robert Kantor Deposition: ,Exhibit F). Despite
the clear language of the PSA that the property would be "sold as soon as reasonably possible,"
Plaintiff Robert Kantor had been attempting all along to obtain a loan modification from Bank of
America, which would allow him to retain possession of the property (Robert Kantor Deposition:
Exhibit A and p. 20, LL 5-7). Bank of America indicated that it would not allow a borrower to

4

Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Sondra Kantor in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, filed concurrently. Subsequent references to this pleading are cited to "Sondra
Kantor Affidavit" by paragraph or exhibit number.
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simultaneously a short-sale and a loan modification
p.

to

as a

Kantor

any

Exhibit A
to

continue to reside at the Golden Eagle property for one year prior to any subsequent, potential
sale. 5
Despite learning this information, Mr. Kantor continues to seek a loan modification and
has caused a closing on the approved short-sale with the Augusts not to occur. According to the
Augusts' agent, as of July I 8, 2013, the Augusts were still willing to complete the transaction
within the next 90 days, but sought written confirmation from Mr. Kantor that his loan
modification efforts were terminated and that "all efforts will now be refocused on short selling
the property to [the Augusts]."6 To Sondra Kantor's knowledge, Mr. Kantor failed to provide
such written confirmation by the requested date of August 1, 2013. 7
According to Sondra Kantor's credit report from Equifax as of 7/30/13, 8 the balance due
on Golden Eagle property is $3,345,100.00. Monthly payments are $14,007.00. The amount
past due is $308,109.00. Obviously, each month that goes by, while Mr. Kantor continues to
reside at the Golden Eagle property without making monthly payments, Sondra Kantor' s joint
and several exposure for the deficiency increases.

Affidavit of Daniel

Williams. ,i 2.

Sondra Kantor Affidavit, Exhibit B.
Sondra Kantor Affidavit, ,i 2.
Sondra Kantor Affidavit, Exhibit C.
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ARGUMENT

Sondra Kantor is entitled to Injunctive Relief to
timely short-sale of the Golden Eagle property.

to

According to Rule 65( e), a preliminary injunction may be granted under certain
circumstances, inter alia:
( 1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period
or perpetually.
***
(3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens,
or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of
the plaintift's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
Sondra Kantor makes the requisite showing to obtain such injunctive relief under Rule 65(e).
1.

The standard under Rule 65(e).

Real property and real property transactions are often the subject of preliminary injunctive
relief. See, generally, Jacklin Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV, Inc., 151 Idaho 242 (2011); Walker v.

Boozer, 140 Idaho 451 (Idaho 2004). "Whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is a
matter for the discretion of the trial court." Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451,454 (2004),

quoting, Brady v. City of Homedale, 130 Idaho 569, 572, 944 P.2d 704, 707 (1997). They key is
whether a party is doing or threatening to do some act in violation of the plaintiffs rights tending
to render an eventual judgment ineffectual under Rule 65(e)(3).
An injunction will issue to temporarily restrain an act which will result in great damage to
the plaintiff although the injury is not irreparable, and although other remedies by way of
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are open to the plaintiff

V.

0 Idaho

(

10 Idaho
the mere existence of a legal remedy is not of itself a sufficient ground for
refusing an injunction. For the existence of a legal remedy to bar the denial of
injunctive relief, it must appear that the legal remedy is as practical and efficient
to secure the ends of justice and its prompt administration as injunctive relief.

Sams v. Goff 208 W. Va. 315 (W. Va. 1999).
In considering whether an eventual legal remedy might be sufficient, courts do not
suddenly become blind to the real-world situation of the parties. The Seventh Circuit, for
example, explained its decision to vacate a district court's refusal to issue injunctive relief and to
remand "with instructions to craft appropriate equitable relief with dispatch" as follows:
The court's final reason fails to take account of the limits on Robinson's wealth.
The judge wrote that, if Robinson fails to honor his contractual obligations, 'the
damage could be very large, given ttie nature of the industry involved and the
length of the revenue-generating relationship with customers' but could be
calculated, so that a financial remedy would be adequate. Ability to calculate
damages does not make that remedy adequate, however, if the plaintiff cannot
collect the award. A judgment-proof defendant is not deterred by the threat of
money damages, so some other remedy (such as the contempt power) may be
essential. Nothing in the record suggests that Robinson would be good for "very
large" damages.

Lakeview Tech., Inc. v. Robinson, 446 F.3d 655, 657-658 (7th Cir. 2006).
Similarly, in Aviara Parkway Farms, Inc. v. Agropecuaria La Finca, S.P.R. de R.L., 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7173 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009), the district court explained its preliminary
injunction:
The court's preliminary findings also indicate legal remedies would be inadequate
to Plaintiffs and they would suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief.
First, Finca's allegedly tenuous financial position and status as a Mexican
organization may thwart any attempts to recover a potential monetary award. See
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'

.

Inc. v. Robinson, 446 F.3d
(7th
2006)
judgment-proof defendant is not deterred by the threat money damages, so
addition,
some
(such as the contempt power) may be essential.
even where goods appear fungible, injunctive relief is appropriate where monetary
damages are uncertain. See Ross-Simons ofWanvick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102
F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1996) (where a plaintiff suffers ''substantial injury that is not
accurately measurable or adequately compensable by money damages, irreparable
harm is a natural sequel').
2.

Sondra Kantor has a con~ractual right, which is threatened by Mr. Kantor's
ongoing conduct, and an eventual legal remedy is inadequate.

Here, under the parties' PSA, Sondra Kantor has a contractual right that the Golden Eagle
property be "sold as soon as reasonably possible." That right is fulfilled by the bank-approved
short-sale to the Augusts with a zero deficiency, but her right has been and continues to be
violated by Mr. Kantor's loan modificatiop efforts. At the last hearing, this Court opined that,
since the interests of the parties coincide,,Mr. Kantor cannot damage Sondra Kantor without
damaging himself. Unfortunately, that is no guarantee ofreasonable behavior. Mr. Kantor is
free to play fast and loose with his own credit and debt obligations, but the PSA requires him not
to do so with Sondra Kantor's. The parties' interests are not perfectly aligned, for while Mr.
Kantor continues to live in a 12,000 square foot house without making payments to the bank,
Sondra Kantor's exposure on the indebtedness continues and increases every passing day. Mr.
Kantor freely bound himself in the PSA to effect a sale as soon as reasonably possible and should
be enjoined from further efforts to procure a loan modification.
Further, as set forth in the authority cited above, should Sondra Kantor become liable to
Bank of America on a deficiency, Mr. Kantor does not have the means by which to pay damages
for breach of the PSA. As the PSA itself demonstrates, the parties' marital assets consisted
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estate

ventures.

was not awarded any substantial property, but only retained her interest in Rokan Partners, LLP

(,r 2), plus Mr. Kantor's promise to conduct his ongoing real estate activities through Rokan
Ventures, LLC

(i! 16.2), which_was owned (until recently) by Rokan Partners.

Mr. Kantor cannot

show this Court that he has the liquid assets available to pay a large damage award for his breach
of the PSA. Moreover, at the time of trial in January, 2014, if the Golden Eagle property has still
not been sold, it may not be possible to calculate the extent of Sondra Kantor's eventual
damages. This inability renders her dam.ages not "accurately measurable" or "adequately
compensable," so as to make injunctive relief the only viable remedy available to her.

3.

The clock is ticking.

If all of the above reasons were not enough, there is the added consideration of time.
Passed originally in 2007, the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act, P.L. 110-42 ("the Act"),
expires January 1, 2014. The Act amended 26 U .S.C. § 108(h)( l ), inter alia, to make mortgage
debt forgiveness on a principal residence not count as taxable income. While Mr. Kantor
continues to pursue a loan modification and frustrates any short-sale to the Augusts, the clock is
running out on taking advantage of the Act. Failure to accomplish the closing of the short-sale
by the end of the year would cost the parties dearly in extra taxes on any future debt forgiveness
by means of either a modification or short-sale. Mr. Kantor simply may not run these enormous
risks when he has obligated himself to cooperate in a sale as soon as reasonably possible.

DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, P. 9
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CONCLUSION
that this
Robert Kantor from taking any further actions with regard to a loan modification and to
cooperate fully in consummating the already agreed short-sale with the Augusts by the end of
2013.

a~

DATED t h i s l day of August, 2013.
HOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK,

)
Daniel E. Williams
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 9-_~y of August, 2013, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served upon opposing counsel as indicated below:

Scot M. Ludwig
Daniel A. Miller
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP
209 Main Streeet
Boise, ID 83702

~ H a n d Delivery
Via Facsimile: 208-387-1999
Via U.S. Mail

Daniel E. Williams

DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MEMORA.NDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, P. 10
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OR\G\NAL

Boise, ID 83701-1776
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

AUG O9 2013
~r,nn Dr_age, Clerk District
vuurt Blame Coun Idaho

Attorneys for Defendant/
Counterclaimant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

)
)
)
)

VS.

)

)

SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Blaine

)
)
)

Case No. CV- 2012-734

AFFIDAVIT OF SONDRA
KANTOR IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

)
)ss.
)

SONDRA KANTOR, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says.
I.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a document I received on Bank

of America stationery regarding the forgiveness of the home equity line of credit on the Golden

AFFIDAVIT OF SONDRA KANTOR IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION, P. 1
0
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2.

as

B is

true

correct copy

I

a

i

on

stationery dated July 18, 2013, from the Buyers' agent representinJ the Augusts' regarding the
i

(

short-sale of the Golden Eagle property. To my knowledge, RoberyKantor did not provide the
i

requested written confirmation that loan modification efforts are tenninated and that all efforts
I

would be refocused on short selling to Buyers.

I

3.

Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of tin Equifax credit report I
l

obtained online current as of 7/30/2013.
i

~~~~
Sondra Louise! Kantor
I

0\

Subscribed and sworn to before me this - - day of August,I 2013.

!

~\C)~
Notary Public lfor Idaho

Residing a t : ~ ~ b
My C o ~ i s s ~ : ~

:::L=-...Q:a,o..

I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

;;\4:>-

I hereby certify that on thiV_!_ day of August, 2013, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served upon opposing counsel as indicated below:
Scot M. Ludwig
Daniel A. Miller
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP
209 Main Streeet
Boise, ID 83 702

VVia Hand Delivery
Via Facsimile: 208-387-1
Via U.S. Mail

AFFIDAVIT OF SONDRA. KANTOR IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
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Robert A Kantor
Sondra F Kantor
265 S GOLDEN EAGLE DRIVE
ID 83333-0000

FvBa':ire li~~r~i;i,6Tf6r·,a•:tu11···.·.·
principal forgiveness of your
Home Equity Account.

Account Number: 68220136813699

Dear Robert A Kantor and Sondra F Kantor:
We are pleased to inform you that we have approved your Home Equity account for participation in a principal
forgiveness program offered as a result of the Department of Justice and State Attorneys General national settlement
with major mortgage servicers, including Bank of America, N.A.

You will receive a full forgiveness of the remaining principal balance of $999,145.33 on your Home Equity Line
of Credit account. This means that you will no longer owe this amount, and we will also waive any outstanding fees
and accrued interest. Please note that if we receive any payments from you before we forgive your remaining principal
balance, we will apply them to your Home Equity account, which will reduce the actual principal balance amount we will
forgive.

What To Do If Your Account Is In Foreclosure
Although your home equity loan balance is being forgiven, this doas not extinguish your 1st mortgage. If your 1st
mortgage Is in foreclosure, this will not stop the foreclosure process and foreclosure activities will continue. Please
continue to answer and reply to all foreclosure communications from us. If you do not understand the legal
consequences of the foreclosure, you are also encouraged to contact an attorney or·housing counselor for assistance.
What You Need to Know
Your acceptance of this offer is automatic unless we hear from you. If you choose not to accept this forgiveness offer,
please call within 30 days of the date of the letter to the number listed below.
Please be aware that we are required to report the amount of your cancelled principal debt to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). Currently federal law provides for certain exceptions to tax llablllty when debt is forgiven in connection
with a foreclosure prevention transaction. In order to know whether you qualify for one of these exceptions and what
other tax impacts this transaction may have for you, we recommend that you contact a tax professional. Additional
information can also be found at www.irs.gov.
Also, once we forgive the remaining balance on your Home Equity account, we will report to the major credit bureaus
that your account was paid and closed. Your credit score may be affected by this forgiveness. Credit scores are
determined by your credit history and not controlled directly by Bank of America, NA beyond our commitment to
accurately report the status of all our customers. For more information about credit scores, please go to
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/creditlcre24.shtm.
If you have questions about this forgiveness, or would like to discuss any other options that may be available to you,
please contact us at 1.800.496.7831.
Home Loan Team
Bank of America, N.A.

MILIIABY PERSONNEL/SERVICEMEMBERS: If you or your spouse is a member of lhe military, please contact us Immediately. The federal
Servicemambers Civil Relief Act and comparable state laws afford significant protections and benefits to .!1llil:!J2.l!! military service personnel, fnciudlng
protections from foreclosure as wen as interest rate relief. For addilional information and to determine eligibility please contact our Milltary Assistance
Team tolf free at 1.877A30.6434. If you are calling from outside the U.S. please contact us at 1.817.685.6491.
Bank of America, N.A. Is required by law to Inform you that this communlcallon Is from a debt collector. However, the purpose of !his communication is to
!et you know about your eligibility for a debt forgiveness program.
M«trJl,QU Nnded and adff!Stllsftted by anl'.£tEqual Housing Lender.
{)Pro!actffl('~~beltn~UbG:lQ11'11fiL

C3_2518-3
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COLDUIC!LL

PO BOX 7246/191 & 333 MAIN STREET
Ketchum, m 83340
OFFICE (208) 622-3400
OFFICE (208) 622-6400
fax: (208)-622-3800
www.coldwellbankerdistinctiveproperties.com

BANl{eRm

DISTINCTIVE PROPERTIES

350 South Lincoln Avenue
Steamboat Springs, CO 80487
OFFICE (970) 879-88H
FAX (970) 879-9734

July 18, 2013
John Sofro
Robert Kantor
Sondra Kantor

286 Bridge Street
Vail, CO 81657
Off!CE (970) 476-2113
FAX (970) 476-3084

I am writing to you today to clarify our position in the acquisition of 265 Golden Eagle
Drive.

It has come to my attention that Sondra is not willing to participat~ in a Loan
Modification. Obviously, the Lender would require all parties to participate "if' the
Lender were to modify any loan. Given this new information, it is clear that a Loan
Modification is not an option for the Sellers.
The Buyer would like to receive written confirmation from the Sellers and the Lender
that the Loan Modification efforts are terminated, and that all efforts will now be
refocused on short selling the property to Buyer. Please provide this notification by
August 1, 2013, mailed or hand delivered to:

Deborah Sievers
Coldwell Banker Distinctive Properties
PO Box7248
Ketchum, ID 83340
We hope that all parties are on the same page. As you know, we have been Under
Contract for the Short Sale of 265 Golden Eagle Drive since October 2012 with little or
no movement towards completing that sale. We believe, with this latest revelation, that
there is no reason we should not be able to complete this transaction according to the
terms of the contract, with in the next 90 days.
We look forward to your immediate response and the completion of this sale.
Sincerely,

/ll ,

,I

1

1
/s~~~
Deborah Sievers

Each Office Is Independently Owned and Operated.
593

EXHIBIT C
594

EqmJax Personal Solutions

https://facLeconsumer.cquifax.com/fact/productViewchtml?prod_ed..

• Contact Annua!CredltReport.com

Get Started>> Veri(v >> View Report
Equifa'- understands the importance of keeping your infonnation secure from unauthorized
access. All of your data, such as your SSN and Card Number, is encrypted before being transmitted to/from our
servers. For yom sec..'llrity, this site requires the use of a 128-bit SSL compatible browser.

Equifax Credit Report™

l.
2. Account,

3.
4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

Equifax Credit Report ™ for Sondra L. Kantor

As of:
07/30/2013
Available until:
08/29/2013 - Report Docs Not Update

Confirmation #:
3711659407

Did you know that your free annual credit report does not include your credit score? Know
where you stand by getting your credH score today.

l of2

7/3~013 3:52 PM

https://fact .econsumer.equifax.com/facUproduc!View. ehtml?prod_ed ...

Credit ScoreTM with this credit report/or on(v $7.95

Order your

Mortgage accounts include first mortgages, home equity loans, and any other loans secured by real estate you O\vn.

Open Accounts
Account Name

Account
Number

Date
Opened

87112:XXXX

03/27/2008

Balance
$3,345,100

Date
Reported
05/31/201

Credit
Limit

Past Due Status·'!.·
$308,019

J_:-

·Closed Accounts
Account Name

Account Number

Date
Opened

BANK OF
AMERICA

l33680285XXXX

12/01/2007 $0

Balance

Date
Reported i&·
04/01/2008

93
6822013681XXXX 10/25/2005 $i,Ol , 0l 08/31/2012

BANK OF
AivfERICA,
N.A

6822900050:XXXX 01/01/2002 $0

11/01/2005

Past
Due

Status+

Credit
Limit

PAYS AS

CHARGE-OFF

PAYS AS
AGREED

$1,000,000

$0

Equifax offers you personal credit products that enlighten, enable and empower you. Whether you.are managing your
credit, protecting your identity or preparing for a major purchase, Equifax offers the tools you need to make the
smartest choices possible. For more information visit www.Equifax.com.
Copyright Equifax 2013
Copyright Equifax 2013
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Personal Soluiiorn,

htlps://facteconsumcr.cquifax_com/fact/prcparcForYicw.ehtml?prod_ ...

Contact Armua!CreditReport.rorn

Your Annual Equifax Credit
Get Started>> Verify >> View Report
,,. , ·"··
Equifax understands the importance of keeping your information secure from unauthorized
access. All of your data, such as your SSN and Card Number, is encrypted before being transmitted to/from our
servers. For your security, this site requires the use of a 128-bit SSL compatible browser.

Equifax Credit ReportTM

L
2.,
3.
4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

Equifax Credit Report™ for Sondra L. Kantor

As of:
07/30/2013
Available until:
08/29/2013 - Report Does Not Update

Confirmation #:
3711659407

Did you know that your free annual credit report does not in dude your credit score? Know
where you stand by getting your credit score today.
Order your Equifax Credit Score"r.i wilh this credit report/or only $7. 95

l of3

7l3'mfJB 3:51 PM

https:/ifacteconsumer.eqmtax. com/fact/prepa reForView .e html?prod_ ..

Swmrr111Iy highlights the information in your credit file that is most important in determining your
credit information into one
summary

Your~~,,, ..~,
credit ~-..-·.."

Accounts
Lenders usually take a positive view of individuals with a range of credit accounts - car loan, credit cards, mortgage,
etc. - that have a record of timely payments. However, a high debtto credit ratio on certain types of revolving ( credit
card) accounts and installment loans will typically have a negative impact.

Open
Accounts

Balance Available',i

$3,345,100

Total

Credit
Lmnt,,·

$0 $3,345,100

Debt to
Credit

Monthly Accounts
Pavment
with a

100%

14 007

I

$0

NIA

NIA

NIA

$0

0

9

$45,880

$84,520

$130,400

35%

$1,734

3

0

$0

NIA

NIA

NIA

$0

0

10

$3,390,980

$84,520 $3,475,500

98%

$15,741

4

Debt by Account Type

Debt to Credit Ratio by Account Type

Account Age
Usually. it is a good idea to keep your oldest credit account open, as a high average account age generally demonstrates
stability to lenders. Also, especially if you have been managing credit for a short time, opening many new accounts
will lower your average account age and mayhave a negative impact.
Length of Credit
History

2013 Years, 6 Months

Average Account
Age

15 Years, 4 Months

Oldest Account
Most Recent
Account

Inquiries - Requests for your Credit History
Numerous inquiries on your credit file for new credit may cause you to appear risky to lenders, so it is usually better to
only seek new credit when you need it. Typically, lenders distinguish between inquiries for a single loan and many new
loans in part by the length of time over which the inquiries occur" So, when rate shopping for a loan it's a good idea to
do it within a focused period of time.
4

2 of3

713ggW13 3:51 PM

https://fact.econswner.equifa.x.c(Hn/factlprepa..1~ForVic,v.chL"1ll?prod_~ ..
' '

Most Recent

Late payments, collections and public records can have a negative impact on your credit standing. The more severe and
recent they are, the more negative the potential impact might be.

0
3
0

Copyright Equifax 2013
Copyright Equifax 2013
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M.LUDWIG
DANIEL MILLER
LUDWIG• SHOUFLER •MILLER+ JOHNSON, LLP
Attorneys at Law
209 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone; 208-387-0400
Facsimile: 208-387-1999
ISB 3506
ISB 3571
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Plaintiff,

vs.
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2012-734

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, ROBERT ARON KANTOR, by and through his attorneys, Scot
M. Ludwig and Daniel A. Miller of Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP, and hereby moves this
Court pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)-(e) for an Order entering a Preliminary

Injunction enjoining the Defendant, her representatives and agents, from contacting Bank of America
regarding the cunent financing on the Golden Eagle real property.
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 1
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9. 20i3

: 12PM

No. 4781

.J-lAW

P. 3

and
Support of the Motion

days before

filed no later

time specified for the Hearing

of the Motion.

DA IBD t h i ~ day of August, 2013.

ILLER +JOHNSON, LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thisq:~y of August, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated:

U.S. Mail
_ Hand Delivery
_ Overnight Courier

Daniel E. Williams
Thomas, Williams & Park LLP

P.O. Box 1776
Boise, Idaho 83701

-Asimile Transmission
/
(208)34
4
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'I

AUG 1 2 2013

_\

JoL.ynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine Countv Idaho

' .T J>

Box
Roise, TD 83701-1776
'ldcphonc (.208) 34:;_ 7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw(cz),Lhomaswill iamslaw .corn

Attorneys for Defendunt/Counterdaimant

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT ()Ji' THI~ FIFTH .flJOlCIAL DI.STRICT
OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF llLAlNE

ROBERT ARON KANTOTI,

)
)

Plain ti l"UCounlenk lend ant

)

Case No. CV- 2012-734

)

vs.

)
>

SONDRA LOUTSE KANTOR,

DEI1'ENDANT/COUN'l'ERCLA[MANT'S
OBJRCTTON TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR A WARD 011'
COSTS i\NJ> A TTORNRY FF'.F.8

Dele.ndant/Countcrdaimant.

Dcfcndant/Countcrc!aimant Sondrn L .K.::mtor, by and through her allomey of' record,
pursuanl lo Rule 54(d)(1 )(B). T.R.C.P., hereby o~jccts to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Costs

nnd Attorney l•ees.

ARGUME~T
Under· Rule 54(cl)(l)(ll), an award of costs and fees requires a fornl judgment or:
other-Jina! r·esolulion of all claims of the rrnrties.
Midway through these proceedings, Plmntiff seeks an award of costs and fees on the
grounds that he prevailed on certain issues regarding his motion for pmiiul summary judgment.

DEfl.iNDANT/COUNT.ERCLAIMANT'S ORJF.CTTON TO PT .ATNTIFF'S
MOTION FOR/\ W /\RD OF COSTS AND Al TORN.LY l"JJLS, P. 1
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or Rule 54 and umnislakahle

motion
i!s

irntion. Rule

In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitkd to t:osts,
the tnal court shall in its sour1d discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation Lo the relief' sought by the rcspccti vc parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a party Lo an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part. and upon so finding muy appo1tion the costs between
an<l among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and daims involved in !.be action and the resultant judgment or indgmcnts
obtained.
(emphasis a<lded)
As this language clearly indicates, prevailing party analysis requires a final result.

The Idaho Supreme Comi has made the same poinl tJuiLe dearly.
Allhough the disLricl court had jllrisdiction to award costs, including attorney fees,
they ure awarded to the prevailing party in the action. Idaho R. Ci v. P.
54(d)(l)(B). Where a party prevails only in part, Lhe court 'may apporlion the
costs between and among the parties in a fair ,md equitable manner ;laer
considering all
the is.sues and claims involved in the action and the resultant
judgment or judgments obtained.' fd The court cannol do su al'tcr considering
'aH of the claims involved in the ::iction and the resultant judgment or judgmenl.s

or

ubtaincd' unlil all of the claims between the relevant parties have been resolved.
All ol'Ragley.s' claims and Thomasons' counterclaims were not resolved when the
district comt awarded Hagleys court cosl.s, including allomey lee.s, !'or prevailing
on one of their claims. Thonrnsons huve not argued on appeal Lhal the <lislricL
court cncd in i1warding costs before there was a prevniling pmty in the action, and
nothing herein should be construed as holding thnt a trial court can award comt
costs, including allorney lees, on a piecem(:al basis as each claitn between the
parties is decide<!.
(emphasis in original)

Raxley 1). Th011wsm1, 14q Tdaho 799, 804 (20 l 0). Similarly, in Calcitve/1 v. Cometro, 15 l ldaho
3 9-40 (2011 ), the Comi reaffirmed that tht language of Rule 54( <l )( 1)(Rl empowers courts lo
award cosls an<l fees only as "lo a !imtl judgment or to an aclion that has been completely
adj udicatcd. ''

DF.FF.NDANT/COl JNTERCT .AlMANT'S 0BJECT10N TO PLJ\lNTU:FS
MOTION 1"()1{ A WARD
COSTS AND ATTORNF.Y FEES, P 2

or
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not
or

the

an<l claims mvolvetl m
J\1 tl1(:

same

have been fornlly

on

upon which Plaintiff bases his costs and fee5 application, this Courl granted Dcfonclant's motion
to amend her Answer and Counlerch:iirn. Plaintiff is attempting to make clain, for costs an<l fcl'.s
on just the kind of "pk:ccmcal basis" that the Tdaho Supreme Courl has repeatedly held invalid. 1
Defendant suhrnils that PlaintiH's motion, as well as its further pursuit, is not warranted under

existing law and c;:in.not be supported hy a good l'ailh argument for an extension, modification, m
reversal

or existing law, pursuant to LC.§ 12-123.
CON Cl ,UST ON

Fur all the fr,rcgoing reasons. Defendant respectfully requests that the Court deny
Plaintiff's motion for an award o!' costs an<l allorn1:.'.y k:cs without prc_iuclicc.
DATF.D this

J~~~f August, 2013.
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK., LLP

Attorneys for Oefendant/Cmmlen:lai111ant

Because this objection compleLe.ly resolves lhc issue before the Court, Defendant
docs not 3rgue the multiple other failings of Plainli !rs submission, nulahly its foilurc to
<li fferenliaLe lees and costs related to the issues upon wbich it has pi-evai led and others upon
which it has not yet prevailed.
DEFF.NDANT/COUNTERCL/\lMJ\NT'S 0DJ1::CT10N 1'0 PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES. P. 3
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C

l hereby certify that on this { ~ o f ' August, 2013, a true and correct copy or the
foregoing instrument was served upon opposi11g counsel as indicated below:
Scot M. Ludwig
Daniel ,t\. J\.,ii Iler
Ludwig Shoutler Milkr Johnson, LLP
209 Main StrGcct
Roise, ID 83702

_ _ Viu IlanJ Delivery
l·acsimile: 208-387-1999

~ ia

Via U.S. Mail

DEFENDANT/COUN·11.;KCLJ\lMANT'S ORJECTTON TO PIJ\!NT!FF'S
MOTION FOR AWARD OF COSTS AND A'lTOKNEY FDES, P. 4

605

08

U/20

MON

4: 47

FAX

fl!OOZ 003

Fl LED

~

~-~--:.,,+.........

AUG 2 f 20t3
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blame
Countt·
,.,,..,..._,..,
...• ,, /!,,,.,"

IN Tll.1£ l)JSTRICT counT OF THF.: FIFTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 'f HE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND ttOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINR

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Ca$c No. CV-20 J2-7J4
Plaintiff/Countcrdefendant,

vs.
SONDRA ID1JTSE KANTOR,

ORDRR DRNVTNG PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR A WARD OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FRRS

Dcfendant/Cou11terclaimant.

The Court, having before it PlainLitrs Motion for Award ,)f Cost~ and Attorney i·ccs filed
July 17, 2013, and having considered the submissions of the pmties and conducted a telephonic

hearing on August J9,201);
IT lS HERE13 Y ORDER.ED, that Plaintiffs Motion is <leniec1 as premature for the
reasons staled hy the Court on the reeord.

ORDER DENYING PT.ATNTTFF'S MOTION FOR AWARD 01" COSTS AND ATfORNDY
FEES

Pnge I
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14,

I hereby certify thal on this ~ a y of
A 0. , 20 I3, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served upon opposing~! as indicated bcJow:
Scot M. Ludwig
Daniel A. Miller
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP
209 Main Street
Roise, ID 83 702

_ _ Via Hand Delivery
Via Facsimile: 208~387-1999
_L'Via U.S. Mail

Daniel L Williams

_ _ Via Hand Delivery
Via Fue,simile: 208-345-7894

Thomas, Williams & Park, T,T ,P
121 N. 9 111 Slreel, Suite 300

/"Via U.S. Mui!

Boise, Idaho 83702

Deputy Clerk

or the Court

ORD1:1Z DENYTNG PLAINTWF'S MOTTON FOR AWARIJ OF COSTS AND AlTORNFY
FEES - Page 2
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DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WlLLlAMS &
N. 91" St., Suite 300
0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

~
F ··'.J.,,..,. ~·o

A.M
P.M-1,---

[ A'!S 2 2 2013
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Btaine County, Idaho

Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Case No. CV-2012-734

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

AFFIDAVIT OF
MITCHEL J. AUGUST

vs.

SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
..

lJI.~ .Jk)

STATE OF &:ALif@RHIA
County of

p\A:i rJe.,,

)
)ss.
.)

MITCHEL J. AUGUST, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
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L

personal knowledge of the facts and matters set forth herein. I am
this

to provide the

with our current intentions with regard to

real

property, which I understand forms the subject of part of this case. The testimony set forth in this
Affidavit is the same as I would provide if appearing live as a witness in a hearing or trial in this
action.
2.

My wife, Gwynn E. August, and I are the Buyers referred to in the Real Estate

Purchase and Sale Agreement of February, 2013, regarding real property at 265 Golden Eagle
Drive, Hailey, Idaho ("the Golden Eagle property"). A true and correct copy of this Agreement is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3.

We understood that the transaction described in Exhibit A, as a "short-sale,"

required the consent of Bank of America, as the lender to the Sellers.
4.

We also understood that Bank of America gave its consent to the transaction set

forth in Exhibit A, but that the transaction did not close as anticipated due to Robert Kantor's

i
effo11s instead to seek a loan modification.
5.

As a result of the multiple delays that have occu1Ted in closing on the Golden

Eagle property, my wife and I have become frustrated at the lack of progress to complete the
agreed-upon sale. We have started to look seriously at other properties in the area to purchase.
While we wou]d still be willing to go through with the sale described in Exhibit A, it is our intent
to abandon any effort to purchase the Golden Eagle property, if those efforts cannot be completed
in the very near future.
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this

i~

day of August, 2013.

IVYSLIKE
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO
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hereby certify that on this:l( ~y of hi • 013, a true and correct copy
foregoing instrument was served upon opposing counsel as indicated below:
Scot M. Ludwig
Daniel A. Miller
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP
209 Main Street
Boise, ID 83 702

__ Via Hand Delivery
..----Via Facsimile: 208-387-1999
Via U.S. Mail

-----_...c--=---=--~Daniel E. Williams
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Real Estate Purchase And Sale
and Gwynn E. August, husband and wife

Robert A. Kantor and Sondra F. Kantor

Seller:
Property Address:

265 Golden Eagle Drive

Legal Description:

Golden Eagle Ranch AM, Lot 34A

City:

Hailey

County: Blaine

Slate: Idaho

ZIP: 83333

3. Buyer hereby offers to purchase the above described Property on the following terms and conditions:

Terms The purchase price is payable as follows:
$ 2,400,000.00
$
$

Cash, cashier's check, loan proceeds, or certified funds at closing, including Earnest Money
Seller Financing - See Financing Contingency "Other Financing Terms·
Other- See Financing Contingency "Other Financing Terms"

$2,400,000.00

Total Purchase Price- Not including closing costs

4. Earnest Money $ 50,000.00
To be Held By:
Evidenced By:
D Personal Check D Listing Broker
D Cashier's Check 1:8] Selling Broker
Promissory Note
Title Company

0

O

Fifty Thousand and no/10oths Dollars
Other Remarks:

EM to be wired to Coldwell Banker Trust Account
within 3 business days after mutual acceptance.

Earnest Money to be deposited in a trust account upon written acceptance of this Agreement by all parties.
5. Offer Expires On: Date: 02/06/2013

Time: 5:00 p.m.

6. Closing Date: June 15 or sooner or whatever the date that is set by the short sale lender.
Possession Date: l8I On closing date OR O Other:
7. Responsible Closing Broker/ Office:
Todd Conklin/Coldweli Banker
Responsible Closing Agency/ Title Co: Sun Valley Title Company

D

8. New Construction or Recent Improvements:
Yes
No~
lf"YES", see Standard Terms, paragraph 6, of this Agreement.

[gj

D

Yes
No
9. Inspection Contingency
1) This offer is contingent upon Buyer's acceptance of the condition of the Property, subject to paragraph 7,
below. If Buyer does not object to the condition of the Property in writing on or before 7 Business Days
("inspection contingency period"), pursuant to paragraph 8, below, this inspection contingency shall be
deemed released.
2) Buyer shall have the right to, and is strongly advised to, conduct inspections, tests, surveys and other studies
("inspections") at Buyer's sole cos! to confirm all information provided to Buyer, and to thoroughly inspect the
Property.
3) Square footage verification: Buyer is aware that any reference to the square footage of the Property or ils
improvements has not been verified. Alternative methods of measurement and calculation may vary
significantly. If square footage Is material to the Buyer, Buyer must verify same during the inspection period.
4) Water Rights verification: It is strongly advised that the Buyer contact a knowledgeable attorney of the
Buyer's choice, experienced in water law, to advise the Buyer of the validity, quality, and quantity of any
water right acquired with real estate described in this Agreement. Buyer must verify same during !he
inspection period.
5) Buyer to select own professionals with appropriate qualifications to conduct all inspections and verifications.
6) Seller shall provide reasonable access for such inspections; Buyer shall Indemnify Seller and hold Seller
harmless from all injury, loss or liability regarding such inspections.
-Continued
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Inspection Contingency Continued

7) THIS INSPECTION CONTINGENCY MAY NOT BE USED BY BUYER TO OBJECT TO ANY MATIER
OTHER THAN A MATERIAL CONDITION OR DEFECT UNKNOWN TO BUYER AT THE TIME THIS
AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED.
8) If Buyer objects to the condition of the Property, Buyer shall, prior to the expiration of the msoei}t1c1n
contingency period, give one of the following written notices to Seller:
A. Notice of the previously unknown material conditlon(s) and/or defect(s) to which Buyer objects and
declaring this Agreement null and void, in which case the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less
any unpaid expenses incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the ·costs To Be Paid By" section); or
B. Notice of the previously unknown material conditlon(s) and/or defect(s} to which Buyer objects and
Buyer's desired remedy shall be set forth on a Contingency Release form, in which case this Agreement
shall remain in effect, subject to sub-paragraph C, below.
C. Upon receipt of notice under paragraph 8, above, Seller shall have~ business days to give Buyer written
notice {by signing the Buyer's Contingency Release form) that Seller will correct such condition(s) and/or
defect(s) prior to closing. lf Seller does not sign the Buyer's Contingency Release form, Buyer may, within ,;a
business days following Seller's notice period, above, release the contingency in writing, or this Agreement
shall be nun and void, in which case the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less any unpaid
expenses incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the "Costs To Be Paid By" section). Buyer's closing of the
transaction shall constitute acceptance of the condltion of the Property, unless otherwise stated in wriling
signed by both parties.
9) FHA INSPECTION REQUIREMENT, If applicable: "For Your Protection: Get a Home Inspection",
HUD 92564-CN must be signed on or before execution of this agreement.

10. Lead-Based Paint Disclosure/ Contingency The subject Property is "Target Housing" (built prior to 1978)

D

[2].

regarding lead-based paint and/or lead-based hazards, regardless of the source of the lead: Yes
No
If "YES", Buyer has been provided with Seller's completed and signed "Disclosure of Information and
Acknowiedgement: Lead-Based Paint and I or Lead-Based Paint Hazards" ("Disclosure") and a copy of the
pamphlet "Protect Your Family From Lead in Your Home" ("Pamphlet"), and one of the following boxes must be
checked:
Buyer shall have the unconditional right to cancel this Agreement and shall be allowed ten (1 O} days to
conduct an inspection for lead-based pain! hazards. Should Buyer elect to conduct a lead-based paint inspection,
a "lead-Based Paint Inspection Contingency Addendum• shall be attached hereto; OR
Buyer hereby acknowledges receipt of the Disclosure and Pamphlet and hereby waives the right to conduct a
lead-based paint inspection.

D

0

11.Financing Contingency

This offer is contingent upon
Assume Existing Loan:D
NewLoan: D
Amount $/Percent %
Years:

Yes
Buyer securing the following financing:
Conv.
Type of Loan:
Maximum% Rate:
Maximum Points:

D

FHA
Fixed Rate
Institutional Lender

D
0

D

VA
Adj. Rale
Private Lender

D
D
D

Other Financing Terms:

Buyer agrees to make a best effort to obtain such financing and to make written application to the lender within
_ business days after acceptance of this Agreement by both parties.

D Property must appraise at no less than the purchase price.

0

Preliminary Approval: Buyer shall, on or before _ _
provide Seller with a letter from Buyer's lender evidencing preliminary approval of Buyer's ability to qualify for the
loan amount and terms set forth above, subject only to such reasonable and customary conditions as the lender
typically imposes on such preliminary approval letters.
If Buyer has not released this contingency in writing on or before _ _
this Agreement shall terminate and the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less any unpaid expenses
incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to !he "Costs To Be Paid By" section of this Agreement).
Date of Document: 02/0312013
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Date _ _ __
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12. Sale of Buyer's Property Contingency

Yes

D NolZ]

This offer is contingent on the closing of a sale of Buyer's property located at:
Phone:

Listed with:
Listing Agent
If Buyer has not released this contingency in writing on or before

this Agreement shall terminate and the Earnest Money shall be refunded lo Buyer (less any unpaid expenses
incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the "Costs To Be Paid By" section of this Agreement).

D

13. Seller's Right to Accelerate Buyer's Contingency Releases
Yes
No lZ]
Should Seller receive another acceptable offer to purchase, prior to Buyer's contingencies being released, Seller
shall give Buyer written notice of such new offer. !n the event the Buyer does not release all contingencies in
writing within _
business days after the receipt of such notice then this Agreement shall terminate and the
Eames! Money shall be returned to Buyer (less any unpaid expenses incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the
"Costs To Be Paid By'' section of this Agreement). In the event the Buyer does release the contingencies, the
Buyer shall proceed lo purchase the Property under the remaining terms and conditions of this Agreement,
notwithstanding that the terms of the new offer may be more or less favorable.

14. Other Contingencies

Yes

0

No

D

See Addendum(s)

D

1. Buyer expects lo make modifications to the property. During the Contingency Period, Buyer shall employ
contractor(s) and architect to determine the viability of the comtemplated modificaUons. This agreement is
contingent upon the Buyer's acceptance of the viability and cost of modificalions.

If Buyer has not released this/ these contingency(ies) in writing on or before
7 Business Days after mutual acceptance
this Agreement shall terminate and the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less any unpaid expenses
incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the "Costs To Be Paid By" section of this Agreement).

15. Additional Terms

Yes

!ZI No D

See Addendum(s)

D

1. Property to be professionally cleaned including carpets and windows prior to close of escrow.
2. All electrical, heating and plumbing to be in good working order at close of escrow.
3. All holes from art in the walls to be repaired and painted.

Document# 0SMGA2313
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16. Included Items (In addition to Standard Terms, oaragraph 4) Excluded Items
All kilchen appliances, washer and dryer.
Seller's personal property and belongings.

17. Costs To Be Appraisal
Paid Bv
Buyers

gJ

1 Sellers

D
0
D
D

Share Eauallv

NIA
See Addi. Terms

Assess
ments

Well
lnso.

Septic Septic
Other:
lnsp.
Pumpino

0
D

0

D
0

0
D
D

0
D
D

lx1
Il

Standard Closing
Title Ins. Escrow Fee

18. Broker working with Seller
Broker's Name: John Sofro
Listing Agent: John Sofro
Brokerage:
JAP
Maillng Address:
City, State, Zip:
Office Phone:
208 726 3411

0
IZl
D
D
0

[8J

Fax:

E-Mail:

n

D

[8J
[l

[8J

D

D
181
D
0
0

0
0
D
D
0

Broker working with Buyer
Broker's Name: Todd Conklin
Selling Agent: Deborah Sievers
Brokerage:
Coldwell Banker
Mailing Address:
City, State, Zip:
Office Phone:
208 622 3400 Fax:622 3800
E-Mail:

19. REPRESENTATION CONFIRMATION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DISCLOSURE
Check one {1) box in Section 1 below and one (1) box in Section 2 below to confirm that in this transaction, the brokerage(s)
involved had the following re!ationship(s) with the BUYER(S) and SELLER(S).
Section 1:
The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) ls acting as an AGENT for Iha BUYER(S).
0 The brokerage working with the BUYER{S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the BUYER(S), without an ASSIGNED
AGENT.
0 The brokerage working wilh the BUYER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the BUYER(S) and has an
ASSIGNED AGENT acting solely on behalf of the BUYER(S).
0 The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) is acting as a NONA GENT for the BUYER(S).

181

Section 2:
The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) is acting as an AGENT for the SELLER(S).
The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the SELLER(S), without an ASSIGNED
AGENT.
0 The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the SELLER(S) and has an
ASSIGNED AGENT acting solely on behalf of the SELLER(S).
0 The brokerage working wlth the SELLER(S) Is acting as a NONAGENT for the SELLER(S).

t8l
0

Each party signing this document confirms that he has received, read and understood the Agency Disclosure Brochure
adopted or approved by the Idaho real estate commission and has consented to the relaUonship confirmed above. In addition,
each party confirms that the brokerage's agency office policy was made available for inspection and review.
EACH PARTY UNDERSTANDS THAT HE IS A "CUSTOMER" AND lS NOT REPRESENTED BY A BROKERAGE UNLESS
THERE IS A SIGNED WRITTEN AGREEMENT FOR AGENCY REPRESENTATION.

20. Standard Terms. All parties are advised to carefully review the following:
1) Withdrawal of Offer/Counteroffer - By delivery of a written notice of withdrawal to the office of the broker
working with the Seller or Offeree (whether Buyer or Seller}. (A) Buyer can withdraw this offer at any time prior to
Buyer's receipt of Seller's written acceptance of this Agreement, and (B) an Offerer (whether Buyer or Seller}
may withdraw his Counteroffer at any time prior to Offeror's receipt of Offeree's written acceptance of such
Counteroffer.
2) Closing Date - On or before the closing date, Buyer and Seller shall deposit with the closing agency all
funds and instruments necessary to complete the sale. Closing means the date on which all documents are
either recorded or accepted by an escrow agent and the sale proceeds are available to Seller. Taxes, insurance,
dues, assessments (using the last available assessment as a basis), rent, interest and reserves, liens,
encumbrances or obligations assumed and utilities shall be pro-rated as of the Closing Date.
Standard Terms • Continued
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Standard Terms· Continued

Closing Costs - Costs in addition to those listed may be incurred by Buyer and Seller. Unless otherwise agreed
herein, or provided by law or required by lender, Buyer shall purchase Seller's reserve account If Seller's loan is
assumed.
included Items - If present at time of offer, all Items attached, including but not limited to, floor coverlngs, attached
television antennae, attached plumbing, bathroom and lighting fixtures, window screens, window coverings, screen
doors, storm windows, storm doors, garage door opener(s), transmi!ter(s), exterior trees, plants, shrubbery, water
heating apparatus and fixtures, attached fireplaces and free-standing fireplaces, awnings, ventilating, cooling and
heating systems, built-in and drop-in ranges (but excepting all other ranges), any alanns (burglar, fire, etc.), fences and
gates, fuel tanks, irrigalion fixtures and equipment, any and all water and water rights, and all ditches and ditch rights
that are appurtenant thereto shall be Included In the sale unless otherwise provided herein.
5) Seller's Property Disclosure - If required by Title 55, Chapter 25 Idaho Code, Seller shall within ten (10) calendar
days after the execution of this Agreement provide to the Buyer a "Seller's Property Disclosure Form• and Buyer shall
have three (3) business days from receipt of the disclosure report lo waive or not waive the right to rescind the offer
based upon Information contained In the report, a copy of which shall be delivered upon execution to Seller.
6) New Construction or Recent Improvements- If Residential Property Is newly constructed or has a recent
improvement of over $2,000.00, the General Contractor is required by Title 45, Chapter 5, Idaho Code, to provide
certain disclosures to the prospective residential real property purchaser. If applicable, Buyer should obtain such
comp!eled forms from the General Contractor. Such disclosure ls the responsibility of the General Contractor and i! is
not the duty of your agent to obtain this information on your behalf. You are advised to consult with any General
Contractor subject to Idaho Code §45-525 et seq. regarding the General Contractor Disclosure Statement.
7) Existing Loans - Within three (3) business days of acceptance, Seller shall provide Buyer with all Notes and Deeds of
Trust or other financing documents to be assumed or taken subject to. Within five (5) business days of receipt thereof,
Buyer shall In writing notify Seller of his/ her approval or disapproval of the terms of said documents. Buyer's approval
shall not be unreasonably withheld.
8) Definitions - "Business Day" shall mean Monday through Friday, excluding Saturday and Sunday, and excluding
holidays as defined by Idaho Code, Section 67-5302. "Notice(s)" shall mean a written document specifying the
necessary information. "Delivery" shall mean transmittal of information by mail, facsimile transmission, courier, hand
delivery, or e-mail, to the addresses stated herein. "Receipt" shaH mean possession of the Item of Information by the
named recipient or within the office of the appropriate broker. "Written Acceptance" shall mean receipt of a document
signed and dated by all undersigned parties, specifying a certain Offer or Counteroffer. "Signed" shall mean a
document containing the original, facsimile. photocopied or scanned signature of a party, any of which shall be binding
on the signatory.
9) Counterparts I Facsimile Transmission/ E-mail - This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts,
each is deemed to be the original hereof, and all of which together constitute one and the same instrument. Facsimile
or email transmission of any signed original document, and retransmission of any signed facsimile or emall
transmission shall be the same as personal delivery of the orlglnal. At the request of either party, or the Closing
Agency, the parties will confirm facsimile or email transmitted signatures by signing an original document.
10) Standard Title Insurance - The Seller shan within a reasonable lime after closing furnish to the Buyer a title insurance
policy in the amount of the purchase price of the property showing marketable and Insurable title subject to the liens,
encumbrances and defects elsewhere set out in this Agreement to be discharged or assumed by the Buyer. Prior to
closing the transaction, the Seller shall furnish to the Buyer a commitment of title insurance policy showing the
condition of the title to said property. Buyer shall have either five (5) business days from the receipt of the commitment
or until twenty-four (24) hours prior to the closing, whichever first occurs, within which to object to the condition of the
tiUe as set forth in the commitment. If the Buyer does not object, the Buyer shall be deemed to have accepted the
conditions of the !ille.
11} Extended and Other Coverage Title Policies - A standard policy of HIie insurance does not cover certain potential
problems or risks such as liens (I.e., a legal claim against property for payment of some debt or obligation), boundary
disputes, claims of easement, and other matters of claims if they are not of public record al the time of closing.
However, under Idaho law such potential claims against the property may have become a legal obligation before the
purchase of the home and may not yet be of public record until after the purchase, Title Insurance companies may be
able to issue an "extended coverage· policy for an additional premium. In addition to the premium for an extended
coverage title policy, there may be other costs Involved, i.e., survey or additional closing fees. Such a policy may
pmtect the Buyer against such problems. It is recommended that the Buyer talk to a title insurance company about
what it offers in the way of extended coverage and other coverages that may be appropriate. Only the policy itself
shows exactly what type or coverage Is offered, so contact a title company for particulars.
Standard Terms - Continued
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Standard Terms· Continued

Title Conveyance - Tille of Seller is to be conveyed by warranty deed, unless otherwise provided, and is to be
marketable and insurable except for rights reserved in federal patents, state or railroad deeds, building or use
restrictions, building and zoning regulations and ordinances of any governmental unit, and rights of way and
easements established or of record. Liens, encumbrances or defects to be discharged by Seller may be paid out
of purchase money at date of closing. No liens, encumbrances, defects, except !hose which are to be discharged
or assumed by Buyer or to which title is taken subject to, shall exist unless otherwise specified In this Agreement.
13) Default by Buyer If the Buyer defaults in the performance of this Agreement, Seller will have the option of (1)
accepting the Earnest Money as liquidated damages and this Agreement shall terminate; or (2) pursuing any
other lawful right or remedy to which the Seller may be entitled, which may include specific performance. In the
case of option ( 1), Seller shall make demand in writing upon the holder of the Earnest Money, upon which
demand said holder shall pay from the Earnest Money any unpaid costs incurred by or on behalf of Seller and
Buyer related to the transaction, as set forth in the ncosts To Be Paid By" section above, and said holder shall
pay any remaining balance of the Earnest Money to the Seller. Seller and Buyer specifically acknowledge and
agree that if Seller elects to accept the Earnest Money as liquidated damages, such shall be the Seller's sole and
exclusive remedy, and such shall not be considered a penalty or forfeiture.
14) Default by Seller - It is agreed that if the title of said property is not marketable, or cannot reasonably be made
so within twenty (20) business days after notice containing a written statement of defects Is delivered to the
Seller, or if the Seller defaults in the performance of this Agreement including Seller's obligations (if any) to
correct defects pursuant to Paragraph 8) C of the Inspection Contingency, the Buyer has the option of (1) having
the Earnest Money returned lo the Buyer and this Agreement shall terminate; or (2) pursuing any other lawful
right or remedy to which the Buyer may be entitled, including specific performance. In the case of option ( 1), the
Buyer shall make demand In writing upon the holder of the Earnest Money. Upon such demand, and provided
there is no dispute as to the Seller's default, said holder shall refund the Earnest Money to the Buyer. Seller shall
pay for the unpaid costs incurred of title Insurance and escrow fees, if any, and any unpaid costs incurred by or
on behalf of the Seller and the Buyer related to the transaction, as set forth in this Agreement.
15) lnterpJeader - If a dispute arises as to Buyer's or Seller's default and entitlement to the Earnest Money, and
such dispute is not resolved within ten (10) business days of a demand for payment of the Earnest Money by the
Buyer or the Seller, the holder of the Earnest Money shall file an interpleader action in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and shall recover its attorneys fees and costs therefore, as provided by Idaho Code Section 5-321.
16) Attorney's Fees_- If either party initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or proceedings, which are in
any way connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the non-prevaillng
party reasonable costs and attorneys' fees including such costs and fees on appeal and in any bankruptcy
proceeding.
17) Risk of Loss - Prior to closing of this sale, all risk of loss shall remain with Seller. In addition should the Property
be materially damaged by fire or other cause prior to the closing, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option
of the Buyer. Buyer shall give written notice of intent to void the Agreement to Seller or Seller's Agent and shall
be entitled to a full refund of the Earnest Money.
18) Entire Agreement - This Agreement contains the entire agreement of the parties respecting the matters herein
set forth and supersedes any prior agreements or negotiations respecting such matters. No agreement,
represel'ltations, or warranties Including, without limitations. any warranty of habitability. not expressly set forth
herein shall be binding on either party.
19) Time is of the Essence in this Agreement.
20) Agent Representations - The Agents representing the Buyer and Seller in this transaction relay information to
Buyers and Sellers that has been received from third parties. However, Agents do not make any representations
regarding flood plain, wetlands, avalanche zone, hazardous waste, environmental or health hazards, code
compliance, survey data, finished square footage, property size, zoning or other physical factors nor do the
Agents make any representations regarding law or taxation, unless specifically set forth in writing in this
Agreement. The Buyer and Seller specifically waive all claims against the Agents regarding any
these matters
which are not specifically included in this Agreement. It may be diligent and prudent for the Seller and/or Buyer to
employ the services of qualified independent professionals who perform services or provide opinions regarding
these matters, and the Agents may, during the course of this transaction, identify such individuals or entities.
However, Agents are not warranting in any way the services or opinions provided by such individuals or entities,
and the Buyer and Seller specifically waive any and all claims against the Agents regarding such identification.

of
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Standard Terms· Continued

FIRPTA - Tax Withholding at Closing - The parties agree that they shall fully comply with the Foreign
Investment in Real Property Tax Act ("FIRPTA"). If Seller Is not a "foreign person" under FIRPTA, at closing,
Seller shall sign an affidavit stating the same. If Seller is a "foreign person" under FIRPTA, at closing the Closing
Agent shall withhold from the sale proceeds the appropriate tax amount and submit such amount and any
required forms to the Internal Revenue Service. Seller hereby indemnifies and holds Buyer and Closing Agent
harmless from any and all liability, including attorney's fees, related to Seller's taxes under FIRPTA, or otherwise,
which indemnification and hold harmless shall survive closing of the transaction.
22) AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORY: If BUYER or SELLER is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity,
the person executing this agreement on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind BUYER or

SELLER.
THIS IS INTENDED TO BE A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, THE PARTIES ARE
ADVISED TO SEEK THE ADVICE OF AN AITORNEY.
In the event this fonn is received by electronic transmission and/ or email, the parties hereto acknowledge !hat they
have not changed or altered the content of this form template.

21. Buyer(s) Acceptance Buyer hereby acknowledges having read this Agreement in its entirety, including the
Standard Terms, and having received a copy of this Agreemenl
Addendum(s) attached

D_

Buyer's Signature

/l

~..........,ig4flt.
...........
ure~~[-=---fil~UA--'C),0-r--'-Printed Name:
Mitchel Jay August
Physical Address:
Mailing Address:
City, State, Zip:
Home Phone:
Fax:
Business Phone:
Fax:

.,/1,1.. /,.

2@l

Gwynn E. August
Printed Name:
Physical Address:
Mailing Address:
City, State. Zip:
Fax:
Home Phone:
Business Phone:
Fax:
E-Mail:

E-MaU:

22. Seller(s) Acceptance On the specified date, Seller acknowledges having read this Agreement in "its entirety,
including the Standard Terms, and Seller hereby approves and accepts the offer to purchase set forth in the
above Agreement

D

"AS-IS"

D

Subject to attached Counteroffer

Seller agrees to carry out all of the terms thereof on the part of the Seller and acknowledges receipt of a true
copy of this
ment signed by all parties.

Seller's Signature
X'-------------Signature
Printed Name:
:::R:.J<ootef Robert A.
Physical Address:
Mailing Address:
City, State, Zip:
Home Phone:
Fax:
Business Phone:
Fax:
E-Mail:
Document# DSMGA2313

Kan to Printed Name:
Physical Address:
Mailing Address:
City, State. Zip:
Home Phone;
Business Phone:
E-Mail:

Date of Document: 02/03/2013
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Date

Sondra F. Kantor
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Real Estate Purchase And Sale Agreement
Two Million Four Hundred Thousaoo and oot10oths Dollars

1. Purchase Price$ 2,400,000.00
2. Buyer:

Seller:

Mitchel Jay and Gwynn E. August, husband and wife
Kantor

Property Address:

265 Golden Eagle Drive

Legal Description:

Golden Eagle Ranah AM. Lot 34A

City:

Hailey

State: Idaho

County: Ellaine

Zl!-; 83333

3. Buyer hereby offers to purchase the above described Property on the following terms and conditions:
Terms The purchase price Is payable as.follows;
Cash, cashier's check, loan proceeds, or certified funds at closing, Including Earnest Money
Seller Financing - See Financing Contingency "other Financing Terms·
Olher - See Financing Contingency ·otner Financing Terms·

$ 2,400,000.00
$
$
$ 2,400,000.00

Total Purohase Price- Not Including closing costs

4. Earnest Money $ 50,000.00
Evidenced By:

D Personal Check
0 Cashier's Check
0 Promissory Note

i

F'ifty Thousand and no/100ths Dollars
other Remarks:
EM to be wired to Coldw&II Banker TrU$t At:count
within 3 business days after mutual accept.'lnco.

To be Held By:

D Listing Broker
O Trtle Company
~ Selling Broker

Earnest Money to be deposited in a trust account upon written acceptance of this Agreement by all partia&..
5. Offer Expires On: Date: 02/06/2013

Time: 5:00 p.m.

6. Closing Date: June 15 or sooner or whatever the date that is set by the short sale lender.
Possession Date: ~ On closing date OR

7. Responsible Closing Broker I Office:

O Other.

·

Todd Conklin/CoidweB Banker

Responsible Clos!ng Agency I TIile Co: Sun Vanoy Title Company

8. New Construction or Recent Improvements:

D

Yes
No
If •yes•. see Standard Terms, paragraph 6, of this Agreement.

9. rnspec:tion Contingency

Yes

l',83

fgJ No 0

1} This offer Is contingent upon Buyer's acceptance of lhe condition of the Property, subj eel to paragraph 7,

2)
3)
4)

5)
6)

below. If Buyer does not object to the condition of the Property in writing on or before 7 Business Days
("inspection contingency period"), pursuant to paragraph B, below, this Inspection contingency shall be
deemed released.
Buyer shall have the rlght to, and is strongly advised to, conduct inspections, tests, surveys and other sb.ldm
("inspections") at Buyer's sole cost to confirm aD Information provided 1o Buyer, and to thoroughly inspect !he
Property.
Square footage verification; Buyer is aware lhat any reference to the square footage of the Property or ils
improvements has not been verified. Alternative methods of measurement and calculation may var-/
slgnificanlfy. If square footage is material to the Buyer. Bu~r must verify same during the inspection perlOd,
Water Rights veriflcaUon: If is strongly advised !ha! the Buyer contact a knowledgeable attorney of the
Buyer's choice, experienced in waler law, to adllise the Buyer of the validity, quality, and quantity of any
waler right aequirad with rear estate described in this Agreement. Buyer must verify same during the
inspecticm period.
Buyer to sel&Ct own professionals with appropriate quallflcatlons to conduct all inspections and verifications.
Seller shall provide reasonable access for such inspeotlons; Buyer shall indemnify Seller and hold Seller
harmle-ss fl'om all injury, loss or liability regarding such inspectlons.

OOOllnlllll# D8MGA2313

Seller's lnlU

Date of 000!.ment 02/00/2013
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~ Contillgftncy • Continued

7) THIS INSPECTION CONTINGENCY MAY NOT BE USED BY BUYER TO OBJECT TO ANY MATIER
OTHER THAN A MATERIAL CONDITION OR DEFECT UNKNOWN TO BUYER AT THE TIME THIS
AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED.
8) If Buyer objects to the condHion of the Property. Buyer shall, prior to the expiration of the inspection
contingency period, give one of tha following written notices to Seller:
A Notice of the previously unknown material conditlon(s) and/or defect(&) to which Buyer objects and
declaring this Agreement null and void, in which case the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less
any unpaid expenses incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant lo the "Costs To Be Paid By' section); or
B. Notice of the previously unknown material condltlon(s) andfor defect(s) to which Buyer objects and
Buyer's desired remedy shall be set forth on a Contingency Release form. In Which case this Agreement
shall remain In effect, subject to sub-paragraph C, below.
C. Upon receipt of notice under paragraph B. above, SeUer shall have 2 business days to give Buyer written
notlce (by signing the Buyer's Contingency Release form) that Seller Will correct such condition(s) and/or
defect(s) prior to closing. If SeUer does not sign lhe Buyer's Contingency Release form, Buyer may, within ;J.
business days following Seller's notice period, above. release the contingency in writing, or this Agreement
sh~I be null and void. In which case the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less any unpaid
expenses incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the "Costs To l3e Paid By" section). Buyer's closing of the
transaction shaD constitute acceptance of Iha condition of the Propeny, unless otherwise stated in writing
signed by both parties,
9} FHA INSPECTION REQUIREMENT, if applicable; "For Your Protection: Get a Home Inspection".
HUD 92564-CN must be signed on or before execution of this agreement
10. Lead-Based Paint Disclosure I Contingency The subject Property is "Target Housing" (built pnor to 1978)
regarding lead-based paint and/or lead-based hazards, regardless of the sourca of the lead: Yes
No
ff "YES·, Buyer has been provided with Seller's completed and signed "Disclosuro of Information and
Acknowledgement lead-Based Paint and/ or Lead-Based Paint Hazards• ("Disel0$ure·) and a copy of the
pamphlet "Protect Your Family From Lead In Your Home· rPamphler}. and one Of the following boxes must be
chocked:
Buyer shall have the unconditional right to cancel this Agreemeritand shall be allowed ten (10)days to
conduct an inspection fer lead-based paint hazards. Should Buyer elect to conduct a lead-based paint inspection.
a "Lead-Based Pain! Inspection Contingency Addendum" shall be attached hereto; OR
Buyer hereby ackl'IOW!edgos receipt of the Disclosure and Pamphlet end hereby waives the right to conduct a
lead-based paint inspecllon.

D

181.

D

D

D r8J

11.Finanelng Contingency
Yes
No
This offer is contingent ~ n Buyer securing the following flnarioing;
A$sume Existing Loan:D
New Loan: D
Type of Loan:
Conv. D FHA
Amount $/Pef'C5nt %
Maximum % Rate:
Fixed Rate
Years:
Maximum Points:
lnstltulional Lender

D
D
D

VA
Adj.Rate
Private Lender

D
D
D

Other Financing Tenns:

Buyer agrees lo make a best effort to obtain such financing and to make written application io the lender Within
_ business days after acceptance of Ul!s Agreement by both parties.

D Property must appraise at no leM than the purchase price.
D Preliminary Approval: Buyer shall. on or before-~
provide Seller with a letter from Buyer's lender evidencing preliminary approval of Buyer's abi!Hy to qualify for the
loan amount and terms set forth above, subject only to such re8$00able and customary conditions as the lender
typlcally impl)SeS on such preliminary approval letters.
If Buyer has not released !his contingency in writing on or before _ _
this Agreement shaU terminate and the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less any unpaid eXPenses
Incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to !he ·costs To Be Paid By" section of this Ag eement)
Do1M11ent# DSMGA2313
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Yes

12. Sale of Buyer's Property Contingency
This offer is contlngenl on ttle closing of a sale of Buyer's property located at:

Phone:

Usted with:
Listing Agent:
If Buyer has not released this contingency in writing on or before

this Agreement shall te1T11inate and the Earnest Money shall be refunded lo Buyer {less any unpaid expenses
incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the ·costs To Be Paid By" section of 1his Agreement).

D

[gJ

13. Seller's Right to Ac:celerate Buyer's Contingency Releases
Yes
No
Should Seller receive another acceptable offer to purchase, pnor to Buyer's contingencies being released, Seller
shall give Buyer written notice of such new offer. In the event the Buyer does not ~elease all conlingencles in
writing Wittlin_ business days after the receipt Of such notice then this Agreement shall terminate and the
Earnest Money shall be returned to Buyer (less any unpaid expenses incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the
•costs To Be Paid By" section of this Agreement). In the avent the Buyer does release the contingencies, the
Buye< shall l)(Oceed to purchase the Property under the remaining terms and conditions of this Agreement,
nolWil:hslandlng that the terms Of the new offer may be more or !ass favorable_

14. other Contingencies

Yes

[Ei

No

D

See Addendum(s)

0

1- Buyer expects to make modifications to lhe property. During the Contingency Period, Buyer shall employ
eontractor(s) and architect to determine the viability of the comtemplated modifications. This agreement is
contingent upon the B1.1yers acceptance of the viability and cost of modifications.

----·-------------------------------------'
If Buyer has not released this/ these contlngency(ies) in writing on or before
7 Business Days after mutual acceptanct
this Agreement shall terminate and the Earnest Money shall be refunded lo Buyer (less any unpaid expenses
il'ICl.lrred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the •eos15 To Be Paid By" section of this Agreement).
15. Additional Terms

Yes

tzl No D

See Addendum(s)

0

1. Property to be professionally cleaned including carpets and windows prior to close of escrow,
2. All electrical. healing and plumbing to be in good working order at close of escrow.
3. All holes from art In the walls to be repaired and painted.

Ooc;ument # D$MGA2313
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16. Included Items (In addition to Standard Terms, oaraoraph 4) Excluded Items

All kitchen appliances, washer and dryer.

Seller's personal property and belongings.

17. Costs To Be Appraisal

Well
lnsp.

Septic Septic

D

D

Standard Closing

Assess
Title Ins. EscrowFc::e ments

PaidBv
Buvers

IXl

r1

D

D

Sellers

0

D

D

Share Eauallv
NJA
See Addi.Terms

t8l
D
D

0

I:><

D
D

D

~

n

D

D

r
I)
r

I

ll'ISD.

Other:

Pumra~a

0

0
)<

[

(5,

~

[

~

I I

D
n
D

18. Broker working with Seller

Broker working with Buyer

Broker'$ Name: John Sofro
Listing Agent John Sofro

Broker's Name: Todd Conklin
Selling Agent; Deborah Sievers

Brokerage:
JAP
Maillng Address:
City, State, Zip:

Brokerage:
Coldwell Banker
Malling Address:
City, State. Zip:
Office Phone:
208 622 3400 Fax:622 3800

Office Phone:
E-Mail:

208 726 3411

Fax:

E-MaU:

19. REPRESENTATION CONFIRMATION A.ND ACl<NOWLEDG14ENT OF DISCLOSURE

Check one (1) box in Section 1 bolow and one (1 l box in Section 2 below lo confirm !hat in this transaction, Iha brOkerage(s)
involved had the folloWing relationship(s} ~th the BUYER(S) and SB.LER(S).

Section 1:

181

The brokerage working wHh the BUYER(S} ls ading as an AGENT foc th& BUVER{S).

0 Toa bmkerago working with th& SUVER(S) is acting as a LHl,UT'EO DUAi. AGENT for the BUYER($), withOUI an ASSIGNED
AGENT.
The brokerage working wilh the 8lJYER{S) ill acting aa a UMlrED OUAL AGENT for tho BUYER(S) and has an
ASSIGNED AGENT acting solely on behalf of the BUYER(S).
0 The brokerage working wilh the BUYER(S) is acting as a NONAGEITT for tho 6UYER(S).
· Section 2:
1ZJ The brokerage working willt !he SEli.ER(S) is acting a3 an AGENT for the SELLER(S).
0 Toe brokerage working with the SEU.eR(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUA!.. AGENT forttle 51:LLER(S), witl10ut an ASSIGNED
AGENT.
0 The brokerage wortcing with the SELlER(S) I& acttng as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT forttta Sl:I.LER{S) and has an
ASSIGNED AGENT ading solely r,m behalf of the SEUER(S).
0 Toe brokerage working wlth th& SELLER{S) Is acting as a NON/\GENT fot !lie SEI.LER(S}.
Each party signing tis document confirm& that he has recetved, read and understood Iha Agency Disclosure 6rocll uro
adopted or approved by lhe Idaho real estate commission and has tooseoted to lhe relat!Ol'lship confirmed above. In addition,
each party confirms that the PrOk.eraga·s agency Office pollcy was made available ror lnspectiorl and revieW.
EACH PARTY UNDERSTANDS THAT HE IS A "CUSTOMER' AND IS NOT REPRESENTED BY A BROKERAGE UNLESS

0

'!'HERE IS A SIGNED WRrrrEN AGREEMENT FOR AGENCY REPR!aSENTATION.
20. Standard Terms. All parties are acMsed to carefully review the foll owing:
1) Withdrawal of Offer/Counteroffer - By delivery of a written notice of withdrawal to the office of the broker

working wi1h the Seller or Offeree (wttetner Buyer or Seller). (A) Buyer can wltl'lclraW tt,Is offer at any time prior to
Buyer's receipt of Seller's written acceptance of this Agreement, and (8) an Offeror (whether Buyer or Seller)
may withdraw his Counteroffer at any time prior to Offerer's receipt of Offeree's written acceptance of such
Counteroffer.
2) Closing Date - On or before the closing date, Buyer and Seller shall deposit with 1he closing agency all
funds and instruments necessary to complete the sale. Closing means the date on which all documents are
either recorded or accepted by an esctow agent and the sale proceeds are available to S811or. Taxes, Insurance,
dues. assessments (using Ille last available assessment as a basis), rent, interest and reserves. Kens,
encumbrances or obligations assumed and utilities shall be pro-rated as of the Closing Oate.
Sta
Docurnent#DSMGA2313
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3) Closing Costs - Costs in addi!ion to those listed may be Incurred by Buyer and Seller. Unless otherwise agreed
herein, or prQVided by law or required by lender, Buyer shall purchase Seller's rese.ve account if Seller's loan is
assumed.
4) Included Item~ - If pt8$f!)flf; at tima of offer, all items attached, including but not limited to, floor coverings, attached
television antennae, attacheo p1umblng, bathroom Bnd lighting fixtures, window screens, window coverings, screen
doors, storm windcms, slorm doom, garage door opener(,}, mmsmHter(s). exterior trees, plants, shrubbery, water
heating apparatus and fiXtl.1(&$, attached fireplaces and frae-standlng fireplaces, awnings, venlilaliog, cooling Md
healing $Y$1emS. built-in and drop.in ranges (but excepting an other ranges), any alarms (burglar. tire, etc.), fences and
gates, fuel tanks. lrrlgallon fixtures and equipment, any Md all water and water rights, and Sil ditches and dlt.ch rights
lhat are eppooenant thereto shall be included in the sale unless otherwise provided herein.
5) Sailer's Property Disclosure - If required by TIiie 55, Chapter 25 Idaho Code. Seller shall within ten (10) calendar
days after the execu1ion of this Agreement provide to the Buyer a "Seller's Property Dlsclcsure Fonn• and Buyer shaU
have three (3) business days from receipt of the disclownt report to waive or not waive the rtght to reselnd 1he offer
based upon Information contained in tha report, a copy of which shall be delivered upon execution lo Seller.
6) New ConsttuctJon « Rec&nt Improvements· If Residential Property Is newly conslructed ot has a racent
improvement of over $2,000.00, the General Conb'actor IS reqUlred by TIiie 45, Chapter 5, Idaho Cede, to provide
certain disclosures to Iha prosp,;sclive residential real property purchaser. if applicable, Buyer should obtain such
oompleted forms from the General Contractor. Such disclosure Is the responsibility of the General Contractor and it is
not llie duty af y0ur agent to obtain lhls tnformatlon on your behaff. You are acMsed to consult Wlth any General
Contractor subject tD Idaho Cede §45-525 er se4. regard"sng the General Contractor Disclosure Statement
7) Existing Loans - Within three (3) business days of aCCfll)tance. Seller shall provide Buyerwilh all Notes and Deeds of
Trusl or olher financing documents to be assumed or taken subject to. Within five (5) business days of receipt thereof,
Buyer shall in wming notify Seiter of his I her approval or disapproval of the terms of said documents. Buyer's approval
shall not be unreasonably wtlhheld.
8} Definitions • "Business Day" shall mean Monday through Friday, excluding Saturaay and Sunday, and excluding
holidays as defined by Idaho Code, Sedion 57-5302. "NoUce(s)" shall mean a written document specifying tne
neceliliafy information. "Dellwry" shall mean transmittal of information by mall, facsimile transmission, courier, hand
delivery, or e-mail, to the addresses stated herein. "Receipt" shall mean possession of the Item of Information by the
named recipient or wllhln the office of lhe appropriatlil broker. "Written Acceptance" shall mean reco!pt of a document
signed and dated by all undersignad panies, specifying e certain Offer or Counteroffer. "Signed" shall mean a
document containing Iha original, filcslmile, photocopied or scanned signatul9 of a party, any or which shall be binding
ort the signatory.
9} Counterparts I Facsimile Tmnsmission l E-mail - This Agreement may be executed In one or more counterparts,
each is deemed to be the original hereof, and all of which together constib.lte one and the $ame in$trument. Facsimile
or email lransmission of any signed original documsnt. and relransmission of any signed facsimile or email
transmission shall be !he same as personal delivery of the or!ginal. At the request of eilh0r party, or the Closing
Agency, the parties will confm facsimile or eman transmitted signatures by signing an original document
10) Standard Title lnsur.mce - The Seller shall within a reasonable IJme after closing furnish to the Buyer e title insurance
pclicy in the amount of !he purchase price of the property showing marketable and insurable tiUe subject tn the tiens,
encumbrances and defects elsewhere Ht out in this AgJSement to be discharged or assumed by the Buyer. Prior to
c:loslng the transacllon, the Seller sliall furnish to the Buyer a commitment of title insurance poficy shawing the
condition of the title to said property. Buyer shall have el1her Ave (5) business days from the receipt of the commitment
or unUI twenty.four (24) hours prior to 1he closing, whichever first occurs. within which to object to the condition of the
!Ille as set for1h in the commitment It the Buyer dOes not object. the Buyer sh.all be deemed to have accepted the
conditions of the tille.
11} Extended and Other Coverage rrtle Poliaies -A standard policy of tille insurance does not cover certain potential
problems or rl9ks such as liens {I.e., a legal Claim against property for payment of some debt or obligation), bounda,y
disputes, claims of easement. and other matters of claims if they are not of public record al !he time of closing.
However, under Idaho raw such potential claims against the propeny may have become a legal obligaUon before 01e
purchase of the home and may not yet be of pubHc record until after too purchase. Title l118urancE1 companies may be
able to issue an ·extended coverage• policy for an additional premium. In addition to the premium for an extended
coverage Htle policy, !here may oo other cQ$f.s Involved, I.e., survey or additional closing fees. Such a policy may
protect the Buyer against sUCh problems. It is recommended that the Buyer talk to a Ufle insurance company about
what it offers in the way of extended coverage and other coverages that may be appropriate. Only the policy Itself
shows exactly what type of coverage ls offered, so contact a title company for patticulars.
Ool:lllnent# DSMGA.2313
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12) Title Conveyance - Tille of Seller Is to oo comreyed by warranty deed, unless otherwise provided, and is to be
marketable and insurable except for rights reserved in federal patents, state or railroad deeds, building or use
restrictions. building and 2:0ning regulations and ordinances of any governmental unit, and rights of way and
easements established or of record. Liens, encumbrances or defects to be discharged by Sen81' may be paid oul
of purcha$e money at date or closing. No liens, encumbrances, defects, except those which are to be discharged
or assumed by Buyer or to which title is taken subject lo, shall exist unless otherwise specified In thts Agreement.
13) Default by BUY9r- If the Buyer defaults in the performance of this Agreement, Seller will have lhe option of ( 1)
accepting the Eamast Money as liquidated damages and this Agreement shall terminate; or (2) pursuing any
oUier lawful rtght or remedy to which the Seller may b& entitled, wllieli may include specific performance. In the
case of option (1 ). Seller shall make demand In writing upon the holder of the Earnest Money, upon which
demand said holder shall pay from ti'>e Earnest Money any unpaid costs incurred by or on behalf of Seller and
Buyer related to the lransarniOn, as set forU, in the #Costs To Be Paid By" secllon above, and said holder shall
pay any remaining balance of 1he Earnest Money to the Seller_ Seller and Buyer specifically acknowledge and
agree that If Sefler elects to accept the Eamest Money as liquidated damages, such shall be the Seller's sole and
exclusiVe remedy, and such shall not be considel'ed a penalty or forfeiture.
14) Default by Seller- It is agreed that if the Htle af said property i& not marketable, or cannot reasonably be made
so withili twenty (20) business daY-f after nolk:a containing a wrltten statement of defects is delivered to the
Seller, ot if the 8eller defaults in the performance of 1his Agreement including Seller's obligations (if any) to
correct defects pursuant to Paragraph 8) C of the Inspection Contingency, the Buyer has the option of (1) having
the Earnest Money returned to the Buyer and this Agreement shall terminate; or {2) pt.J1'$1.1lng any other lawful
right or remedy to which the Buyer may be entitled. lnclu<fing specific performance. In the case of opiiOn ( 1), the
Buyer shall make demand In writing upon the holder of the Eamest Money. Upon such demand, and provided
thE:fe is 110 dispute as to the Seller's default, said holder shall refund the Earnest MonEly to the Buyer. Seller &hall
pay for the unpaid cosls Incurred of title insurance and escrow fees, if any, and any unpaid costs Incurred by or
on behalf of the Seller and !he Buyer related to the transaction. as set forth In tl'lls Agreement.
15) lnterpleader- If a dispute arises a& to Buyer's or SeUer's default and entitlement to the Earnest Money, and
such dispute is not resolved within ten (10) business days of a demand for payment of the Earnest Money by the
Buyer or the Saller, the holder or the Earnest Money shall file an interpleader action In a court of competent
jurisdiction, and shall recover Its attorneys fees and costs therefore, as provided by Idaho Code Section 5-321.
16) Attorney'a Fee&_- If either party initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or p(OCeedlng$, whleh are in
any way connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the noo-prevaifing
party reasonable costs and attorneys' fees including such costs and fees on appeal and in any bankruptcy
proceeding.
17) Risk or Loss - Prior to closing of this sale, all risk of Joss shall remain with Seller. In addition shoUld the Property
be matenatly damaged by fire or other cause prior to the closing, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option
of the Buyer. Buyer shall give written notice of intent to void the Agreement to Seller or Seller'!! Agent and shall
be entitled to a full refund of the Earnest Money.
18) Entire Agreement- This Agreement contains the entire agreement of the parties respecting toe matters herein
set forth and supersedes any prior agreemenm or negotiations respecting such matters. No agreel'Oent,
represent.alions, or warranties lncludlng, wilhout limllalions, any wammly of habitability, not expressly set forth
l'lel'ein shall be binding on either party_
19) Time Is of the 1:ssence in this Agreement.
20) Agent Representatlol'IS - The Agents representing the Buyer and Seller In this tran$$C1lon relay infonnation to
Buyers end Sellers !hat has been received from third parties. However, Agents do not make any representations
regarding flood plain, wetlands, avalanche zone, hazardous waste, environmenmi or health hazards, code
compliance. survey data, finished square footage, property siZe, zoning or oU,er physical factors nor do lhe
Agents make any representations regarding law or taxation, unless speclflcaHy set forth in writing in this
Agreement. The Buyer and Seller specifically v,,ahre all claims against the Agents regarding any of these matters
which are not speclflcally included in !his Agreement. It may be diligent and prudent for the Seller and/or Buyer to
employ lhe services of Qualified independent professionals who perform services or provide oPinions regarding
these matters, and 1he Agents may, during the course of this transaction, identify such lndMduals or entities.
Hr.>wever, Agents are not waminting in any way the seJViC85 or opinions provided by such Individuals or entities,
and the Buyer and Seller specifically waive any and afl claim5 against !he Agents regarding such Identification.

Document# 0SMGA2!13

Date ofDocumllll'lf: 02/0:J/2013

Sollct:. lnlllals

Pagel.lof7
vcr,;1..,G.ro:>f.!011

624

02/06/2013 WED

FAX

~008/012

21) FIR.PTA - Tex Withholding at Closing - The parties agree that they shall fully comply with !he Foreign
Investment ln Real Property Tax Act ('FIRPTA"). If Seller Is not a "foreign person" under FIRPTA, at closing,
Seller shall sign an affidavit stating the same. If Seller is a "foreign person· under FIRPTA, at closing 1he Cloilng
Agent shall withhold from Iha sale proceeds the appropriate tax amount and submit such amount and any
required forms to the tntemaf Revenue Service. Seller hereby indemnifies and holds Buyer and Closing Agent
harmless from any and all liability, including attorney's fees, related to Seller's taxes under FIRPT A, or otherwise,
which indemnification and hold hannless shall survive closing of the transaction.
22) AUTHORITY Of SIGNATORY: If BUYER or SELLER is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other enllty,
lhe person executing this agreement on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind BUYER or
SELLER.

THIS IS INTENDED TO BE A LEGAl.LY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, THE PARTIES ARE
ADVISED TO SEEK THE ADVICE OF AN ATTORNEY.
In the event this fomi is received by electronic transmission and / or email, the parties hereto acknowledge that they
have not changed or altered the content of this form template.

21. Buyer(s) Acc:epiance Buyer hereby acknowledges having read this Agreement in its entirety, fr.cludlng the
standard Terms, and having reoeived a copy or !his Agreement
D _ Addendum(a} attached

8uyar'a Signature

r

11-u

~lg~{-~~
Printed Name:
Mitchel Jay August
Physical Address:
Malling Address:
City, State, Zip:
Home Phone:
Fax:
Business Phone:
Fax:
E~Mad:

Printed Name:
Gwynn E. August
Physical Address:
Mamng Address:
City, State. Zip:
Home PhOne:

Fax:

Business Phone:
E-Mafl:

Fax:

22. Seller(s) Acceptance On !he specified date, Seller acknowtedges having read 1111s Agreement in its entirety,

induding lhe Standard Terms. and Seller hereby approves and accepts the offer to purchase set forth in the
bo e Agreement

'AS-IS"

0

SUbJect to attached Counteroffer

r ag-ees to carry out all of the terms thereof on the part of the Seller and acknowledges receipt of a true
copy of ihis Agreement signed by all parties.

~~

Seller's Signature

X~----------

Signature

Printed Name;
R. Kantor
Physical Address;
· Malling Address;
City, State, Zip;
Home Phone:
Business Phone:
E-Mao:
Document# DSMGA2313

,;J;~

Printed Name:
S. Kant~ fl_
_. · ~
Physical Address: ~~
J
~1ins Addr~ss:
City, state, Z1p;.._e:, 1.'l'l..-. fO '/:YT

po Boy.., LI o '6; cf4

Fax:
Fax:

Home Phone: c;,t..)1:5
Businessfhon,:

E-Mail:
Dal& of Docanam: 02/03'2013

n

c,N..J

{\

,....,

·

ffax

~ l ~·

I
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Short-Sale Addendum

Date of Addendum: 02/03/201 3

This is an ADDENDUM to the [81 Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement,
Other

0

Document#: OSMGA2313

D Counter Offer,

Date of Document: 02/03/2013

Property Address : 265 Golden Eagle Drive, Hailey, Idaho
Buyer(s):

Mitchel Jay and Gwynn E. August

Seller(s):

Kantor

A. SHORT SALE APPROVAL. This Agreement is contingent upon Seller's receipt of written consent from all existing
secured lenders and lien holders ("Short-Sale Lenders"). no later than 5:00 pm MST on 03/15/13 (date) ("Short-Sale
Contingency Date"). to reduce their respective loan balances by an amount sufficient to permil the proceeds from the sale of
the Property to pay the exlsUng balances on loans secured by the Property, real property taxes, brokerage commissions,
closing costs, and other monetary obligations the Agreement requires Seller to pay at Close Of Escrow (lncludlrg, but not
limited to, escrow charges, title charges, prorations, retrofit costs and repairs) without requiring Seller to place any funds into
escrow. If Seller fails to give Buyer written notice of all existing Short-Sale Lenders· consent by the Short-Sale Contlngency
Date, either Seller or Buyer may cancel the Agreement in writing, and Buyer shall be entitled to a return of any deposit. SeUer
shall reasonably cooperate with existing Short-Sale Lenders in the short-sale process.
B. TIME PERIODS. lime periods in the Agreement for contingencies, and/or additional terms shall begin: ( 1) as specified In
the Agreement; (2) - or if checked - [81 the day after Seller delivers to Buyer a written notice of Short-Sale Lenders' consent; or
(3) - If checked- D Other
C. NO ASSSURANCE OF LENDER APPROVAL Buyer and Seller understand that Short-Sale Lenders (1) are not
obllgated to accept a short-sale; {2) may require Seller to forward any other offer received; and (3) may accept other offers.
Additionally, Short-Sale Lenders may require that, in order to obtain their approval for a short sale, some terms of the
Agreement, such as the Close of Escrow, be amended or that Seller sign a personal note or some other obligation for all or a
portion of the amount of the secured debt reductions. Buyer and Seller do not have to agree to any of Short-Sale Lenders'
proposed terms. Buyer, Seller and Brokers do not have control over whether Short-Sale Lenders will consent to a short-sale,
or any act, omission, or decision by any Short-Sale Lender in the short-sale process.
D. BUYER AND SELLER COSTS. Buyer and Seller acknowledge that each may incur costs In conneclion with rights or
obligations under the Agreement These costs may include, but are not limited to, payments for loan applications, Inspections,
appraisals, and other reports. Such costs will be the sole responsibility of the party Incurring them, if Short-Sale Lenders do not
consent to the transaction or either party cancels pursuant to the Agreement.
E. OTHER OFFERS. Unless othefWise agreed in writing, Seller may continue to market the Property despite acceptance of
Buyer's offer, and to present to Short-Sale Lender(s) any additional offers that are received on the P.roperty.
F. CREDIT, LEGAL AND TAX ADVICE. Seller is informed that a short-sale may have credit or legal consequences and
may result in taxable income to Seller. Seller is advised to seek advice from an attorney, certified public accountant or
other expert regarding such potential consequences of a short-sale.

G. TERMINATION BY BUYER. Buyer~ may or O may not (may, if box is left unchecked} give notice to terminate this
Agreement at any time prior to the delivery of Lender Consent. It Buyer terminates this Agreement, the Earnest Money, if
deposited, shall be refunded to the Buyer.
By signing below, Buyer and Seller each acknowledge that U1ey have read, understand, accept and have received a copy of
this Short-Sale Addendum.

Buyer's Signature

11..rf;-?
Da!J!f-!,2

Signature

~
3
Date

Shon-Sale Addendum SBR Form C> 2011 Su, Valoy Bo8ld ol Resllo,o

x:_ _____ _ _____ _
Signature

Date
\lersioo 6.1 • 09121>1 1

626

02/06/2013 WED 9:53 FAX

@Oi0/012

Short-Sale Addendum

Date of Addendum: 02/03/2013

This is an ADDENDUM to the 18! Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement

Oother

Document#: DSMGA2313

Date of Document:

O Counter Offer,

02/03/2013

Property Address: 265 Golden Eagle Drive, Halley, Idaho

Buyer{s):

Mllchel Jay and Gwynn E. August

Seller{s):

Kantor

SHORT SALE APPROVAL. This Agreement Is conHngent upon Senor's receipt of wrl118n consent ftom all existing
secured lenders and len holdel's ("Short-Sale lenders'"), no later than 5:oo pm MST o n ~ (date} {·Short-sale
Conflngency Da!Ei»). to rewce their respectivo loan balances by an amount S\lfllclent to pennlt the proceeds from the sale of
the Property lo pay ttle •xisling balallCl>S on leant 88Ctired by the Property, real property mxes, brokerage rommlssfons,
closing costs, and other monetary obligations ll'le Agreement mquir9s Sell81' to pay at Close Of Escrow fincludlog. but not
Dmlled to, e&erow charges, 1ille ctlarges, pmraUOflS, retrofit costs and repairs) without requiring Seller to placa arJ'] funds Into
e:,cmw. If Seller fails to give Buyerwrltren notice of all existing Short-Sale J.eaclers' conaent by the Short-Sale Contingency
Date, eilher Seller or Buyer may cancel the Agreemenl in wrffing, and Buyer shafl be enttlled to a return of any depOSit Seller
;hall f8ffli0nably cooperate with existing Short.Sale Lenders fn the short-ea!& pmcess.
A.

B. TIME PERIODS. Time periods in !he AgrHmal'lt for contingencies. and/or additional terms shall begin: (1) as specified in
Ille Agreement; (2} - or if checked -181 lhe day .sfter SeDer delivers to Buyer a wrlttoo JlOllce of Short.Salo Lenden;' conslilllt; er

(3) - if dlecke<f.. D Other

C. NO ASSSURANCI: OF LENDER APPROVAL.. Buyer and SoUer undersland lhat Short-Sala Lenders (1) are not
obligated to accept a short-sale; {2) may require Seller to forward any other offer received; and (3) may accepl other offers.
Additionelly. Short-Sale Lenders may require that, In order to oblain their approval for a llhort sale, 9Mle terms of the
Agreement, such as 1he Close of Escrow, be amended or that Senor sign u personal note or some other obligation for all or a
portion of the amount of the SGCured debt reducllons. Buyer and Seller do not have It! agree to any of Shott-Sal& Lendern'
propo&ed terrn6. Buyer, Seller ood Brokers do not haw canlrol over wl'letiler Short-Sale Lenoen; wlll consent to a shol'kale,
or any act, omission, or decision by any Short-Sale Lender In the ahort-aale proce5s.
D. BUYER AfllD SEU.ER COSTS. Buyer .and seoer 1.1eknowledge !hat each may incut eosts ln connection With rights or
/
oblgalio1111 under the Agmement Theee wsts may include, bu! are not limited to, J)&yments for loan 11pp6callons, Inspections,
appraisal&. and other reports. Such costs wm be the sole ~pon:,i'bility of the party incurring them, if Short-Sale lender$ dO not
consent w the lransactlon or eilher party cancels pursuant to lhe AgreemenL
E. OTHER OA=ERS. Unless othe!wise agreed In w!lllng, Seller may continue to market the Ptoperty despite acceptance of
Buyers offer, and to prel!Cnt lo Short-Sale Lender(s} any eddlUonal offers Iha!: are received en the P.roperl.y.

t. CREDfT, l.EOAI.. AND TAX ADVICE. sener is Informed that a shOJt..:sale may ha~ credit rs legal eoru1&qUllflces and
may result In taxable income lo Seller. Seller is advised to seek advice from an attorney, certified public accountant or
ottier expert regarding such pot~ntlal consequences of a short.sale.
G. TERMINATION BY BUYER. Buyer 181 may or D may not (rn.,y, if box is lett uncooci<ed} give notice to terminate this
Agreement at any lime prior to the delivery of Lender Consent If Buyer tenninates this Agreell'!fflt. the Earnest Money, if
deposited, shall be refunded to the Buyer.

By signing below, Buyer and Seller each aclolow!edge that they have read, und&tllland, accept arid have received a copy of
this Short-Sele Addendum.
·

Seller's Signature

x,____________
Slgnawra

~
Dale
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SCOT M. LUDWIG
DANIEL A. MILLER
LUDWIG • SHOUFLER •
Attorneys at Law
209 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: 208-387-0400
Facsimile: 208-387-1999
ISB 3506
ISB 3571

FI LED ~. ~.

..........._"-=-llo-4,

SEP 1 2 2013
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Court S1alrie Ooun klaho

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,

)
)

)
)

CASE NO. CV-2012-734

vs.

)

SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,

)
)

BENCH BRIEF, RE:
MOTIONS FOR
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiff,

)
)

Defendant.

.
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, ROBERT ARON KANTOR, by and through his attorneys, Scot
M. Ludwig and Daniel A. Miller of Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP, and hereby submits this
Bench Brief to the Court relating to the pending Motions pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
65(a)-(e).
Mr. Kantor seeks an Order entering a Preliminary Injunction enjoining Ms. Kantor, her

BENCH BRIEF, RE: MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF -1-
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regarding the financing on

Golden

Ms. Kantor has requested a Preliminary Injunction requiring Mr. Kantor to cease taking any
further actions with regard to a Joan modification and to cooperate fully in consummating a short sale
with the Augusts.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e) (grounds for preliminary injunction) provides, in relevant
part, that
A preliminary injunction may be granted in the following cases:
(I) When it appears by the complaint that plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded,

and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.
(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance
of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury

to plaintiff.
(3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens, or
is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the
plaintiffs rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual...
(5) A preliminary injunction may also be granted on the motion of the defendant
upon the filing a counterclaim, praying for affirmative relief upon any of the grounds
mentioned above in this section, subject to the same rules and provisions provided
for the issuance of injunctions on behalf of the plaintiff.

BENCH BRIEF, RE: MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF -2-
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65(e)(

Whenever a party is relying

as the grounds upon which to enter an injunction

our Supreme Court has stated that the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction rests within the
discretion of the trial court. Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513,517,681 P .2d 988,992 (1984).
A preliminary injunction should be granted where the right is very clear and it appears that
irreparable injury will flow from its refusal. Harris, supra, 106 Idaho at 518.
EVIDENTIARY ISSUE
Mr. Kantor has had numerous conversations with Bank of America employees regarding the
financing of the Golden Eagle property. It should be noted that although the Property Settlement
Agreement states that the property should be sold as soon as reasonably possible (paragraph 5.0 l)
there is absolutely no prohibition in the Property SettlemenfAgreement that prevents a Party from
working with the lender to modify the loan that is secured by the real property.

In light of there being no prohibitions in the contract preventing Mr. Kantor from working
with the lender, Mr. Kantor has been working to improve the Parties' financial position by seeking
a Joan modification from Bank of America. As a result of Mr. Kantor's efforts a Bank of America
employee has told Mr. Kantor that he has been approved for a loan modification program. Mr.
Kantor also has correspondence from Bank of America that supports his claim that Bank of America
will approve Mr. Kantor entering into a program that provides home owners the opportunity to
modify their loans.
The correspondence Mr. Kantor has received and the taped phone conversation of the Bank

of America employee stating that Mr. Kantor has Bank of America approval to enter into the
program are admissible pursuant to Idaho's Rules of Evidence.

BENCH BRIEF, RE: MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF -3-
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1

803(3)
a declarant that shows

an exception to the hearsay rule for a statement made
intent or plan of the declarant.

The

recording and correspondence show Bank of America's intent or plan as it relates to the Kantor's
loan,with Bank of America.
In the case of Herrickv. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293,900 P.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1995), our Court
of Appeals held that out of court statements made by a property owner as to her intent to go into the
cattle business were admissible pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(3). Herrick, 127 Idaho at
301. The Court went on to note that the rationale for the 803(3) exception is that the element of
contemporaneity provides some assurance against fabrication. Id.
In this particular case the statements made by the Bank of America employee cannot be
disputed as there is a tape recording of those statements. In addition, they were made pursuant to
a conversation about the parties' loan and the modification. This Court should allow the admission
of the tape recording as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(15) provide an exception to the hearsay rule for statements that
are contained in documents that purport to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter was
relevant to the purpose of the document. LR. E. 803(15). The letters Mr. Kantor has from the Bank
of America are documents that address and relate to an interest in the Kantor property. The purpose
of those letters was to address the Bank's interest in that property. This Court should allow the
admission of the Bank of America letters pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(15) and 803(3).

BENCH BRIEF, RE: MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF -4~

631

2013.

rsoN,

BRIEF, RE: MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

632

v. Leuzinger, 1

0

Page 1 of 11

293

•

VF? \FF

Atb

.M.??m
Tools

.~Hernck v. Leuz,nger, 127 Idaho 293
Reporter 12.7 !doho 293

page

+
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About this Document
Topic: Summaries

v,ew reports

Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293 (Copy citation)
Court of Appeals of Idaho
June 9, 1995, Filed
Docket No. 20361, 1995 Opinion No. 60

(8)

Legal Issue Trail
What's th1st

Activate Passages

Reporter: 127 ldaho 293 i 900 P.2d 701 I 1995 jda. App. LEXIS 78
(Callaghan) 1152

! 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d

GERALD D. HERRICK and KATHRYN 5. HERRICK, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants·Cross
Respondents, v. DOYLE LEU ZINGER and JUDI LEUZINGER, husband and wife, Defendants·
Respondents-Cross Appellants.
Subsequent History: Petition for Review Den,ed August 25, 1995. Released for Publication
August 2.5, 1995.
Prior History: Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Custer County. Hon. James C. Herndon, District Judge.

Disposition: Judgment for defendants on conversion and fraud claims, vacated and case
remanded.

Core Terms
cattle, gift, bill of sale, hearsay, notebook, brand, district court, herd, directed verdict, deposition,
lease, ranch, summary judgment, attorney's fees, donative intent, parol evidence rule, hearsay
rule, tnal court, regularly, grazing, commercial transaction, statute of limitations, head of cattle,
contradict, custodian, decedent, delivery, calf, identification, ownership
Case Summary

Procedural Posture
Plaintiff landowners filed suit against defendant cattle rancners claimmg that the ranchers had
converted the iandowners' cattle to their own use and comm,tted fraud. The District Court of the
Seventh Judicial District, Custer County (Idaho) granted judgment in favor of the ranchers. The
landowners appealed.
Overview
The ranchers had an agreement with the landowners' predecessors that the ranchers would
lease the predecessors' ranch and manage the predecessors' herd of cattle along with their own
and the parties would split the profits from calves sold at auction each year. After the death of
the predecessors, the ranchers claimed that the entire herd belonged to them as a result of a
gift by the predecessors. At trial, the landowners sought to admit evidence of the predecessors'
bookkeeping documents and statements from a witness in support of their contention that there
had ·been no gift of the cattle. The trial court refused to admit the evidence as inadmissible
hearsay, and judgment was rendered in favor of the ranchers. On appeal, the court reversed
and remanded the matter for a new trial, fmding that the trial court had erred in refusing to
admit the evidence which was probative of whether the predecessors had continued to maintain
that they owned the cattle even after the purported gift, which was evidence that could have
negated donative intent.
Outcome
The trial court's judgment in favor of the ranchers on the landowners' conversion and fraud
claims was vacated and the matter was remanded for a new trial.
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~± When

reviewing the disposition of a motion for a directed verdict under Idaho R. Civ. P.
SO( a), the appellate court utilizes the same standard that governs the tnal court's decision. The
court must determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every
legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party, there exists substantial evidence to
justify su~mitting the case to the Jury. snepa,qizi, · Narrow bv this Headnote

Evtdence >
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Documentary Evidence

> ~ >

Evidence> .. >~>~-Business Recoros >

!::!J:Q.± Idaho R. Ev1d.

Genera! Overview
General Overview

803{6)

provides an exception to the hearsay exclusion for any:
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, cond1t1ons,
opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept m the course of a regularly conducted busmess activity, and if ,t
was the'regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness,
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness. She;oardize - Narrow pv this Headnote
Evidence > .. > ~

_>

di Business Records > Genera1 Overview

~± Idaho R.

Evid. 803(6\ does not require a foundation of testimony by the person who
prepared the document in order to admit the document as a business record. The general
requirement for admission under Idaho R. Evict. 803(6) 1s that the document be produced m the
ordinary course of business, at or near the time of occurrence and not in anticipation of
tria!. Sheoarc11ze - Narrow bY this Headnote
Evidence > . , > Statements a~ Evidence > ~ > General Qverv,gw
Evidence > ... > ~ > fple Components > ~
Evidence > ... > ~ > Ryle Components > Trutn pf Nlatter Asserted

l::1l!!.5.± An out-of-court statement or writing is hearsay only if it is offered ro prove the truth of
the matter asserted. Idaho R. Evid 80Hcl. When a statement 1s not being offered as proof of
the facts contained in the statement, but merely as proof that the statement was made, the
hearsay rule has no application. A statement that would be inadmissible hearsay if offered to
prove the truth of the assertion 1s nonetheless admissible (generally with an appropriate hmit•ng
instruction to the jury) if the mere fact the statement was made 1s itself relevant. saeoard.'ze ·
Narrow bY thic: Headnote
> Genera! Provisions {Art1c1~ 1) > General Drpv!i::ions
> Sales (Article 2} > Gen.oral Overview
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ill

Parot Ev1aence

tlt!§.± The parol evidence doctrine 1s a rule of contract construction and provides generally that
when a contract has been reduced to a writing that the parties intend to be a final statement of
their agreement, evidence of any prior or contemporaneous agreements or understandings
which relate tc the same subJect matter 1s not admissible to vary or contradict the terms of the
written contract. ln its application to contracts for the sale of goods, including the sale of cattle,
this common law rule has been codified in the Uniform Commercial Code, Idaho Code § 28·2l.Ql. snea@rc11z1; · Narrow PY tbrs Headnote
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> ... > Form Formation & Readmstment > Paro! Evidence Ryle > General Overview
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> Ill Paro! Evidence > General overview
Readiustments > Paro! Evidence
Iii Ora! Agreements

Contract lnterorotatron
... > saies or Goocts >
Types of Contracts >

1:1!!1.Z.± Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28·2-202, terms with respect to which the confirmatory
memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set Forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous
oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented: (a) by course of dealing or usage of
trade ( Idaho Code§ 28·1-205) or by course of performance ( Idaho Code § 28·2·208); and(b)
by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been
intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. Sneoarct,ze Narrow PY thi$ Headnote
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tf1!lll.± The community or separate property status of an asset acquired during a marriage is
determmed by the source of funds with which it was purchased, not by the fact that only one
spouse 1s named as owner on a document of title. sne®rd:ze ~ Narrow bY th!' Headnote
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§ 12-120(3} provides that the prevailing party in a lawsuit arising from a
commercial transaction is entitled to the award of a reasonable attorney fee. The term
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-·Mi;i!.C.~, .Ms!rrk~.& Mo.n_l;goroe.r'Y., Boise, for ;;;,,;:;r,nriiPnt<.7:i,,,fi'
Judges: J.-.i>,N.$!N.G, Jucge. Chief Judge j/1/!\i,.TJ:;RS. and Judge PJ:;P,J',Y CONCUR.

Opinion by: t-AN.$\111~
Opinion
[29S] LAN$ING, Judge
The plaintiffs, Gerald and Kathryn Herrick, filed suit alleging that Doyle and Judi Leuzinger had
converted the Herncks' cattle to their own use and committed fraud. The Leuzmgers asserted m
defense that the Herricks' predecessors ,n interest had gifted the cattle herd to the Leuzingers. At
the close of evidence the Herricks moved for a directed verdict, which was derned. The jury found
in favor of the Leuz1ngers. The Herricks now appeal, asserting error in the oemal of their motion
for a directed verdict ano numerous errors in the exclusion of evidence by the district court. We
affirm the district court's denial of a directed verdict, but because we find that evidence was
erroneously excluded by the district court to the Herncks' detriment, we reverse and remand the
case for a new trial.

I. FACTS
Prior to 1973 Mildred and Lewis Carlisle acquired land in Custer County known as the Broken Wing
Ranch. The Carlisles obtained a registered brand certificate for use of an "ML" cattle brand. They
also held a United States Forest Service permit entitling them to graze 150 head of cattle on
Forest Service land.
In 1973 the Carlisles purchased forty-five head of cattle with the proceeds of a five-year bank
loan. The bill of sale states that the cattle were sold to Lewis, and Mildred's name does not appear
on the document. The Carlisles did not operate the ranch themselves or manage the cattle herd.
Rather, neighboring ranchers and close friends, Doyle and Judi Leuzinger, leased tne ranch from
the Carlis!es and managed their herd. All parties agree that from 1973 until 1975, the Leuzingers
were managing the Carlisle herd in exchange for one-half of the profits from the yearly calf crop.
During this period, if any of the calves were retained by the Carlisles to replace a cow or to expand
the herd size, the Carhsles paid the Leuzingers half the value of that calf.
ln c982 Lewis Carlisle died, leaving all of his interest in the ranch to Mildred. ln 1988 Mildred
passed away. She bequeathed the ranch to a trust administered by First Interstate Bank. The
benef1c1anes of the trust were various relatives of Mildred. For convenience, the trust and
beneficiaries are hereinafter referred to collectively as Mildred's heirs.
At various points in 1988 and 1989, the heirs, while visiting the ranch, asked the Leuzmgers about
the ownership of cattle that were being grazed on the ranch. The Leuzingers stated that none of
the cattle belonged to the Carlisles. Mildred's heirs eventually sold their interest in the ranch to
Gerald and Kathryn Hernck, the plaintiffs m the current action. The sale included a transfer of any
rights the heirs possessed in the herd of cattle. When the Herricks began investigating to
determine what cattle were encompassed withm their purchase, the Leuzingers [296] again
asserted that all of the cattle on the Broken Wing Ranch belonged to them.
On November 19, 1991, the Herricks brought suit against the Leuzingers for an accounting,
alleging that the Leuzingers, as the Carlisles' managers, owed an accounting for assets. In January
1992, the Leuzingers answered and filed a counterclaim asserting that the Herricks had breached
the Leuzingers' lease of the Broken Wing Ranch. Eventually, through discovery, the Herricks
learned it was the Leuzmgers' contention that in 1975 Lewis Carlisle had transferred the entire
herd to the Leuzingers as a gift Thereafter the Herricks amended their complaint to allege that
the Leuzingers had converted the herd to their own use and had committed fraud.
The trial court bifurcated the trial, separating out the Leuzingers' counterclaim for breach of lease
from the issues raised by the Herricks' complaint. A court trial on the breach of lease case was
held in April 1992, and the court found for the Leuzingers.
A Jury tnal was then held on the Herncks' claims in October 1993. At this trial Doyle Leuzinger
testified that in 1975 Lewis Carlisle had given the entire herd to the Leuzingers. He stated that out
of gratitude for this gift, and to enable the Carhsles to obtain certain tax advantages from their
ownership cf the Broken Wing Ranch, even after the cattle were given to them the Leuzingers
continued to split the yearly calf crop with the Carhsles. This sharing of the calf crop after 1975
was, according to the Leuz1ngers, a return gift to the Carlisles. ln 1975 when Lewis allegedly gave
the cattle to the Leuzingers, he executed a bill of sale which recited that Lewis Carlisle sold to
Doyle Leuz1nger seventy-eight head of cattle bearing tne Carlisles' "ML" brand. Doyle Leuzinger
testified at one point that this bill of sale was to transfer title and thereby effectuate the gift. At
another point he testified that the bill of sale was executed because the Leuzingers were running
their own cattle on United States Forest Service land for which the Carlis!es' held a grazing permit.
In order to graze their cattle on the land, he said, the Leuzingers had branded their own cattle
with the Carlisles' ML brand in addition to the Leuzingers' brand. Doyle Leuzinger stated that he
therefore asked Lewis Carlisle to execute the bill of sale in order to show that these cattle, though
falsely branded with the ML brand, belonged to the Leuzingers.
From 1975 until Mildred's death in 1988, the leuzingers continued to split with the Carhsles (and
after Lewis' death, with Mildred) the yearly calf crop from those cows branded solely with the ML
brand. During this period, the Carlisles continued to pay Leuzinger one-half the vaiue of any calves
retamed and not sold at the yearly auction. In 1983, at Doyle Leuzinger's request, Mildred
executed a bill of sale to the Leuzingers for seventy-four head of cattle. Doyle Leuzinger testified
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A: the close of the evidence m the October 1993 trial on the conversion and fraud claims, the
Hemcks moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the Leuzingers had failed to carry their burden
of proof regarding the alleged gift. The tnal court derned the motion, and the Jury later returned a
verdict for the Leuzingers. On appeal the Herncks contend that the district court erred in excluding
certain evidence, giving an improper Jury instruction, and denying the motion for directed verdict.
The Leuzmgers cross-appeal from the denial of a motion for summary Judgment they had filed and
the denial of their request for attorney fees in the breach of lease case which was tried to the
court in April 1992.

II. MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
We first address the Herncks' argument that they are entitled to a directed verdict on the
Leuzingers· affirmative defense of gift. They contend that the tnal evidence was insufficient to
support a finding by the Jury [297) that the Carlisles gave the herd to the Leuz1ngers. The
Herncks point out that !::!!:J.J_+ under Idaho law, proof of an enforceable gift must include a
showing that the transferor had a present donative intent and that the gift was delivered to the
donee with the donor immediately relinquishing all dominion over the obJect given. See
Christiansen v. Rumsev 91 Idaho 684. 42C} P.2d 416 11967); Claunch v. Whyte 73 Idaho 243.
249 P,2d 915 ( 1952). Because 1t 1s undisputed that the Carlisles continued to receive income from
the calf crops until Mildred's death, the Herricks argue there was no complete relinquishment of
dominion over the cattle herd and that an essential element for the claim of gift was therefore
m1ss1ng.

l::J.N2.+

When reviewing the disposition of a motion for a directed verdict under l.R.C.P. SO(a), we
utilize the same standard that governs the trial court's decision. That is, we must determine
whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most
favorably to the opposing party, there exists substantial evidence to Justify submitting the case to
the jury. Quick v Crane 111 ldaho 759. 727 P,2d 1187 !1986); StPohens y. Steams• 106 ldaho
249 678 P.2d 41 r1984); Smith v Great Basin Grain Co. 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 {1977).

Applymg this standard, we conclude that the d1stnct court correctly denied the Herricks' motior..
The Leuz1ngers presented evidence that Lewis Carlisle expressed an intent to completely transfer
all control over the cattle to the Leuzingers and that because the cattle were already on the ranch
which they leased from the Carllsles, delivery was complete at the inception of the alleged gift.
They also presented testimony from two of Lewis's friends who said Lewis had told them that he
gave the cattle to tne Leuzmgers. As explanation for the fact that the Carlisles continued to
receive nalf the income from the calf crops, the Leuz1ngers testified that this income was a gift
back from them to the Cari1sles, not a retention of control or limitation on the gift imposed by
Lewis Carlisle. Although the Herncks presented evidence that called into question the credibility of
this explanation from the Leuz1ngers, we cannot say that the evidence of gift was insufficient to
submit the question to the Jury. Accordingly, the d1stnct court's denial of the motion for a directed
verdict is affirmed.

!I!. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
The Herricks maintain that the trial court committed error by excluding from evidence testimony
about statements made by Mildred to her sister and three exhibits. This evidence was offered by
the Herncks principally to show that Mildred and Lewis considered themselves to b€ the owners of
the cattle herd both before and after the date when the Leuzingers allege Lewis gave the cattle
away.
A. HANDWRITTEN NOTEBOOK OF MILDRED CARLISLE
The Herricks contend the court erred in excluding a spiral notebook in which Mildred Carhsle made

handwritten entries from 1973 to 1986. On their face, these entries purport to record the
expenses and earnings of the cattle operation at Broken Wing Ranch for those years. The district
court sustained the Leuzmgers' obJect1on that the notebook contents were hearsay.
On appeal, the Herricks aver that the notebook should have been admitted under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule. l:lli3.+ LR E 803(5). That rule provides an exception to the
hearsay exclusion for any:
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity
to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack cif trustworthiness.
The premise for this hearsay exception is that business records possess a high degree of reliability
because persons [298] engaged in business inherently have incentives to keep accurate and
truthful records. Curiel v Minqo 100 Idaho 303 305 597 P.2d 26 28 ( 1979}; Christensen v
Rire 114 Idaho 929 933-34, 763 P.2d 302, 306·07 (Ct. App. 1988); 2 Kenneth S. Broun et al.
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 286 at 264 (John W. Strong ed. 4th Ed. 1992). Prior to adoption of
the idaho Rules of Evidence, admission of business records was governed by LC. § 9·414. wh1cn
is similar to !.R.E. 80316). Sectior 9-414 and Rule 803(6) have been interpreted broadly to
liberally allow ,ntroduct1011 of such records See Curiel v. Mingo, 100 ldaho at 305, 597 P.2d at
305; Beco Corporation v. Robe[Ts & Son, Cons:truc:tion Companv, inc. 114 Idaho 704, 71 L 760
P.2d 1120, 1127·{19881 overruled on other grounds. Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, : 19
Idaho 72 803 P.2d 978 ( • 990). In doubtful or close cases, evidence should be admitted under the
business records exception. 8"CQ Corp. 114 idaho at 711 760 P.2d at 1127.
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the ordinary course of business, at or ·near the time oi occurrence and
not in anticipation of tnai.· The comment to LR.E. 803(6) ooints out:
Because records of regularly conducted act,vity are not normally self proving, as
public records may be under Rule 803(8), the testimony of the custodian or other
person who can explain the record keeping of the organization 1s ordmarily essential.
The custodian need not have personal knowledge of the actual creation of the
document nor need [the custodian] have been an employee of the business when the
record was made. The test 1s whether [the custodian] has knowledge of the system
used to make the record and not whether [ the custodian] has knowledge of the
contents of the record.

Large v. Cafferty Realty Inc., 123 Idaho 676 683, 851 P.2d 972 979, (1993) quoting from
REPORT OF IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, C 803, p. 10 (Supplemental 6/1/85)
(citation omitted).
In the present case, Dons Long, Mildred Carlisle's sister, testified that the entries in the cattle
spiral notebook were 1n Mildred's handwriting, that it was Mildred's regular practice to annually
make entries in the notebook, and that the notebook constituted the thirteen-year compilation of
such records of income and expenses related to the cattle operation. Doris based her testimony
upon personal knowledge, having assisted Mildred m maintaining her records, though not the
notebook specifically, during Mildred's final illness. Doris testified that Mildred kept the spiral
notebook and numerous receipts and other documents relating to the cattle in a folder labeled
"cattle." Doyle Leuzinger testified that he regularly reported the transactions involving the cattle
herd to both Lewis and Mildred prior to their deaths. Finally, the tna! court heard the testimony of
Robert Overstreet, a certified public accountant who compared the entries in the notebook to the
various rece1ots and other records contained in the folder marked "cattle." Overstreet testified that
the entries in the notebook accurately reflected 1nformat1on on the receipts and check stubs
contained in the folder,
Th,s evidence, taken together, established the necessary foundation to show that Mildred's spiral
notebook fell within the Rule 803(6) hearsay exception. The testimony'of Dons, who was a
qualified witness by virtue of her familiarity with Mildred's record-keeping methods, indicated that
the notebook entries were made regularly at or near the time of occurrence as part of the records
of the cattle operation, and that this record was not prepared in ant1cipat1on of lit1gat1on. Further,
the testimony of Robert Overstreet 1nd1cated that tne notebook rehably reflected the receipts and
check stubs showing ,ncome from and expenses of the cattle. Although this foundational testimony
was offered at different times in the trial and not" as a [2.99) cohesive "offer of proof," when the
notebook was offered following all of the foregoing testimony, a sufficient foundation had been
established to bring the notebook within the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and ,t
should have been admitted into evidence. W
The erroneous exclusion of evidence Justifies setting aside a Jury verdict only i' substantial rights
of the parties were affected by the error. I.R.C.P. 61;· l.R.E. 103(a}. In our v,ew, the exclusion of
the spiral notebook was sufficiently preJudic1al to the HerrickS that the verd,ct and Judgment must
be vacated. The Herricks were faced with the Leuzingers' assertion that cattle once belonging to
the Carhsles had been gifted to the Leuzingers. The Leuzingers relied principally upon Doyle
Leuzinger's own testimony of a conversation with Lewis Carlisle that had not been witnessed by
any other person. With Lewis Carlisle now deceased, the Herricks had no ability to directly refute
Doyle Leuzinger's version of that conversation but, of necessity, had to rely upon less direct
evidence of Lewis and Mildred Carlisle's understanding regarding ownership of the cattle. The
spiral notebook was indirect evidence that Mildred believed herself to be the owner of the herd. An
inference of such belief on Mildred's part could be drawn both from the fact that such detailed
records of the cattle operation were maintained and from the content of entnes regarding
particular expenses paid and income received. The notebook entries would have been probative
for the Jury's determination as to whether the cattle had been gifted to the Leuzmgers and, if not,
the number of cattle owned by Mildred at the time of her death. Because the Jtiry was prevented
from considering this probative evidence, the Judgment in favor of the Leuzingers on the fraud and
conversion claims must be set aside and the case remanded for a new trial.
B. STATEMENTS OF MILDRED TO DORIS LONG
Before trial, the leuzingers filed two rnot1ons ,n limine seeking to exclude from trial any testimony
by Doris Long regarding statements made by Mildred to Doris relative to ownership of the ca.ttle.
The distnct court apparently held that these statements were inadmissible parol evidence because
they would alter or contradict the terms of the 1973, 1975 and 1983 bills of sale. At trial, the
Herncks sought to ehcit testimony from Doris regarding at least one statement, apparently made
by Mildred in 1973 shortly after the car11sles purchased the cattle. Ill According to the offer of
proof, the proffered evidence was to the effect that Mildred said to Dons: "You won't believe it, but
I'm in the cattle business;" to which Doris responded, "You>'' Mildred then replied: "Yeah. Me,
myself personally. l have gone into the cattle business." Upon ObJection by the Leuzingers, the
district court again ruled this testimony inadmissible both because it violated the parol evidence
rule and because it was [300] hearsay. We therefore review each of these grounds for
exclusion.
·
l. Parol Evidence Rulel:l!YR+ The parol evidence doctrine 1s a rule of contract construction and
provides generally that when a contract has been reduced to a writing that the parties intend to be
a final statement of their agreement, evidence of any prior or contemporaneous agreements or
understandings which relate to the same subject matter is not admlssll:>le to vary or contradict the
terms of the written contract. Tuscn Enterprises v. Coffin 113 Idaho 37 44,740 P.2d 1022 1029
ill.!lZl.; Chapman v. Haney Seed Co., Inc .. 102 Idaho 26t28, 624 P,2d 408. 410 /l981). In its
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· -··seve·nt)Fl!1gm nellcn:rr~rnewnrc1nne-.:.eazmgers·i::onrerm w,g··grve-r,··r1nme·cnn1m::-T11e·m,ri::rw1rs· a bill of sale from Mildred Carl!sle 1r 1983 to Doyle and iudi Leuztnger for s1xty·three head of
cattle.
The Leuzingers contend that Mildred's statements that she was going into the cattle business
would contradict the 1973 bili of sale by indicating that Mildred was an owner of the cattle, while
the bill of sale indicates that Lewis alone had purchased them. The parol evidence rule is
inapplicable, however, for it excludes only extnnsic evidence of agreements or understandings
that precede or are contemporaneous with the written contract; it does not preclude evidence of
agreements or statements made after the writing. Brewer v. Pitkm 99 Idaho 114, 116 577 P.2d
1162, H66 (1978); Tusch 113 Idaho at 44 740 P.2d at 1029. The bill of sale showing Lewis as
purchaser does not obviate the possibility that Mildred subsequently acquired an interest in the
cattle, by gift from Lewis or otherwise. Moreover, tl.!!J[+ the community or separate property
status of an asset acquired during a marnage ,s determined by the source of funds with which it
was purchased, not by the fact that only one spouse is named as owner on a document of title.
Stanger v. Stanger 98 Idaho 725 571 P.2d 1126 (1970); Farmers Insurance Exchange v.
Wendler 84 ldaho 114 118 368 P.2d 933 935 ( 1962); Bowman v. Bowman 72 Idaho 266 270
240 P.2d 487 489 11952).
The parol evidence rule likewise has no application v1s·a·vis the 1975 bill of sale from Lewis to the
Leuzmgers, which the Leuzingers contend was delivered to evidence a gift. First, as noted above,
the parol evidence rule applies only to evidence of agreements or understandings between the
parties to the writing which vary or contradict the written contract. Absent any evidence that she
Joined or acquiesced in the alleged gih, Mildred was not a party to the writing; and her statements
to Dons that she was gomg into the cattle business were not evidence of any agreement or
understanding with the Leuzingers.
Second, even the Leuzingers, who are the proponents of the bill of sale and advocate for
application of the parol evidence rule, acknowledge that the bill of sale 1s not an accurate
expression of their agreement with Lewis. In direct contradiction of the bill of sale's statement tnat
the cattle were being "bargained and sold to" the Leuzingers, the Leuzingers presented extrinsic
evidence that [301] Lewis contemporaneously said he was giving the cattle to therr and that the
bill of sale was intended to effectuate a gift. Moreover, at one point Doyle Leuzinger also testified
that the 1975 bill of sale was intended to not only convey Lewis's cattle but also to essentially
clear the title to the Leuzmgers' own cattle, which carried both the Leuzingers' brand and the
Carlisles' Ml brand in order to take advantage of Carhsles' grazing rights. Both the Leuzingers'
position that the bill of sale effectuated a gift and their testimony that it covered cattle the
Leuzmgers already owned are fundamentaliy inconsistent with their reliance upon the parol
evidence ruie. In short, the 1975 bill of sale does not, by virtue of the parol evidence rule, present
an obstacle to the admissibility of Doris's testimony about Mildred's 1973 statements that she was
entering the cattle business.
Finaliy, the 1983 bill of sale from Mildred to the Leuzingers provides no basis for exclusion of parol
evidence for the same reasons that apply to the 1975 bill of sale. The Leuzingers themselves
acknowledge that it, like the 1975 bill of sale, is not what it purports to be. Their evidence showed
1t was not a conveyance by Mildred but was a device used to again clear title to the Leuzingers'
own cattle which falsely carried the Carlisle brand in order to gain use nf grazing rights.
2. Hearsay
The district court also concluded that Mildred's statements to Dons were inadmissible as hearsay.
The Herncks contend that the statements fell within the hearsay exceptions of LR.E. 803/3) (then
existing mental or physical condition) and 803(24) (the residual exception).

J:ll!l!l+

ldaho Rule of Evidence 803(3) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for statements
offered to prove the declarant's then-existing mental or physical condition. The rule provides that
a hearsay statement is admissible if 1t is:
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
phys,cal condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feelmg, pain, and
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification,
or terms of declarant's will.

The rationale for the Rule 80313) hearsay exception 1s that the element of contemporaneity
provides some assurance against fabrication. REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE
COMMJITEE, C 803 p. 4 (Supplemented 6/1/1985),
Rule 803(3) effecteC: no change from prevmus Idaho law except, perhaps, with respect to
statements of memory. Id., at 4·6. Idaho law has long allowed evidence of statements of a
decedent to snow that she had considered herself to be the owner of certain property. In
Fredricksen v. Fullmer. 74 Idaho 164 258 P,2d 1155 {1953), an alleged purchaser of the
decedent's real property produced a copy of a sale contract purportedly signed by the decedent
and sought to compel specific performance of the contract by the decedent's estate. The estate
denied that the contract was genuine and sought to introduce evidence of the decedent's
statements made and letters written after the date of the alleged contract indicating that she
believed that she was still the owner of the premises. The Court, citing its previous decision in me
same case, Fr,.dricksen v, Luthy 72 Idaho 164 238 P 2d 430 {195ll, held the statements and
ietters were admissible despite a hearsay objection.
In Crensnaw v Crenshaw 68 ldaho 470 1 99 P.2d 264 0948). the parties disouted whether a
deed, executed t,y the deceased granter, was delivered to the grantee prior to the grantor's death.
Both the grantor's estate and the grantee sought.to. introduce ~t_"..~er:;~nt5._by_the deceased
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Id at 476 199 P 2d at 267.
Thus, by terms of i.R.E. 803(3) and the aforementioned decisions, the adm,sslbillty of Mildred's
statements to Doris turns upon whether the statements were probative as to Mildred's state of
mind about ownership of the cattle. It is apparent that Mildred's statements to Doris indicated her
belief that she owned the cattle shortly after their acquisition in 1973, and the statements are
therefore relevant for determining whether she had an ownership interest.
This evidence was relevant to a material issue in the action. The existence of donative intent was
a central issue with respect to Leuzingers' contention that Lew,s Carlisle gave the cattle to them in
1975. !::ll!!1.1.+ A gift occurs when there is a delivery of the asset to the donee with a present
donative intent. In re Estate of Lew•s 97 Idaho 299 302 543 P 2d 852. 855 (1975), The person
whose donative intent must be shown to prove a gift is, of course, the person who owned the
property and thus had authority to give it away. If the property at issue is community property. it
may not be g,ven away without the consent of both husband and wife. Koenig v. Bishop 90 Idaho
182 186 409 P 2d 102 103 <1965); Anderson v. i®ho Mutual Benefit Association 77 Idaho 373.
380 292 P.2d 760. 764 /1956). Hence, evidence md,cating whether the cattle were owned
separately by Lewis or Mildred or were the community property of i:ioth was relevant. Therefore,
upon retria! of this case, this evrdence of Mildred's comments to Doris should be admitted unless
the Leuzingers then concede that Mildred was an owner such that her donative intent was
necessary to effect a gift of the cattle.
We agree with the Leuzrngers, however. that these 1973 statements are not relevant to establrsh
whether Mildred had a donative intent two years later when the gift allegedly was made.
Therefore, if the Leuz,ngers concede·on remand that Mildred was an owner of the cattle, evidence
of these statements should be excluded because they would no longer be relevant on any disputed
issue. !41
C. LETIER FROM LEWIS CARLISLE TO HIS ACCOUNTANT

Next the Hemcks argue the district court erred in excluding a letter purportedly written by Lewis
Carlisle in 1980 to his now-deceased accountant. ln the letter, Lewis explained:
As you know we give the Leuzmgers half the calves for running our cattle etc. We held
back seven heifers this year so Millie paid Doyle Leuzinger half the market value of
these heifers. ,
The district court excluded this exhibit for lack of an evidentiary foundation,
Idaho Rule of Evidence 901 requires that when offering any physical exhibit, a proper
foundation must be laid to show that the item ,s what it is represented to be. The rule states: "The
requirement of authentication or identif,cat,on as a condition precedent to admissibilrty is satisfied
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in ouest,on ,s what its proponent
claims." This standard "requires only that the court admit evidence if sufficient proof has been
introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authentication or identification."
REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMJTIEE, C 901 p. 1 (Supplemented 6/1/85)
quoting 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE P 901(a)[01] at 16 (Supp 1983).

l:!lin+

We conclude that the district court properly exduded the proffered letter. The Herncks made no
effort to lay a foundation for admission of the letter through any witness. Instead, they argued
only that the [303] Leuz,ngers' attorney had opened the door for admission of thrs letter by
referring to it in his opening statement to the Jury, This contention by the Herricks that reference
to an exhibit during an opening statement will waive any ODJect,on when the exhibit is offered
during the trial has not been supported by any citation of authority, and we find it to be without
merit. Attorneys' opening statements often comment upon anticipated adverse evidence in order
to defuse ,ts impact or diminish its importance. We perce,ve no reason that such a comment
should excuse the proponent of the evidence from laying an adequate foundation for ,ts
admission. Therefore, the tnal court's exclusion of this ietter was not in error.
Our ruling does not, of course, preclude the Herricks from again offering th,s evidence with a
proper foundation in the event of a new trial on remand.
D. DEPOSITION OF MILDRED CARLISLE
The Herricks next claim as error the district court's exclusion of a portion of a deposition of Mildred
Carlisle that was taken in another case. They sought to place in evidence part of the transcript of a
deposition of Mildred ta ken ,n February 1988 during proceedings for her divorce from a man she
had married following Lew,s Carlisle's death. In that deposition the following questions and
answers occurred:

Q. What

1s

the property

A. The property ,s

111

Idaho?

in Idaho is a cattle ranch.

Q. Are there presently cattle on it?
A. Yes.
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And l have someone else on the ranch so some of these cattle belong to him.

Q.
ls tnat

a person who rents the property or is that like a supervisor that you hire?

A.

He leases part of it to run his cattle and then he runs my cattle.

Q.
And has this setup with Mr. Lysinger [sic], has that -- now long has that been going

on?
A. It's been going for about 20 years.

Q.
How many of the-· are the 300 cattle yours plus his or does that include both?

A. That includes part of both. That includes both, yes.

Q. Do you know how many cattle you have?
A. Not totally.

Q. Is it around half and half or do you know>
A. Probably he has more.

The Herricks do not contend that this deposition testimony was admissible as direct evidence that
Mildred owned the cattle, apparently conceding that it would be hearsay if offered for that
purpose. Rather, they argue it was admissibie to impeach the testimony of a witness called by the
Leuzingers during their case in chief. The witness. Clark Munger, was an attorney from Arizona
who had represented Mildred 1n the divorce proceedings in that state and was present during the
deposition. Munger testified on direct examination that when he was representing Mildred he
asked whether she owned any cattle and Mildred informed him that she had none. He also said
that he never at any time heard Mildred say that she had a cattle herd. When it came time to
cross-examine Munger, the Herncks' attorney apparently did not have a copy of Mildred's
deposition transcript in the courtroom, and he therefore did not place the transcript 1n front of
Munger but, rather, asked him whether he had heard Mildred state under oath in her deposition
that she owned cattle on the Broken Wing Ranch. Munger responded that, to his recol!ect1on,
Mildred had not made a definite statement but rather had ··waffled" on that issue and had given
ambiguous testimony. The day after Munger's testimony was completed and he had left Idaho to
return to Arizona, the Herricks moved to have Mildred's deposition entered into evidence. The
[304) Herricks contend that the deposition testimony was not hearsay because it was offered
not for the truth of Mildred's statements, but only to impeach Munger's testimony that he never
heard Mildred c!aim that she owned cattle.
As noted above, the hearsay preclusion of LR.E. 802 applies when an out-of-court statement ,s
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated and its value thus rests upon credibility of the
declarant. If the evidence is offered for purposes for which the truth or falsity of the statement is
irrelevant, the hearsay rule does not apply. For that reason, an out-of-court statement offered to
impeach a witness's credibility is not hearsay. United States v. Miller 874 F 2d 1255 1271 n 9

(9th Cir. 1989). cert. denied,
U.S. , 126 l.Ed.2d 210 114 S Ct. 258 Cl993l; UnitedSrate, v
Wmkle 587 F 2d 70'1 710 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, <144 U.S. 827, 62 L Ed 2d 34 JOOS Ct.
SJ /l979): 1 Kenneth S. Broun, et. al., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 34 at 113 (John W. Strong,
ed., 4th ed. 1992). In such circumstances it is not the truth of the statement that has evidentiary
value, but rather its juxtaposition against the inconsistent testimony of the witness.
Munger's testimony that he never heard Mildred Carlisle say that she owned cattle was directly
contradicted by the transcript of the deposition at which he was present as counsel. Regardless of
whether Mildred's deposition testimony was true, the transcnpt had ev1dentiary value to draw into
question the reliability of Munger's testimony. Therefore, the hearsay rule presented no obstacle
to admission of the transcript for impeachment purposes.
Although we conclude that the HerrickS' position has merit, we cannot find error m this case due to
the timing of their motion for admission of the partial transcript. After establishing the necessary
foundation, the Herricks' attorney properly could have read from the transcript during crossexamination of Munger and asked htm whether he heard that testimony by Mildred. Alternatively,
with appropriate foundation to establish authenticity, the pertinent portion of the transcnpt could
have been placed in evidence during the Herricks' rebuttal case following the Leuzingers'
completion of their case In chieL We find no error in exclusion of the transcript in this case,
however, because the Herricks attempted neither of these alternatives, Instead, the Herricks' only
offer of the deposition transcrlpt'°was mad ii' the -day'° after Munger's testimony had beer completed
and while the Leuz,ngers were still in the midst of presenting their case in chief. The Herricks were
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JURY lNSTRUCT!ON AND SPEClAL VERDICT
The Herricks claim that the d1stnct court committed error
which stated:

in

giving Jury 111struct1on number fifteen.

"You are instructed that when used in these instructions the terms 'plaintiff's
predecessors in interest' and 'Millie's successors in interest' refer to and mean 1. Tne
personal representative bank, acting through its representatives who were involved m
the probating of Millie's estate, including its attorney, ~l,'1;:I<; .i".1.4.1)9~.r . . "
The Herricks contend that this instruction improperly told the Jury that attorney .c:;1.i'.r.~ .Ml!Q9..er was
the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest. We cannot agree with the Herncks' interpretation of this
instruction. It does not indicate that Munger himself should be considered the Herricks'
predecessor in interest but that the bank, which was the personal representative of Mildred's
estate, was a predecessor in interest. Munger is identified in the instruction only as a
representative who acted for tne bank. Therefore, we find no error in the instruction.
The Herricks also claim tnat there was an error in the special verdict forno presented to the Jury.
We decline to resolve this issue due to the Herricks' failure to obJeCt to the special verdict form on
the [30SJ record. Fa,!ure to ObJect to the verdict form ,n the trial court constitutes a waiver of
the issue. Garrett v. Nobles. 1 02 Idaho 369. 374 630 P 2d 656 661 {1981}: ~
international Harvester Co. 95 Idaho 881. 890 522 P.2d 1102 1111 /1974 }.

V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION BASED ON STATUTE OF LlMITATJON
The Leuzingers cross-appeal from the denial of their motion for summary Judgment. in which they
asserted that the Herricks' claims were barred by the statute of limitation, LC.§ 5-218{4). The
district court denied the motion, concluding that there' existed genuine issues of fact material to
this defense which required resolution by the jury. On appeal, the Leuzingers contend that even if
there were errors in the trial that invalidate the jury verdict, they are nonetheless entitled to
Judgment based upon their statute of limitation defense.
We conclude that the order denying summary Judgment is non-reviewable. l:l!!ifl.+ The denial of a
motion for summary Judgment 1s ordinarily both non·appealable and nor,-rev1ewable. Watson v.
Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals inc. 1111daho 44, 46 720 P.2d 632 614 r1986); ~
Keeler 124 )daho 407 410 860 P.2d 23. 26 /Ct. App. 1993); Evans v, Jensen, 103 Idaho 937
655 P.2d 454 /Ct. App. 1982). The rationale for this rule is that, once all the evidence has been
presented at trial, the final judgment ,n a case should be tested upon tne record made at tnal, not
the less complete record existing when summary judgment was denied. Evans 103 Idaho at 942
655 P 2d at 459. ln Evans we stated:
This will prevent a litigant who loses a case, after a full and fair trial, from having an
appellate court go back to the time when the litigant had moved for summary
Judgment to view the relative strengths and weaknesses of the litigants at that earlier
stage. Were we to hold otherwise, one who had sustained his position after a fair
hearing of the whole case might nevertheless lose, because he had failed to prove h,s
case fully on an interlocutory motion.
Id. The Leuzingers ask this Court to do precisely what this discussion in Evans re;ected. We
dechne their request to review the demal of summary Judgment after a complete trial has
occurred.
Nor can we consider the ,ssue as part of our review of the trial proceedings. At the conclusion of
trial, the jury was presented with a special verdict form containing seven interrogatories. Question
number four asked the jury to resolve the statute of limitation issue. Question number one,
however, instructed that if the jury responded to question number one in favor of the Leuzingers,
it should proceed no further but sign the verdict form and return it to the court. Upon resolving
this first question 1n the i.euzmgers' favor, the Jury did as instructed and proceeded no further,
leaving unresolved any factual issues regarding the applicability of the statute of limitation.
Therefore, we have no jury verdict on this defense to review.
The Leuzingers did not request a ruling from the court on this defense by a motion for directed
verdict before submitting the case to the jury or by any post-trial motion. The Leuzingers
essentially request that this Court enter a directed verdict in their favor. We, however, will not rule
on a matter that was not presented to the trial court. See Sun Vallev Shoppmq Center v. Ioaho
Power Co., 119 ldaho 87 93. 803 P.2d 993 999 (1991}: Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33,644
P 2d 355 !1982}; Johnson Equipment Inc v Nielson 108 Idaho 867 870, 702 P.2d 905 908
/Ct. App. 1985). Thus, we conclude that the Leuzingers have presented no reviewable verdict or
order regarding the statute of limitation defense for our consideration on appeal. Because we are
remanding this case due to erroneous evidentiary rulings, the opportunity remains for the
Leuzingers to further pursue the statute of limitation defense m the trial court.
VJ. ATTORNEY FEES

Finally, the Leuzmgers cross-appeal from the denial of their request for attorney fees on their
counterclaim for intetierence with their lease agreement. They contend they are entitled to
attorney fees under~· LC. § 12-120(3), [306] which provicies that the prevailing party in
a lawsuit ansing from a commercial transaction is entitled to the award of a reasonable attorney
fee.
·
The term "commercial transaction" is"defihed-by·the statute to mean "all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes." LC.§ 12-120(3).

642

https ://advanceJexis. com/Go T oContentView?requestid=6b4 3a3 90-7 aOf-fd46-fd99-3 de l

0/2013

v. Leuzinger, 127

0

Page 11 of l l

293

1erms & Condmons

About this Document

".'. Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 ldano 293
Reporter

·· oage

····s-r:,-Tz:·A·tra-ris1:rct1llri·rnrcommerc1anarmm;rll~!!rai:rmrs-wanmrncrto··til':a-comme·,c:ra1----··-·-- ····------ -···
transactmn" under I.C § 12·120(3i in Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson 125 Idaho 270,
275 869 P.2d 1365 1370 ( "l94).
The lease in question allowed Jud, and Doyle Leuzmger to utilize the Broken Wing Ranch for the
purpose of operating a commercial cattle ranch. They did not maintain a home on the ranch
property. Therefore, the lease was a commercial transaction, and the Leuz,ngers were entitled to
reasonable attorney's fees. Upon remand the district court shall award to the Leuzingers the
reasonable amount of fees incurred for that portion of this case relating to alleged breaches of the
lease.
The Leuzingers also requested attorney fees with respect to the remaining claims that were tried
in October 1993. We need not address this request because we have determined that the verdict
and judgment from that trial must be vacated.

VII. CONCLUSION

In summary, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied·the Henricks' motion for a directed
verdict, and we decline to review the trial court's denial of the Leuzingers' motion for summary
Judgment. We find there was no error ,n the Jury mstruct,ons. We also conclude, however, tnat the
Herricks were pre3udiced by the erroneous exclusion of admissible evidence. We therefore remand
this case to the d1stnct court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Because each party has prevailed in part,

no costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal.

Chief Judge WA~T.E.!l.$ and Judge P.~[(.RY CONCUR.
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
RE: AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, ROBERT ARON KANTOR, by and through his attorney of
record, Scot M. Ludwig of Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP, Boise, Idaho and hereby submits
this Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Re; Amended
Counterclaim.
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Plaintiff (Robert) is asking this Court to dismiss a portion of Defendant's (Sondra) Amended
Procedure

Counterclaim pursuant to Idaho Rule

Specifically, Robert did not breach

the parties' Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) by engaging in real estate work outside ofRokan
Ventures because Rokan Ventures, through its Manager Michael Page, made it clear that Rokan
Ventures would not create new ventures/syndications or do any new projects with Rokan Partners
and Rokan Ventures bought out Rokan Partners' interest in Rokan Ventures. Second, Sondra can
demonstrate no damages related to Robert engaging in real estate work outside of Rokan Ventures.
Third, the provision requiring Robert to do real estate work through Rokan Ventures is a covenant
not to compete and it is void because it lacks a time limitation and a geographic limitation and as
such it is an improper restraint upon Robert's ability to earn a living.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
Paragraph 16 of the PSA states:
"16.01 Rokan Partners owns 25% ofRokan Ventures.
16.02 Any new commercial real estate syndications or other commercial real estate activities
that Robert intends to do, or does, become involved in shall be done in Rokan Ventures provided
that any activity that Rokan Ventures declines shall not be done in Rokan Ventures.
16.03 To the extent agreed upon with other members ofRokan Ventures, Robert may receive
a salary or guaranteed payment from Rokan Ventures. Any salary or guaranteed payment in excess
of $60,000.00 paid or payable to Robert by Rokan Ventures shall be paid to Rokan Partners and
become an asset of Rokan Partners." 1

1

Property Settlement Agreement, ,i 16.
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Sondra has made the following allegations regarding paragraph 16 of the PSA in her

"33.

When the PSA was entered into, Rokan Partners was the principal entity by which

Counterclaimant would realize any benefit from her community interest in the parties' business
activities during their marriage through her 44% ownership in Rokan Partners.
34.

When the PSA was entered into, Rokan Partners owned 25% of another entity called

Rokan Ventures.
35.

The PSA required of Counterdefendant that '[a]ny new commercial real estate

syndications or other commercial real estate activities that Robert intends to, or does, become
involved in shall be done in Rokan Ventures'(ifl6.02).
36.

The above requirement gave Counterclaimant an interest in Counterdefendant's

ongoing commercial real estate activities through her interest in Rokan Partners.
37.

On or about January 1, 2013, Counterdefendant caused Rokan Partner's interest in

Rokan Ventures to be sold for $41,675.48 in cash, along with other consideration.
38.

Counterdefendant continues to pursue commercial real estate activities for

compensation, but together with the sale of Rokan Partner's interest in Rokan Ventures, he does so
in such a way as to defeat the purposes of paragraph 16.02 of the PSA. Counterdefendant's conduct
includes, but is not limited to characterizing his ongoing commercial real estate activities as personal
consulting, for which Rokan Partners receives no benefit.
39.

Counterdefendant's conduct constitutes a breach of the PSA and/or a breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
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40.

a direct and proximate result of Counterdefendant's breaches, Counterclaimant

is damaged in amounts to be proven at trial." 2
On October 29, 2012, Rokan Ventures, through its manager Michael Page informed Rokan
Partners that it would no longer do business with Rokan Partners. 3 In a letter to Robert from Mr.
Page dated October 29, 2012, Mr. Page stated in clear and unambiguous terms that Rokan Ventures
would not create new ventures/syndications in partnership with Rokan Partners. 4 Mr. Page gave
Robert two options, one was that Rokan Ventures would buy Rokan Partners' interest in the
company, the second option was that Rokan Ventures would be dissolved. 5 On November 26, 2012,
and pursuant to paragraph 2.13 of the PSA, Robert gave Sondra notice of the sale of Rokan Partners'
interest in Rokan Ventures. 6 Robert explained to Sondra and her attorney why the sale of Rokan
Partners' interest was necessary and how the sale was beneficial to the owners of Rokan Partners
compared to a liquidation of Rokan Ventures. 7 Sondra took no action regarding the proposed sale
until she filed a motion for TRO on March 5, 2013. This Court did not enter a TRO regarding the
sale of Rokan Partners' interest in Rokan Ventures.
LEGAL STANDARDS

Amended Counterclaim, Count One, 1 33-40.

2

3

A.ffidavit of Michael Page filed on March 7, 2013.

4

Affidavit of Michael Page, Exhibit B to Page Affidavit.

5

Id.

6

Affidavit of Robert Kantor filed on March 7, 2013, Exhibit B to Kantor Affidavit.
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In a summary judgment proceeding the Court must construe all disputed facts in favor of the
non-moving

must draw

reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record

in favor of the party opposing the motion. Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 280 P.3d 176, 179
(2012). However, summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LR.C.P. 56(c).
The elements for breach of contract are the existence of a contract, the breach of the contract,
the breach caused damages, and the amount of the damages. Mosel! Equities, LLC v. Berryhill &

Co., 2013 Ida. LEXIS 51 (2013).
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises regarding terms agreed to by the parties,
and requires that the parties perform, in good faith, the obligations imposed by their agreement.

Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 137 P.3d 409,413 (2006).
The covenant does not override an express provision in the contract. Independence Lead Mines Co ..

supra, 143 Idaho at 26. The determination of whether the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
has been breached is an objective determination of whether the parties have acted in good faith in
terms of enforcing the contractual provisions. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho
881, 891-892, 243 P.3d 1069, 1079-1080 (2010).
Covenants not to compete are valid when they are reasonable as applied to the covenantor,
the covenantee, and the general public. A non-compete covenant must be reasonably limited as to
time, scope, and territorial extent. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524,527 - 528, 181 P.3d 450,
453 - 454 (2008). If the covenant is not reasonably limited as to time, scope and territorial extent
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covenant is void and unenforceable. Id.
ARGUMENT
Sondra's cause of action relating to Robert's real estate activities rely totally upon paragraph
16 of the PSA. Sondra's pleadings admit that her only interest in having Robert perform deals
through Rokan Ventures was because of her ownership interest in Rokan Partners. At the time the
parties executed the PSA Rokan Partners had a 25% ownership interest in Rokan Ventures. It is
undisputed that Rokan Partners now has no ownership interest in Rokan Ventures. Therefore,
Sondra has no financial stake in whether Robert engages in real estate activities with Rokan Ventures
or if he engages in real estate activities outside ofRokan Ventures. It does not effect her financially
either way.
There is also no dispute that Rokan Ventures was not going to do any more deals with Rokan
Partners. Rokan Partners had two choices, either sell its interest to Rokan Ventures or obtain
share of the liquidation proceeds after Rokan Ventures was dissolved. Robert informed Sondra
the choices and offered his opinion that selling Rokan Partners' interest in Rokan Ventures made the
most financial sense to the owners ofRokan Partners. Sondra did nothing in response to Robert's
notice until March of 2013 when she filed her TRO Motion. By that time the sale of Rokan Partners
interest had occurred. 8 Sondra has no evidence to support a claim that the sale of Rokan Partners
interest was orchestrated by Robert to defeat the provisions of paragraph 16.02. She also has no
evidence to support a claim that the sale was not in Rokan Partners best interest compared to Rokan
Ventures being dissolved.

8

Affidavit of Michael Page filed March 7, 2013.
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These undisputed facts show that Robert is no longer bound
through Rokan Ventures because Rokan Partners no longer

the PSA to perform real estate
an ownership interest in Rokan

Ventures and Sondra has no interest in Rokan Ventures. By her ovvn admission her only tie to
Rokan Ventures was through Rokan Partners. Robert has not breached the PSA relating to paragraph
16. Sondra has offered, and cannot offer, any admissible evidence to show that the sale ofRokan
Partners' interest in Rokan Ventures was inappropriate or done with an intent to circumvent the
provisions of paragraph 16. There simply is nothing to support a claim that Robert did not act in
good faith and fair dealing when the decision was made to sell Rokan Partners' interest in Rokan
Ventures.
Sondra can show no damages related to Robert's real estate work. She admits in her
pleadings that her only financial interest was that if the deals were done through Rokan Ventures that
improved the financial position of Rokan Partners. Now that Rokan Partners is not an O\\'Iler of
Rokan Ventures, Sondra is not damaged by Robert obtaining real estate work outside of Rokan
Ventures.
The provision of the PSA that Sondra is relying upon is a restraint upon Robert's ability to
earn a living. It essentially is a covenant not to compete. Paragraph 16.2 of the PSA requires Robert
to perform all real estate activities through Rokan Ventures. The covenant not to perform real estate
work outside ofRokan Ventures has no time limitation and no geographic limitation and therefore
it is unenforceable and void. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, supra. Sondra cannot bring a cause of action
against Robert based on paragraph I 6.2 of the PSA because the covenant not to compete is
unenforceable and void.
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CONCLUSION
should enter Judgment on behalf of Robert related to Sondra's claims related to
paragraph 16.2 of the PSA for three reasons: l) Rokan Ventures refused to do any work related with
Rokan Partners and Sondra can make no showing that Robert acted in bad faith when Rokan
Ventures acquired Rokan Partners interest; 2) Sondra has no interest in Rokan Ventures now that
Rokan Partners is no longer an owner and as such she is not damaged in any way by Robert engaging
in real estate activities outside ofRokan Ventures; and 3) the provision of the PSA that Sondra bases
her claim upon is in essence a covenant not to compete. This covenant not to compete is not limited
in its duration or geographic area and as such it is unenforceable and void.
DATED t h i s ~ of October, 2013.
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I hereby
on
October, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated:
Daniel E. Williams
Thomas, Williams & Park LLP
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, Idaho 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
_Overnight Courier
~imile Transmission

/ (208) 345-7894;:;

Scot M. Ludwi
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SCOT M. LUDWIG
DANIEL A MILLER
LUDWIG+ SHOUFLER + MILLER+ JOHN'SON, LLP
Attorneys at Law
209 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: 208-387-0400
Facsimile: 208-387-1999
ISB 3506
ISB 3571

2

P. 2

OCT O9 2013
i

JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Maha

L..9:!:!rt Blaine Coun

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN 11iE DIS1RICT COURT OF THE FlFTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

IBE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Plaintiff;

)
)

)
)
)

vs.
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2012-734

MOTION TO COMPEL
RECORDING OF QtJITCLAIM
DEED

C0l\1ES NOW the Plaintiff; ROBERT ARON KANTOR, by and through his attorneys, Scot
M. Ludwig and Daniel A. Miller of Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP, and hereby moves this

Court to enter its Order compelling the Defendant to record or allowing Plaintiff to record the Quitclaim
Deed executed by Defendant in favor of Plaintiff.
This Motion is made and based upon Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e), the documents on
file herein and the Affidavit of Robert Aron Kantor in Support of Motion to Compel filed
contemporaneously herewith.
Oral argument is requested on this Motion.
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DATED~y
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P. 3

October,2013.

LER • JOHNSON LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ·

if

I hereby certify that on this ..n..day of October, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy, of the
foregoing document to be served u~e following as indicated:
U.S. Mail
_ Hand Delivery
_ Overnight Courier
-4acsimile Transmission
/(208) 345-7897

Daniel E. Williams
Thomas, Williams & Park LLP
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, Idaho 83701

Scot
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No. 5892
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FI LED A.M____,..,.,,
OCT O9 2013
SCOT M. LUDWIG
DA.NJ.EL A. MlLL.ER
LUDWIG+ SliOUFLER + MILLER • JOHNSON, LLP
Attorneys at Law
209 West Main Street
Bois·e, JD 83702
Telephone: 208-387-0400
Facsimile: 208-3 87 -1999
ISB 3506
ISB 357J.

JoLynn Drage. Cieri( District
Court Bialne Coun . Maho

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TJ:-tE FIFTH JUDlClAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-20l2p 734

)

vs.

)

SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,

)

)
Defendant.

)
)

AF.FlDAVIT OF
ROBERT ARON KANTOR
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
COMPEL RECORO.lNG OF

QUITCLAIM DEED

----------~---·>
STAt.E OF IDAHO )
JI_

Couo.ty o f ~

) ss
)

ROBERT ARON KANTOR, bejng first duly swom upon oatb, deposes and says;

J.

1am the Plaintiff in the above entitl.ccf action and 1make this affidavit ba.11ed upon my

own persona!. knowledge a11d belief.
2.

On September 12, 2013, J was present at a hearing Ol\ my Motion for a prelitni11ru-y

ir:i,illl'lttion asking the Court for !ill order prollibiti.ng Sondra Kantor from contacti11g the Bank of

America which was being heard in conjunction with tbe- Defonda11t's Motion for a Preliminacy
AFFIDAVlT OF ROBERT ARON KANTOR lN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
RECORDING OF QUITCLAIM DEED~ I
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lnjunctioft a.'lk.i.ng that 1 be rcqu.u-ed to abandon my efforts for a loan. tfiodi.fication. and to be ordc.red
to proceed with a short sale r:egarding my residence at 265 Golden Eagle Dr, Hailey Idaho ("hom.c").

Duri o.g that hearing, Sondra achoitted that paragraph 28 stated that "Sondl'a shall co~operate fo au.y
manner needed to conclude such refinancing nftcr review of the ro:financing docttments and tcnns
by her attorney."

3.

The hearing concluded after Sondra's te~timony with n stipulatio11 that l was not

going to have to pursue a short sale, but ratJ1er wa:. going to proceed with my efforts to obtain a loan
pri..ncipal reducti.on under the Depanment of Justice Settlement Prograin with the Bank of Amcr.i.ca

or ather .1.oan modification program with the Bauk of America.
4.

Duri.ng the pei-lod from September l2, 2013, uutil the present day (berci11after

''period") I have diligently been pursu.i.ng a loan modification and par.ttcipatio11 in tbc Department
of Justice Settlement (hereinafter "SettJement").
5.

Bank of Arnerioa bas required only a recorded. Quitclaim Deed from Sondra. to

complete their loan modification review. Through counse.l and directly, I at all times infonned
Sondra Kantor imd her boyfriend/advi5or Al Weter of the require1nent that a Quitclaim Deed of

Sondra's in.terost .i.11 the Hotne to me was a .requirement for further an.cl finol collsidcratton by the
Bnnk of America for inclu~ion in the Program.
6.

r was able to record a convemiation with myself aud Veronica Tovar r,f .Bank of

America and during that conversation Ms. Tova,: co1lfmm,d tbat the Quitclaim Deed from Son.dra
to me must be recorded or we would be relea8cd from comdde.ration. Sondra co.ntinues to refuse to

rnyrequest to record a Quitclaim Deed de::ipitc assurance her ioto.1:cst will be protected contractually.
7.

There is st.it.I a possibility that Bank of Amerioo. will allow a m.odificatiou if the
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Quitclaim Deed is reco.rdod but the o:fficial dea.dJine has passed and each passing doy rntt.kes it morlil
un.like1y that the modification wHl occut because of the lack of a recorded Quitclaim Deed. I have
hope that the Bauk wm still consider tbe modification because of the relatiom1hip I have developed
with the Bank over the past several months.

8.

I am requesting that the Court order De.f:e:ode11t to record a. Quitclatm Deed on the

Goldc1l Eagle .real property 10 me, or in tbe alternative give me authorizntioti 1:0 record th.c Deed.

Regardless ofthe recorded Deed, l should be deem.eel as holding Sondt"'a's 50% interest io the Golden
Eagle real property fo. ttust for her until th.is matter is re:iolved.

DAT.ED This

_j_ day of October, 20l3.

~

- ~ ~ )v---ROBERT ARON KANTOR

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO bcfor . c U1isq__ day of October, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

t#tiay

I h·ereby certify tbnt on this
of Oetoberi 2013, 1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be serve upon t.be following as indicated:

Daniel E. Willhuns
Tboinas, William~ & Park LLP

P.O. Box 1776
Boise; Idaho 83701
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SCOT M. LUDWIG
DANIEL A. MILLER
LUDWIG. SHOUFLER •
Attorneys at Law
209 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: 208-387-0400
Facsimile: 208-387-1999
ISB 3506
ISB 3571

.V.U.L-"A.J..._,,H_.

JOHNSON, LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2012-734

ORDER

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the 12th day of September, 2013, on Cross
Motions for Preliminary Injunction, with both parties being present with their respective attorneys
of record, Scot M. Ludwig of Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP for Plaintiff and Daniel E.
Williams of Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP for Defendant.
During the presentation of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the parties reached

ORDER- I
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Stipulation that was placed on the record and which is incorporated into this Order as follows:
Both Motions for Preliminary Injunction are withdrawn and shall not be filed again
through the date of Trial;
2.

Both parties shall pay their own costs and attorney fees in the Cross Motions for

Preliminary Injunction;
3.

Defendant, or her representatives, shall not contact Bank of America regarding the

Golden Eagle debt until the time of Trial. Further, Defendant shall not pursue a Short Sale of the
Golden Eagle real property until the time of Trial; and
4.

Plaintiff shall provide Defendant's attorney any correspondence and recordings he

receives from Bank of America. In the event a telephone conference between Plaintiff and Bank of
America occurs and there is no recording, Plaintiff shall send a summary of the content of said call.
Plaintiff shall also deliver to Defendant's attorney any recording or correspondence he has had with
Bank of America from August I, 2013 to present upon entry hereof.
DATEDthis /~dayof

6~

,2013.

JUDGE ROBERT.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_1:t

a~ ,

I hereby certify that on this
day of
2013, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated:

Scot M. Ludwig
LUDWIG + SHOUFLER + MILLER
+ JOHNSON, LLP
209 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

Daniel E. Williams
Thomas, Williams & Park LLP
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, Idaho 83701

_ P(J.s. Mail
_ Hand Delivery
_Overnight Courier

Facsimile Transmission
(208)387-1999

_0r.s. Mail
_ Hand Delivery
_ Overnight Courier
Facsimile Transmission

(208)345-7894

Deputy Clerk of the Court
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DENNIS P. WILKINSON, ESQ.
Idaho State Bar #6023

~lynn Drage, Cieri< District
·-·· ·-omt f3l~<!unty, Idaho

THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & ANDERSON, PLLC
3480 Merlin Drive

P.O. Box 50160
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone: (208) 525-8792
Facsimile: (208) 525-5266
Attorney for Defendant, Sondra Kantor.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

vs.
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-734
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL
RECORDING OF QUITCLAIM
DEED

)

COMES NOW, Defendant/Counterclaimant, ("Sondra") by and through her attorneys of
record, the law finn of Thompson, Smith, Woolf & Anderson, and hereby submits this

Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Recording of Quitclaim Deed filed by the
Plaintiff. This Objection is supported by the Affidavit ofSondra Kantor submitted herewith.

AJW:UMENT
The Counterdefendant brings the instant motion based on Rule 65(e), seeking injunctive
relief. As the Court is aware an injunction is only granted in extreme cases where the right is

very clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal. Harris v. Cassia
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO COMPEL RECORDING OF QU1TCLAIM DEED - 1
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681 P.2d 988 (1984).

Based on the pleading submitted by the

Counterdefendant it is difficult to discern what the statutory basis is of the request and more

importantly there is no apparent allegation that failure to grant the relief will result in irreparable
harm.

The Property Settlement Agreement {''PSA") entered into between the parties deals with
the home at issue. 1 Paragraph 5.01 of the PSA mandates that the home be sold as reasonably
possible. 2 The PSA allows the Counterdefendant to stay in the home pending disposition of the

real property. 3
It is important to note that the home is encumbered with a significant mortgage for which
both parties are obligated.4 According to his Affidavit the Counterdefendant claims that he has
been working with Bank of America to effectuate a loan modification. He cites this as his
rationale, that Sondra has an obligation to sign a quitclaim deed paragraph 28 of the PSA.
Paragraph 28 states the following:

In the event Robert shall obtain refinancing of any debts for which Sondra has
liabUity, Sondra shall eo-ope.-ate in any manner needed to conclude such
refinancing after review of the :refinancing documents and terms by her attorney
and/ol" accountant.5
As a starting point, there is no evidence in the record that the Counterdefendant has in fact
successfully obtained refinancing which would be a condition precedent to Sondra's obligation

to execute any documents. Additionally, the tenn "refinancing" above indicates that it would be
a mechanism for removing Sondra's name from the liability.

It appears that this loan

modification would not be a true refinance, rather it would simply change terms associated with

1

Affidavit of Sondra Kantor at Bxlubit A
at paragraph 5.

2 Id.

3 Id.

4
5

Affidavit of Sondra Kantor at paragraph 18.
Affidavit of Sondra Kantor at Edtlbit A paragraph 28.
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the present obligation but would not release Sondra from mortgage liability.
The Counterdefendant is asking the Court to force Sondra to quitclaim any interest she
has in the home and give it to the Counterdefendant. He then is the owner of the home, left to
enjoy the benefit of the modified loan and is free to transfer title at will. She would be left with
no interest but a continued obligation to pay a mortgage for a home she doesn't own or occupy.
The motion/request provides no scheme which would protect Sondra's interests in the home after
executing a quitclaim.
Forcing the execution of a quitclaim deed would likely result in irreparable hann to the
Defendant. The additional problem associated with the Counterdefendant's basis for the request
is that paragraph 28 of the PSA requires that there be full disclosure of the terms and a "review
of the refinancing documents." No refinancing documents have been provided giving Sondra the
ability to carefuliy scrutinize the proposed agreement. Clearly, the obligation to provide such
documents is a condition precedent to any obligation Sondra would have to execute any
documents.

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons the Counterclaimant request should be denied.
DATED this-;>+-day of October, 2013.
THOMPSON, SMITH, WOOLF &
ANDERSON

By:

nenn=is::-:P;:;-.~ffit~n~n?~::::::::::::::,,,,-..,o;;;:;;:::r-

Attomey for Defendant/Counterclaimant
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OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
on this date served upon the persons named below I at the addresses set out below their
name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by facsimile to them a true and correct copy of
said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage
prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this

J

l day of October, 2013.

Dennis P. Wilkinson

Scot M. Ludwig~ Esq.
LUDWIG SHOUFLER
209 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

D Mailed D Hand Delivered \Faxed

Facsimile: (208) 387-1999
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FILED~·~-NOV O1 2013
JoLynn Drage. Clerk D1stncl.
Courl Blaine Coun , Idaho

DENNIS P. WILKJNSON, ESQ.
Idaho State Bar #6023
The Law Offices of
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF
& ANDERSON, PLLC
3480 Merlin Drive
P.O. Box50160

Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone: (208) 525"8792
Facsimile: (208) 525-5266
Attorney for Defeudant1 Sondra Kantor.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,

Defendant.

STATE OF ARIZONA
County of

el ffi

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No, CV-2012-734
AFFIDAVIT OF SONDRA KANTOR
JN RESPONSE TO MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN
OBJECTION TO MOTION

TO COMPEL RECORDING
OF QUITCLAIM DEED

)

: ss.
12\,

)

SONDRA KANTOR, having first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

That I 1nake this affidavit of my own personal knowledge of the facts contained

2.

That I am the Defendant/Countei·claimant in the above entitled action.

herein.

APPIDAVlT OF SONDRA KANTOR. IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PAR.Tl AL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND IN OBJECTION TO MOTION TO COMPEL RECOR.DING OF QUlTCLAIM .1
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I entered

("PSA'1 (Attached hereto as Exhibit A) with the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Robelt Kantor to

settle divorce litigation between us in Blaine County Case No. CV-1 t-525.
4.

As set out in the terms of the Agreement under paragraph 2, I have a 44% interest

in Rokan Partners.

5.

The Counterdefendant and I were represented by coUMel when we entered into

thePSA.
6.

As part of the PSA the Countetde:fendant and I agreed that he would continue to

conduct his real estate business th1·ough Rokan Ventures. This

tern1

is contained in paragraph

16.02 of tho PSA

7.

The purpose of that specific tru.'ln in the Agreement was that I, as a 44% owner of

Rokan Partners, would receive income/compensation as a result of the Counterclaimants promise
to conduct his business through Rokan Ventua-es. This provision was intended to provide me

with a stream of income after the divorce.
8.

This was an essential te1m and was critical in my executing and agreeing to the

tel'ms of the PSA.
9.

On or about November 26, 2012, I received an email from the Counte1:defendant

providing me with notice that he was going to sen the interest that Rokan Pa1tne1·s had in Rokan

Ventures. Attached hereto as Exhibit f(B" is a copy of that email/notice.
10,

The initial notice did not provide me with the details of the sale. I received no

notice as to the actual details until the first week of Fcbt'UE.try, 2013.

11.

The sale of Rokan Ventures by Roka.n Partners significantly impacts what I

expected to t'eceive under the PSA. With the sale ofRokan Ventures I cannot realize the benefit
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bargain that I entered it,to with the Counterdefendruit.
12.

The sale occurred on Febntary 26, 2013. Priot to that date I was not provided

with a closing statement ot final sale documents to review in connection with the sale. Attached

hereto as Exhibit "C., is a copy of the Sate Agreement.

13.

The Counterdefendant and the majority owne1· of Rokan Ventures, Michael Page,

are close personal ftiends and have been business partners for at least the past five (5) years. The
transaction at 1ssue was not "an arm's length,, transaction.
14.

The Counterdefendant continues to work with and provide services to Rokan

Ventures and the Counte1·defendant and Michael Page continue to share the same office suite.
15.

I am aware of and have reviewed the Counterdefendant1 s Motion to Compel

Recording of Quitclaim Deed.

16.

It is my unde1-standi11g that the Countel'defendant is seeking a loan modification

and not a refinance.
17.

I have not been provided with any refhuu1ce documents to review pm·suant to

paragt."aph 28 of the PSA.

18.

Although I have not had the opportunity to review any documents, it is my

understanding that I would remajn liable for the mortgage loan.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3 / day of October, 2013.

(U-~-
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Notary Public for Arizona
Commission Expires: (M ;J::J, JO/(,,

®

'IIICKI INTIIEl<IN

Nolarf Publlo • Arkonl
PlmlCo1111t,

My Comm. . . . Feb 22, 201&

.I
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CERllFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a licensed attorney in Idaho, with my office in
Idaho Falls, and that on the .3J_ day of Octoberi 2013. I served a true and com~ct copy of the
AFFIDAVIT OF SONDRA KANTOR IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OBJECTION TO MOTION TO COMPEL

RECORDING OF QUITCLAIM DEED on the parties listed below, by mailing, with the

correct postage thereon.
Scot M. Ludwig. Esq.
LUDWIG SHOUFLER

0 Mailed O Hand Delivered \ Faxed

209 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facslmfle: (208) 387-1999
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PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this 241h day of April, 2012, by and
between Sondra Kantor, hereinafter referred to as "Sondra, 11 and Robert Kantor, hereinafter

:referred to as "Robert."
1.

RECITALS; This Agreement is made with reference to the following facts:
1.01

The partfos hereto were married on the 8th day of June, 1968, in Houston,

Texas, and ever since have been and still are Husband and Wife.
1.02

The parties have three adult children.

1.03

Unhappy differences have arisen between Robert and Sondra, as a result

of which they have agreed to separate and enter into this Agreement.
2.

ROKAN PARTNERS: The parties own an interest in Rokan Partners, an Idaho

limited partnership. The parties agree that the ownership in Rokan Partners shall be as follows:
•
•
•
•
•

•

Rokan Corporation, a Delaware corporation: 6%
Robert: 44%
Sondra: 44%
Geoffrey F. Kantor: 2%
Aron B. Kantor: 2%
Joshua M. Kantor: 2%

2.01

Rokan Corporation is the sole general partner of Rokan Partners.

2.02

Robert is the president ofRokan Corporation.

2.03

AU stock in Rokan Corporation is owned by Century Trust (in a trust

agreement dated January 1, 2006).
2.04

Rokan Partners owns an interest in PK Ventures LLC reflected in the

operating agreement dated January l, 2012.
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2.05

Roka.n Partners shall own any interest in all of the entities attached in the

described Property and Debt Schedule (hereinafter "PDS") where the remarks have the
initials RP.

2.06

It is the intent and the agreement of the parties that except as specifically

provided herein. all interest in alt other real estate including but not limited. to
syndications where the parties have direct or indirect ownership interest shall be assigned

to Rokan Partners.
2.07

Robert and Sondra shall not sell, transfer, encumber, or in any way convey

their interest in Rokan Partners unless both parties agree to the sale or conveyance.
2.08

The parties shall make such changes to the Rokan Partners agreement

necessary to ensure that no members can be admitted to Rokan Partners without the
written consent of both Robert and Sondra during their lives.

2.09

Other than ordinary and necessary expenses in connection with the assets

of Rokan Partners, neither Robert nor Sondra shall receive directly or indirectly any
compensation from Rokan Partners other than as stated in this agreement.

Further,

Robert and Sondra shall ensure that all documents reflect the fact that other than as stated
in this Agreement, no one else shall directly or indirectly receive any payments from

Rokan Partners. Robert may, under this Agreement, employ and pay such maintenance
personnel and attorneys, accountants and bookkeepers as he deems necessary for
operations of Rokan Partners. It is specifically provided that except as provided herein,
no one shall employed by Rokan Partners without the written consent of Sondra, which

consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
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Ayako has prepared and shall continue to prepare the books and records

and tax returns for Rokan Partners.

Ayako shall continue to receive reasonable

compensation for performing the services that have been performed in the past. A
replacement for Ayako shall be a person agreed upon by Robert and Sondra.
2.11

The management of Rokan Partners is by Rokan Corporation. Robert is

the president of Rokan Corporation and is thus managing Rokan Partners. There shall be

no other person or entity managing Rokan Partners without the written consent of Sondra
and Robert.

2.12

Except for what is reasonably necessary for operations of Rokan Partners,

Robert shall cause Rokan Partners to distribute the available cash of Rokan Partners. The
parties acknowledge that there is a requirement for pro rata distributions to all partners.

Notwithstanding.. Robert agrees that each month cash available to be distributed to Robert
or Sondra shall be distributed

as follows: the first $6,000 available shall be distributed to

Sondra, the next $6,000 available shall be distributed to Robert, the next $4,000 available
shall be distributed to Sondra, the next $4,000 available shall be distributed to Robert and
thereafter available cash shall be distributed equally to Robert and Sondra. Provided
further, that if in a month Sondra has received more than Robert, the next month before
going through the priority of distribution set fo1th herein, Robert shall receive the first
a.mount to equalize the distribution from the prior month. Further notwithstanding the
above provisions. Robert shall use best efforts to ensure that Sondra. receives $6000 from
Rokan Partners on the first day of each month beginning June 1, 2012.
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Prior to sale of any asset of Rokan Partners, Robert shall provide written

notice to Sondra, as much in advance as possible under the circumstances, including all

details of the proposed sale.
2.14

When Robert (whenever a reference is made to Robert the parties

understand and agree that the reference is to Robert acting in his individual capacity, his
capacity as president of Rokan Corporation1 or his capacity as a member or partner in any
other entity where the parties directly or indirectly have some ownership interest)
receives any financial reports on any of the entities, he shall forward those financial
reports to Sondra.
2.15

Anytime Ayako or any substitute bookkeeper prepares reports, monthly

!edgers or general ledgers of Rokan Partners, those reports shall be forwarded to Sondra.
2.16

The parties shall cause the first amendment and the second amendment to

the Rokan Partners agreement to be signed. The form of the second amendment is
attached to this Property Settlement Agreement.
2.17

Attached hereto is a listing of known contingent liabilities. lf Robert

believes a contingent liability should be paid, Sondra shall not unreasonably deny consent
to Rokan Partners making a deemed distribution to Robert and Sondra to pay said
liability. Such deemed distribution shall not be considered a distribution for purposes of
the distributions pursuant to 2. J2.

2.18

Rokan Partners shall continue to pay the parties· son Shalom's loan for

graduate school.
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2.19

The parties acknowledge that the parties' son Aaron owes Rokan Partners

$90,000.
2.20

Coincident with the signing of this Agreement, Rokan Partners shall

distribute $10,000 to Scot Ludwig and $10,000 to Cosho Humphrey to be applied on
attorneys fees and cost of each party. Any remaining fees and cost shall be the obligation
of the respective parties.

3.

PK VENTURES, LLC:
3.01

Rokan Partners owns an interest in PK Ventures, LLC.

3.02

Robert shall receive no compensation, directly or indirectly, from PK

Ventures, LLC. Robert acknowledges that with regard to the operation of PK Ventures,

LLC, he has the same fiduciary obligation to Sondra that he owes with regard to Rokan
Partners or any other entity in which the parties have a joint ownership interest.
4.

CENTURY TRUST:
4.01

Century Trust will receive funds through its ownership interest in Rokan

Corporation.
4.02

Any funds available for distribution from Century Trust to Robert (or his

successor upon his death) shaU be distributed equally to Robert (or his successor upon his

death) and Sondra, There are presently 2 Genworth Term Life Insurance Policies in
effect and held by Century Trust. Policy #5, 984,615 shall be discontinued as of Robert's

701h birthday. Policy #826603 l shall be continued, and the premiumf shall be paid by
Century Trust, for the 10 years following Robert's 70th Birthday.
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Funds distributed from Rokan Corporation to Century Trust, in excess of

the amount needed for payment of the premiums on the policy set forth above, may be
distributed quarterly in equal amounts to Robert and Sondra. These amounts shall not be
considered in the calculations set forth in Section 2.12.

4.04

Robert agrees that the Century Trust documents shall be amended to

provide that the only trustees of Century Trust shall be Robert, Sondra, and their three
children. The amendment to be signed by the parties, entitled First Amendment to the
Century Trust, is attached hereto. Neither Robert nor Sondra shall have the power to

make an appointment or give their interest in the Century Trust to anyone other than their
three children.
5.

REAL PROPERTY: The parties own real property located at 265 Golden Eagle

Drive, Hailey, Idaho.
5.01

This real property shall be sold as soon as reasonably possible.

5.02

Pending the sale or disposition of this real pl'operty, Robe1t shall maintain

the property and pay all utilities provided to the property. Any capital improvements will
be paid one half by each party. Capital improvements will only be made if agreed upon
by both parties in writing or ordered by the court.

5.03

Each party shall provide to the other any information either party receives

that may be relevant to the ownership. sale, rental or other disposition of said property.
6.

US DIGITAL GAMING:

AIi present or future interest of either Robert or

Sondra in US Digital Gaming, Inc. (USDG), a Delaware corporation, shall be assigned to Rokan
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Partners. Sondra shall be promptly provided with and informed of any available information

received by Robert regarding USDG or our interest therein.

1.

KF.LLC:
7.01

The parties own KF. LLC.

7.02

Neither party shall receive directly or indirectly any compensation from

KF, LLC except as stated herein.
7.03

All funds available to be distributed from KF, LLC shall be divided

equally between Robert and Sondra.

8.

KANTOR FAMILY, LLC:
8.04

Robert and Sondra shall have an equal ownership interest in Kantor

Family, LLC.
8.05

Robert shall not receive directly or indirectly any compensation from

Kantor Family, LLC.
8.06

Any funds availe.ble to be distributed to Robert and/or Sondra from Kantor

Family, LLC, shall be divided equally between Robert and Sondra.

9.

OTHER OWNERSHIP INTEREST:

On the attached PDS under business

interests, there are other entities in which Robert and Sondra personally own an interest. The
parties shall each continue to own one half of the interest in the entities where there is an "X"
under both the column entitled "To Husband" and the column entitled "To Wife". To the extent

either party receives financial information concerning these entities, or any other entity where the
parties have on ownership interest (such as described in paragraphs 3, 6, 7, and 8 of this
agreement), that party shall immediately forward the information to the other parry.
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HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND FURNISffiNGS AND OTHER TANGIBLE

PERSONAL PROPERTY:

10.01 On the attached PDS, commencing at ltern 119 is a listing of tangible
personal property.
10.02 Robert is awarded the items under the column entitled "To Husband" as
indicated with an "X" or a dollar amount.
10.03 Sondra is awarded the items under the column entitled "To Wife" as
indicated with an "X" or a dollar amount.
10.04 Where there is an item that does not include an allocation to Robert or

Sondra, that item shall be sold in a manner agreed to by the parties in writing. The first
$35, i 56 of proceeds shall go to Sondra. The proceeds in excess of $35,156 shall be
divided equally between Robert and Sondra. In the event the items do not produce at

least $35,156, Robert shall immediately pay to Sondra one half of the difference between
the proceeds received and $35,156. For example, if the proceeds are only $30,156,
Robert shall immediately pay to Sondra the sum of $2,500.
10.05 Prior to a sale, either party may elect to take an item of personal property

to be sold at a value agreed upon by the parties in writing.

10.06 Jf an item of property is not listed on the attached POS the parties shall
either agree to a value and allocation or sell the item in the manner described in this

paragraph lO.
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EX~LUSIVE RESORTS;

11.01 The parties have an ownership interest in Exclusive Resorts (held in the
names of their children).

11.02 Sondra shall be given the password to Ex.elusive Resorts.
11.03 Robert shall use best efforts to sell Exclusive Resorts. Any net proceeds
shall be paid one half to Robert and one half to Sondra.

Jf Robert has a buyer for

Exclusive Resorts, Sondra shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the sale.
12.

2011 TAX RETUR.'NS: The parties shall file married filing joint tax returns for

13.

MEADOWS STORE ROOM: Sondra shall be given a key to and be allowed to

2011.

use the Meadows store room. To the extent the parties have any property in the Meadows store
room that is not listed on the attached PDS, those items shall be equally divided between Robert

and Sondra.
14.

VALLEY CLUB MEMBERSHIP: The Valley Club membership owned by

Robert and Sondra is up for sale. Upon sale, the parties shall each receive one half of the net

proceeds Pending the sale. Robert shall be obligated to make the required minimum payments
and any payment for his use of said membership.
1S.

AIRLINE MILES: The parties agree that as of January l, 201 l rhe mileage or

points balances on Robert's credit cards were as follows:

•
•
•

American Express Centurion Acct# ... 6"81004 - 610.234:
Delta Sky Miles Amex Acct #... 8-3002 - l 0,800;
Wells Fargo VisaAcct# ...4652-390,461
Total: 1,011,495 points
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As of February l, 2011, Sondra had 71,000 miles in her Delta Sky Miles Accounts.
Robert shall transfer to Sondra one-half of the difference, which is 470,248 (1,011,495 less
71,000 = 940,495 divided by 2 and rounded up).

16.

ROKAN VENTURES:
16.01 Rokan Partners owns 25% ofRokan Ventures.
16.02 Any new commercial real estate syndications or other commercial real

estate activities that Robert intends to, or does, become involved in shall be done in
Rokan Ventures provided that any activity that Rokan Ventures declines shall not be
done in Rokan Ventures.
16.03 To the extent agreed upon with the other members of Rokan Ventures,
Robert may receive a salary or guaranteed payment from Rokan Ventures. Any salary or
guaranteed payment in excess of $60,000 paid or payable to Robert by Rokan Ventures
shall be paid to Rokan Partners and become an asset of Rokan Partners.
17.

PAYMENT OF DEBTS BY ROBERT: Robert shall pay the following debts:

17.01 The debts described as Items A, B, C, E, F, and Pon the attached PDS.
17.02 One half of the contingent liabilities including attorney fees related to the
contingent liabilities.
· 17.03 Any other debts incurred by him.
18.

PAYMENT OF DEBTS BV SONDRA'. Sondra shall pay the following debts:
18.01 The debts described as Ttems D, Q, T, V and Won the attached PDS.
18.02 One half of the contingent liabilities including attorney fees related to the

contingent liabilities.
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18.03 Any other debts incurred by her.
19.

JOINT DEBTS: The debt described as Item U on the attached PDS shall be paid

from Rokan Partners. Payments on this joint debt shall be a deemed distribution to Robert and
Sondra and such deemed distributions shall not be considered a distribution for purposes of the
distributions pursuant to 2.12.
20.

DONOR ADVISED FUND: Robert shall make arrangements so that Sondra can

designate $1,000 per year from Donor Advised Fund to a qualified charity.

21.

ROBERT'S AMERICAN EXPRESS CENTURION CARD:

Sondra shall

have a gold card that is associated with Robert's American Express Centurion card so long as
Robert maintains his membership and Sondra shall be solely reasonable for any charges she
makes.

22.

DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY: Subject to the provisions of this Agreement,

each of the parties hereto may in any way dispose of his or her property of whatever nature, real
or personal; and the parties hereto, each for himself and herself, respectively, and for the

respective heirs, legal representatives, executors and administrators and assigns, hereby waives

any right of election which he or she may have regarding the estate of the other, or any right to
tnke against any last will and testament of the other, and hereby renounces and releases all
interest, right or claim that he or she now has or might otherwise have against the other, under or
by virtue of the laws of any state or country.

23.

BINDING EFFECT: All of the provisions of this Agreement shall be binding

upon the parties hereto and their respective heirs, personal representatives and assigns.
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AGREEMENT MAY BE SUBMJTIED TO COURT: The parties agree that

this agreement shall not initially be submitted to the court but shall be kept private between the
two parties. However, if either party believes there is a need to seek court involvement with
regard to any provision, that party may submit this agreement to the court and upon request the

court shall incorporate this agreement as a supplemental judgment of the court.
25.

ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS: The parties hereto agree to make, execute and

deliver such deeds or other documents as may be requested by the other to cany out the full

performance of this Agreement.
26.

ADVICE QF COUNSEL:

The parties hereto stipulate that he or she has been

represented by counsel and is familiar with the terms and conditions of this Agreement.

27.

SEPARATE PROPERTY/INCOME AFTER SIGNING OF AGREEMENT:

The parties· hereto stipulate and agree that from and after the date of the signing of this
Agreement, any and all property or income acquired or earned by either party hereto shall be the
separate property of the party who has acquired or earned it and the other party shall have no

claim thereon. The parties agree that any income earned by either party after the date of signing

this Agreement shall be the separate property of the party earning the income, and any income on
separate property shall be separate property from and after the date of signing this agreement.

28.

DEB:tS AFTER SIGNING OF AGREEMENT: The parties hereto stipulate

and agree that from and after the date of the signing of this Agreement, any debts incurred by
either party hereto shall be the separate debt of the party incurring the debt and shall not be a
community debt. The parties hereto agree not to incur any debt for which the other party may be
liable, In the event Robert shall obtain refinancing of any debts for which Sondra has liability,
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Sondra shall co-operate l11 any manner needed to conclude such refinancing after review of the
refinancing documents and terms by her attorney and/or accountant
29.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS:
.l8,0l The parti!:ls hereto both stipulate and agree that they have read and fully

understand this Agreement.
.28.02 The parties hereto agree that they have entered into this Agreement

without undue influence or fraud or coercion or misrepresentation or. for any other like

cause.
28,03 If a.ctfon is instituted to enforce any of the terms of this Agreement, then

the losing party agrees to p~ to the prevailing party all costs and attorneys' feev incurred
in that action.

28.04 Each of the partie$ hereto represents to the othct· that they have made {ull

discloS\lre of all community assets and community Ua.bilities of which they are aware:.
28.05 The: parti~s herci:O .stipttlato and agree that the division of community

assets provided for in this Agrooment is fair and equitabl.e .

.
TN WITNEi'SS .WHERSOF,
the parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the day
.
~

V

:

I

and year first al:iovt }r_itw,,,. ·
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STATEOF:::J:.~

f

)
)ss.

Couotyof~~ _J

On t h i s ~ o f ~ • 2012, before rne, the unde~lgned notary public in and
for said State, personally apperedS(}NDRA LOUISE KANTOR, known to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to n,e that
slie executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have l1ereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year first above written.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)ss.

County of Staine

)

On this'{Jfi_ day o f ~ 2012, before me, the undersigned notary public in and
fot said State, personally appeared B,OBBR,t ARON KA'NTQR,, known to me t'o be the pel'Son
whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument. and acknowledged to me that
he ex.ecut~d the same.
(N WITNESS WHEREOF, l have hereunto &et my h811d and affixed my official seal the
day and year first above written.
r

~fj~
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Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor

CA$E NO:
DATE OF MARRIAGE:

CV-2011-0000625
618/1968
I

I

f/!ARKET

rre,11c

21579-001

CH FILE NO.;

COM?LAlNt FU.ED: 1125/2011
CHS EVALUAT(ON AND ALLOCATION

I

TO

TO

WIFe
VALLI~

PROP6Rn' DESCRlf'TION

II<),

EQUITY

LIE.NS

REMARK$

MUSBANtl

CIS
..

Ex11-llj

1 REAL PROPERTY:

C

2 265 Golden Eagle D1. S .. Hailey, ID
63333-5130
3 Mackey Cebi11

INVS:SnlEN'l' PROPEl'\'TY:
5 Helm Station. Ketchum, 10

.

$

I

76,000

I

.

4

6 ~ Wesl~{i°LaWI&), Kotchum. ID

C

722,263

1.800.000 $ 1.077.737
755,HJ&
$ 2,200,000 $
$

100% ownership. PKV

100'% own,m;tiip. Pl<V

1,444,814
I

1

'-s

RP

The Meaao~"ll. l<elchum. 10 - mobile $10:S22.1os
home park (The Meadows. LLC)

$

5,500,000

5.:S22.709

The MeadOW& (Clear Creel< DaveloJ)ment L11nol, Ke1chum, ID

:S00,000

KF, l.!..C

(50,000)

Kl-, LLC

9! 6roactfo(d Roao (Clear creel<).

$

2,!i00,000

$

:uoo.coo

$

350,000

$

400,000

Hafley.10

,
I

10 The Ketchum Depot, Kelcl\um, ID

s

1,S00,000 $ 1,212,139

681,861

'RP

11 E11terprlse 6usinees Pan,;, Flag~lart.
fl:!.
12 200 Partnars, LLC (Staples),
,Wenatchee. WA

S 1,750.000 $ 1,106.552

643,448

RP

$ 2..730,000

i

848,952

1,881,046

R.P

1:31 R & R (540 N. 2nd Ave), Ketcum. ID
(R& R, LLC)

S 1.250.000

$

900,000

360,Ut.JD

14 Gateway, Wenatchee, WA

$

'.350,000

$

250,325

15 Snuct<s Allto, ao1se,
i

ro

16 CE. LLC (,221 Airport Wil)', Hailey,

RP

!
I

'il9.675

(Gateway Proporties, LLC (WA))

-·

RP

I

$

1,000,000

$

600.000

$

?33.!l8i

266.113

RP
RP

-·

500,000

ID)

17 O~I: HOUSfil, Ketchum. ID (OKI:
House, LLC)
16 HP 21!, Bol,c, ID
19

S 1,100.000

247,194

$ 3,254,000

Lot 7, Block 4, Halley, ID (Lo\ 1,
(Block 4, LLCJ
:21 V1:dley Center, 8&M\lue, ID (Vslley

ID

i

RP

200.000

200,000

RP

$

500,000

500.000

RP

I

1

S 1.062,483
$ 3,000,000
$

$
$

27 311 Building, Ketchllm, ID
r==nnex, Boise, 10
wil!. Pocatello. ID

$
$

S
ll

s

490.3116
$ 3,000,000

1,100,000 $ 1,100,000
7,008,824 $ 4,289,006
300.000 $ 600,000
1,400.000 $ 1,050.000
1,000,000 $ 600,000
1.200,000 $ 816,000
4,150,000 S 4,150,000

S1 St lukei. So!Se. ID

f:24,200.000

S 15,337,ll;j,II

37.f

$13,000,000

S 7 500,000

River cente,. Hooelrlvor. OR

RP

s

26 !11 Land. Ketchum, ID

30 711 N. Mam street, Haney, 10

(137;

S 3,254.137

l

Center, LlC>
22 i Bro,idway Bob, Boise, 10
23 Milek Center, Halley, ID

1-100'1

R?

852,806
!

20

~ Friedman Park. Hailey,
25 Americana, Boise, ID

$

I

I RP

:572,137

.

RP

-

RP

2,719,E,1!>
(300.00Q)
350,000

RP

400.000

RP

322,000

RP

RP
RP

.

--

8,662,001
$.500,000

r

!

RP

I

I

RP

RPi

7S5056]
h:\pc!!i

Page 1
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FAX No.

l !0:00 AM

PROPERTY AND DEB'f SCHEDULE

CASETITLEt
CASE NO:
DATe OF MARRIAGE:

Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor

CV-2011-0000525

21579•001
CH FILE NO.:
COMPLAINT FlLED: 1/25/2011
CH'S EVALUATION AND ALLOCATlON

618/1968

ro

MARKl:1

mu

TO

WIPE
WO.

VALUI!

PROPERTY OEsCRIP"TION

33 210 C41pilol, Sakml, OR
34 B0i11e ~11d, Boise, ID

LIEN$

1100,000

$

8SO,OOO

$ 5,438,uw

$

2,9-43,000

$

EQUITY

HUS8ANO

CIS

Kl-'

RP

36 8390 Golden Trout St, BQi&6, ID

ftp

36 10699 W. 1,/sllCk R<I. B01ae, 10
83717

37
~8

i:Xh#

REMARKS

ft~

50,000
2.495,000

.

BUSINESSES:

39 TN! Century Tru.t
40 l<F, U.C
41 SLK. LtC
42 SLK Develoment, LLC (75%
onwe1$hip by KF, LLC)
43 Oo11bla Di.lmond Partner$, LLC

X

X

-

9one

gone

-

gone
gone

44 SC Rancll, LLC
4•
G

gone

46 Rarnon f>ark Associates, Ud.

RP

47 HCC, LLC
46 K.antQr Family, U.C (CO)

&-Old

.

X

X

!

di\llded
go11e
9011e
&$

49 Sprll'l!l C1eek l~vestors. LLC

50 SVR M;inagement. LLC

RP

S1 Rokan Property Se,vices, LLC

52
53
54
55

Mid Valle;' Waler Company, LLC
Mid Valley Sewer i.;ompany. LLC
8ulllon Square, LLC (ID)
Sage CRlf, LLC (ID}
56 Ii, K. Marine, Inc. (100% ownership
1.>y KF, LLC)
67 ,-KFI, LLC • UQUIDATED
Sil ftollan CorporatiOn (6% interest in

-

RP

.

RP
l(P

.

)(

-

X

X
X

KF, LLC ~"I>

.

Gone

Ro"'" Partner»)
&9 Ror.an f'artneri.

Sondra ar,d Roi>ert "' 68%

-

6(1

a,

-

-

62 Broadw,;ry Bob. LLC

Rf>

63 Highlat>ck Station. LLG (10)

64 lb! Homes. u.c {LLC)

.

65 ISi Idaho, LLC
66 KWH Partnership

.

RP
RP
RP

67 MIP, LLC

RP

-

.RP

68 Roken Oregon, LLC

RP

69 RVL, LLC

70
1,
7Z

RP

V

.

VtSIOA Op11cal Partnen;, LL.C

I
RP
'"'

785058_7
n·\pdt.

S;K_
P11ge2

4/1612012 :i:34 p ~ .
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FAX No.

! l 0: OJ

PROPERTY AND DEBT

CASE TITLE:

CASE~O:

Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor
CV-2.011~0000525

618/1968

DATE OF MARRIAGE:

21579-001
CH FILE NO.:
COMPLAINT FILED; 1/2512011
CH'S EVALUAilON ANO ALLOCATION

VAI..UE

PROPERT'I' DISscRIPTION

1/Q.

LlliNS

l;Q\J'ITY

.

13 RV Hood River, LLC (65%
owner&hip by Rokan Partner!)

-Yo

TC

MARKET

m!M

Wl'FE

HUSQANO

CIS

~p

74 Hood River Cent~!. Ll.C (ID)
7f;i John Alan Partn&rs, II, LLC

owned by Rokan Ver1ture.s

'
.

76 RQkan Venture;, LLC

RP

77 200 Partner., LLC (10}
78 31{Flrst Avenue Menager:-., l.l.C

RP
RP

79 Medical Buikllng JnvosllnEtnt Group.
LLC

RP

so PK Venlllres

~

Exh#

REMARKS

RP

RP

X

!:aii!man lnV1!1$tOl'S, LP.

X

82
83

.

84 RETIREMENT, BANK ACCOUNTS,

ll'M;STMl:NTS, CASH ANO UFi::

~85

INSURANCE:
Zions Sank Ac;ct # ... 4$4-4 (in

s

420

420 C

as of 9f19/1 1, Robert

Robert's name only)

86 US flank Acct # ... 5836 (in Robert's

Slopped Ciepcsitiflg his
Soc;ial Secijr!\y chec;ks imo
\hi$ bcc:ount after 8118110

s

4,755

as or 9/1511 i Oniy

4,156 C

Robert·, social seev111y
checks deposill::d lo thi&c
account

naml'l only)

67 Wellf. Fargo Saving! Acct

I

;

#163~03.2237 (In Robert's name
only)
87a Waiki faftjlo Ch&eklng Acct Ii.. , 1653
(lfl Robert's name only)
88 • ~anll of America Checking Acet
#.. -5236 (in Sondra·:. name only)
89 ~I< or Ame~ Sllviogs lv;el.
#..•5236 (In Sondra·, natne)
90 Sank or America Checking Aoi;t

3,275

3,275

C

B&

of 9/1 3/11

.
I v10$e<.1

' !llooed
X

C

a qf January :.ru12

n...0161J On Som:mfs n;1me ooly)

91 Bank of America S11111ngs Acct
#...0188 (In S0hdr111s nema only)
92 Bankof the Wei~ AOC!. 'fl7?
93 Oppenheimer Ac.cl #024•1647036
{KFI LCC • Rotiert Kantot Trus~ -

CI09&Cl

s

X

t.:

as ol Janv;iry
Closeo

C

I
2012

i

PAS Cambiar)
94 Oppenh11imer Acct #G24-1S45B40
(KFI LCC. Robel1 Kaf!W Tr<.rstl!>e)

95 Oppenheimer Acct tfG:24·164 7044

.
.

i

C

$

c

l

Closed

Closed

(KFI LCC • Robert Kantor Trustee.
PAS PIMCO COMM)

78S058_7

.

.

.'L.

4116120t2 3·34 PM
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FAX No.

I 10: 01 AM

PROPERTY AND DEBT SCHEDULE

CASE TITLE:
CASE NO:

DATE Of MARRIAGE:

Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor
CV-2011-0000525
6/8/1968

21579-001
CHFILE NO.:
COMPLAINT FILED: 1125/2011
CH'S EVALUATIO.N ANO ALLOCATION

ro

MAAKE'l'

llnl

l'ffOPERTY 01:SC~PTION
$
96 Opp•nhelmer Acct #G2+ 164705'1
(l<F I LLC - Robert A l<anto r Trustee •
PAS Van ECII)
$
87 Oppenheimer Apct #624-1647089
(KFI LlC • RObert A Kantor Tn.istee ,
Star-Schafer)
NO.

98 OppenheitJ1er Acct #G24·i647077

$

(KFI LCC • Rob6rt Kantor Truitee •
PASl'IIFJ)
99 Oppenheimer Acct. #G2,M647093
(Kf'I LCC - Robert Kanl<>r Tr11stee •
STAR NEW PAiH}

$

100 Opl)lll1h&lmar Acct #G:24-1647101
(KFI LCC - Robert K9ntor Ttusleet •

WJ.ue

LIEN$

.

t!QUrTY

Wlfll

HUSBAHO

C/S

Ft!!IAAl'tkS

C

Close<!

229

229 C

Closed

-

-

C

l;l0Sed

(56) C

Closed

.

C

Closed

C

Clo~

$

s

55

I

TO
&hf

j
l

PAS ACORN)

101 Oppenheimer Acc(#G24-15A7119
(Kl"! LCC - Rooer1 Kantor Trustee •
PAS GS)
102 Schwab Account
103 Scllwsb Acct #9164-9408 (in
Joshua's ~e)
104 Schwab Ao::! #2224-8757 {in Aron':1
name)
105 SchWab Acct #5138-7096 (in

$

~
$

:Z.936

2,936

Na

as of 9130111

$

2.261

2.261

n/~

as or S/30/11

$

3.937

3,937

f'VII

89

.

C

$

C

$

Shelom·s hamo)
106 schWab Acct #5196-5397 (111
Sondra'~ name)
107 Schwab Acct #32'1V-1359 (in
Sondr1ii'& name)
108 First Colony Tci,rn Life lm,unanc.

C
I

1n~ured: Robert

l

-

Polley #8266031 (century Trust
\Agreement did 8/6/02) Issued Auguit
14, 2003 (di,ath benaf,t S1 .SM)•

Insured; Robert
110 Air Miles - Oelta

112 Wells Fargo Bank Acc:t Jru;i:i;J1
(Rokan Psrtnen.)
'""Ti3 Wells Farge Mooey Malket Acd.

224 a$ of 9130" 1

no ti!ISh value

C

x

C

111 American fxpre.s Ce,nturion Acct
#1 "'409S6736 (American cXJ)l'!IS&
Acal#, 6-1004) Membership
Rewan:!& Points - Total: 409,238

as of 9130111

ru, cash 11tloe

Policy No. 5.98.4.615 (death benefit
$2.5M) Issued August 1, :2002 •

~ 'Genworth Term Ute Insurance

1.434

of 9/30/t t

X

X

;is of i111i1. Ciiv1de ana
transfer

$

31.577

M.577

RP

$

17,040

17,040

Rt'

;

4.!0

420

'137

,a782 (Ro1<11n Portner&)
11-4 2lons Bank Acct iro494 (In Robert's
nam!J)

i

440

X

as of 12130/10
441

688
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No.
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DEBT

CASE TITLE:
CASE NO:

OATE OF MARRIAGE:

Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor
CV-2011-0000526
6/8/1968

......

CH File NO.:
COMPLAlNT FILED:

21579-001
1125/201 'I
CH'S EVALUAllON AJJD ALLOCATION

r,wtKl:t

TO

1'0

WIFI£

VAI.IJE

Pf'I.OPER.TY Dl:SCRlf'TlON

11().

LIENS

ECIUIT'I

Em#

RIS:MARKS

HUSS.ANO

Cl$

X

116 Bank of the Wast Acct(in Sondra's

name)
X

11S Bank of Amertca Acct (ill Sondra's

nam9)

117
118 VEHICLES:

119 2008 Red Jeep Cherokee. VIN

'

.
$

21.000

21,000

C

X

iilfo onlained from Idaho
OMV Wtb-site

#... 152115

120 2007 GMC PenaU. VIN ft-... 256S94

$

2-4,000

121 1979 Mercedei; 450, VIN tl...067978

s

e.ooo

24.000 C

e.ooo

X

iofo t>blaincd from ldallo
OMvWeb-site

sell to Riohard Baskin •nd

C

divide proceed equally

~·u

122

123 HOUScHOLO GOOOS &

.

I

Fl,lRNlSHlNGS:

Huld'IIIIS dated 7/8/11

!

$
$

127 A~c:he basket round 26il'ideep

$

128 Pine chest. black knobs S clrawer

$

129 otiental 4 floor cabinet
130 wood fnam& chair, woven seat &
back
·--:iJ, WoOd ClesK with primitive top
""132 Nativ~ Amer1e.1n t:,asKet, round 17
1/Z" X 10"deap
133 Pair of hammered l:>r:ass & ceramic

t.irnP5

650

s

850

Hutvl'tina

1,1:1\1\J

1,800

$

1.$00

Hutchin&

2.800

2,800

Hulch1n!I

55D

560

Hutchins

950
185

650

s

950

$

950

$

185

$

-450

460

$

650

6SO

Hut;::hins
ttutcnl~

$

600

600

Hulclllns

l1t1tchins

ttJtchitl6

s

225

225

$

450

450

H11ld\1ns

$

m

300

Hu\Chtns

$

1,WU

1,200

r\ulch1ns

138 Coffee table G119st S11t1ng area

26:!
200

26&
200

Hutci'lm&

139 Pine olock

s
s

HO Pine 5 drawer c1ie,t. woo1;1 lalo1Ja

$

850

850

HII\Ghins

i41 Armoilil,pine

$

$

1,000
1,000

1,000
1,000

• Hutchin;.

142 Kingbed/pire bedstead Shalom's

$

4,000

4,000

$

850

850

-

$

Antique wood bench. mudroom (2)

-

I

I

Hulchins

200

X

--

x

Sell

X

~~~t:Sotl - 01\c In his

76505.8.7

h:\pds

Page: 5
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II

Hutehins

room

'"144

·-

Hutcllim;

134 Amer. lndlan baal<et 15X14"
135 Amer. Indian bas\:el 16X12"
116 Pair of gee&e ceramJC
137 Cabinet Pine e2x1 8x?8

143 HeadbO~rd Beo.Atoo, Huntzinger

299

.

124 Household,

125 1:1eneh. upholst~~ Nav.iio rugdiwnagea
126 Chinese apotnecary cabinet

Perr.onal property

epprabel by Otwicl

RI 10: 01 AM
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FAX No.

PROPER.TY AND DEBT SCHEDULE

CASE TITLE:
CASE NO:
DATE OF MARRIAGE:

Robert Kantor v. Sondr;i Kantor
CV-2011-0000525
6/8/1968
MARKET

ITa.l

-

21579-00i
CH FILE NO.:
COMPi..AlNT FIL.ED: i/25/2011
CH'S EVACUATION ANO ALLOCATION
TO

TO

WIFE

VALUE

PRO!>ERTY Dl?SCRIPTION

II<>

LIENS

EQUIYY

HU$BAt1D

CIS

8,250

6,2.50

146 Frent:11 Buffet
147 Mvrano pedest;,1 vao"

$

),000

3,000

H111ehlnti

$

250

250

Hutr;hin&

146 17th century clock

$

3,100

$

650

$

3a;ooo

3,100
&50
30,000

$

500

!KJO

Partoeta de!lk

bhtl

REMARl<S

s

145

l111;urance 11st: Hutchins

$1000

149 Vintage woQd

buffet

150 Steinway pie.no
1!$1 JaCODean cl'le&I

Hulctlina

Hutoltlns.
Hut<:hln&-Scll

s

Huti;lllmr. 1iBid $500, found

500

Otle OC\llne 1h lJK for 750
Pounds/$1200/$2350

lnaurionce 11:st
1$2 English toolbath

$

2.500

fmuran,;e list-Ask Oeanna

2.500

Mefin

153 Hunuinger bed-maslsr bedroom

-··
154
i

$

L.A. Da.ign Conc:epts,

10,000

10,000

lroniM rQp.

replacement value
645

645

$

645

Hulchlt\s

155 FuJian Bed-1>id& tat:>l, rlgtit

$

45D

45Q

s

4SO

156 Upright piano
1S7 Hawaiian pool ts ble

$

450

450-

Hutchin~
S¢1d

$

2,000

$

2.000

Oriental bedstand tablf:.-left-

$

..

2,000

Hutchin:. valued Ill
si,COWlnsvrance val1Jod at
S? ,000 on 4113/91

I

s

300

300

s

225

225

16G Tcctrix exercise bike
161 Ab Sclssor
162 SST Stretch trainer

$

950

950

$

80

80

$

163! Vectra Total Gym

$

164 Pree.or walker
165 Prcoor AMT Stepper
166 Fishing rod collectl<111
167 Fishing flies
168 Gun colleetion
169 Watches if real
170
171 Furniture:
H2 Blue sofa and Ci'oalr (MoVI~ R.oom)

s

95
3,000
1,200
4,500

158 Preoor Stmtch tralnar
159 Sa1bdt

$

s

X

X

i
X

.

X

.'
.

9{j

3,000

1,200

1,500

4.500

$

.
.

.

X
X
X

1,500

X

.

Hutchin~

\,60()

..
.
..

,

--

X

I

173 Green $of& (Upstairs Sitting Room)

X

174 L.Mng Room Suede Love Seat and
Chai~
175 Wving Room Sof"
176 Breakfast !&ble,ancl c:haira
177 Ba1stools (6)
176 oming Room Table and Chairs

l

.

.

Pa!JC 6

X

:

-

t,Sf<
411.612012 J.34 PM
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PROPERTY AND DEBT SCHEDULE:

CASE TITLE;

Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor

CASE NO:
DATE OF MARRIAGE:

CV-2011...0000525

21579-001
CH FILE NO.:
COMPLAlNT FILED: 1/2512011
CH'S EVALUATION AND ALLOCATION

6/8/1968
NIA~

rrfl'

TO

TO

V\1~1:

PROPf~'!YDESCRIPTION

NO.

I

VAl-01;

t7$ LH:muy Gl1airs and Ottoman
180 Ov11I Del!k 8 or A
181 I.amp in Sh11lom's room
182 Sofa In Guest Sitting room
163 oma11 d11sk/tilble in Up$ti,; SitlinQ
'i84 Antique wing ollatr

--rn
186

$

1.000

1.lEllS

EQUliY

KUSEIAND

CIS

1.000

$

soo

s

1.000

I

$

MaasageChtiWs{2)

6,750

5,75-0

500

500

$

j Bob's offteEr. Insurance l~I
500

$

~

X

X

Outdoor turnUure

io be shared

}(

X

188 Leptop computer In Kiti;;hen
(/ncludil'\g music end family photOG)

-

Art:

I

Huteh\ns

X

187 Dt:$ktop Computer in bob'e urnce

189
190
1'il1
192
193

fl!l,1,1

fitl:M.JI.R"-S

Bronze "Go for Broke·, library

$

Hat oolleclion-6

$

Peter Beard book

$

2,500
1,500
3,800

Aron's

2,500

1,500
3,800

1,500

$

s

1,500

$

3,SOO

-

104 lnaz Storef pieces

$

'

15,000
6,300

15,000
6,300

$

8,300

195 Chl'iStlanse11 off
196 Fighting Lion

$

8,00Q

ll.000

$

e.ooo

$

10.()0Q

fo.ooo

Trinh Nguyen Panels

s

recen lly porci\ased for

10,000

S.10,000.00
197 Ma,geux Walter -Paperweight•
19\l Big 5lot-uonzalei;

$

3,500

3,500

3,500

X

.

199'cut t.oos&-Oan Snyder

Louise

.

20C CrayOtl$-NlUh11n Kane
201 Cnewea Rultir·Steinberg
20.2 ?ortl'al! of Navejo Code Talker,
Gorman bronze
20! Ceramic and Paper Fens, Luoe

S~elom

X

.
s

205 Robert Henri

206 • CheTCoal-H. C. OaviK
207 Hambv19er in Pilnidise-Sctul'ldler

$

15.500
1,600

1°5:500
1,500

$

10,000

10,000

2011 Stttlng lr1(j1an woman, Gorm1111
209 Sliver c1eek b)' Hugtt Mossman
$
210 Turbaned womel\, Oliviera
210a Red Enc.au&tle, purchased from Gail

)(

lour.ii!

.

1.500

ins11ra/\Ce Lfr.t: 'TBA
111sur11nce list; TEIA·Loulsc

X

iBA-1..ouiee
X

15,000

X

.

.
.
i

$

l

''Close To;tt~r" by Karel Appel

215 Three C0Uu.9e1-Weber

15 !',00

18,000

$evern

t

i

-

X

s

.

211 H.C. D11vi&s "Hllns Hoffmall"

213 fMh L!tolt Photo Collagas
21-4 "Gren Peche" Gonza~$

~

Louise

I
.

2041 Giraffil by Dentzet c. 1890

212

$

.

76505!U
Page7

X

X

x

I

-

See lneurance Usl

uA Lou,se

)t;

l

X

TBA•Loulse/S"'l.11

~

j u

4/16n012 3:34 PM

;1,,_
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AM

PROPERTY AND DEBT SCHEDULE

CASE TITLE:

CASI: NO:
DATE OF MARRIAGE:

Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor
CV-2011-0000525

6/8/1968

CH FILE NO.:

21579-001

COMPLAINT FILED:

'1/25/2011

CH'S EVALUATION ANO ALLOCATION

-·

MARKl;:1

•YE11

Lre~s

VALUE

PROPflt'l'V DESCRIPTION

uo.

SQUITY

216 App&I sculpture fJS,h
.217 Appel Painting "Anlmar
:ml "Mother' Oorman
219 H.c. C>aviee "At tile Opera"
no H.c. oavi6S "Rainy Day"
n1 "Oven oar Gonzales
222 Moonnght Table. Steinberg
223 Got YI\ Covared, Pernie
224 Larg& Photo '"FIim• collage, Litoff
225 Various Prints as per Hutchifis

Appcalsal
226 t.111der The 8ed. Ga.nan Wilson

j()'

TO

.Wll'EI

1-ll.lSBANO

C/S

.

·····

.
.

2,500

ToJoih

To Shalom

1BA•Loutse

X

l'BA-1.0t11se
insurance List

750

7SO

$

.

X

.

$

.!JJ-Y
,x

-

750

EXh'4'

X

.
s

RS.MARKS

l TBA-Louise

X

2,500

lnsurance List:TSA-Suzy
FIND

227 lfl th& Mirror, 1 ooiter
i

$

226 Animation Cells by Ron Searle. rrom $
Dick Deadeye
$
229 PeltUS "StuUy 11"
$
2.30 Pai Cheng Portfollo-Lithos.
131 P\caseo Etching
zsz Vanous etchingi.
235 Alrlcan, M'lencan Indian. Latin
Amelican 1111 Collecrion

4,500

Insurance nl!'l:TSA-Suiy

4,500

FINO

zooo

2,000

650

650

1,200

1,200

.

-

il

2,000

1
$

Hutchin&

I'

650 IMur1mee Ust
per Suzy Locke • Sell

X
X
X

X

FindAppra1ser-lnsu1arice

Ust !lh0\\1'$ s,2535 total;
Hutchin& sl1ows 1 basket

as i2600
234 CarouGel Ho11e. Green & Gold
235 Carou:iaiil Hor&&, Whl!e/Lavor,det

s
$

7,000
7,000

lnsu10nce Ll$t

7,UUV
7,000

111,11rance Li~t
X

2:lii Appel Pann&rs

237

.

Rot>ert's Art (Prices based on
RObllr't'B eelimated value.s for 2004
Idaho Trienniel):

S0,000

lnCIUdes value ot ctem

Nos.238,239,2~1.242.

.
.

WtiileFlower

12 Hearlti

X
X
X
X

X

Thufies

.

"L"

244

.

245 1 co1111ignment fr()m 1.wo11<:
t'IO 1311t1inc:e in Stack and White

X

247

2'48 Art in and &rQIIOd K~ntor koml!:
249 Creation
250 Flower (at Mary's)
Z!:>1 Louise's

I

246

.
.

2.38 Camp I-I-ope
239 VVhtte I-lope

240
241
242
24~

ll

.

I

.
.
.

I

6reel11ut

IX
.x
X

Sk
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PROP:6:.RTY AND DEBT SCHEDULE

CASE TITLE:
CASE NO:
DATE OF MARRIAGE;;

Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor
CV-2011--0000525
6/8/1968

21579-001
1125/2011

CH FILE NO.:
COMPLAINT FILED:

CH'S EVALUATION AND ALLOCATION

MARJ<EJ

!TIii,\

l'ROPl!IO'Y DESCRIPTION
NO
262 Double Hearts Table
253 Hean on Kltohen giss, bar
254 Living Room MCDlle
25~ t::1le
255 carpets:
257 Herlz..t.lbra,y
258 1:ntryway-f>er$lan woolM!llliyer/Sarouk Wool 8'6' x
12'6"L31'{le blue and old rose rosette,
rose flel(l
259 Media Room-Large neWl"r rlJQ

VALUE

TO

TO

WlF'!!
LIENS

f!QUlli'

H~l!!.&.Jllg

Cl$

.

X

X

!

$

~.obo

29.000

$

e;,ooo

5,000

$

5,000

TBA Tarry Reicl1Nancy
Norris
I TBA Terry Reicl/Nancy

260 Great room. Tibetan refu9ees·

Persian su11 Kug
263 Betoucms:tan Wool rug,

s

-·

TBA Terry f{eidJNanoy
Norris
Insurance Li&t

!

1,000
475

1.000

$

4fl>

lnsu,ence L.ill

264 Turkoman wool 37" x 4', old rooe w/ $

800

800

ltiSV<3ncia

2,500

2.500

blue &

ii
--

jNorrts

261 Dining Room Rug

-

brown
Lis!

!blue loi:ange

26!'.i F'er&iall wool 4'1 o· x 1•r Deep blue
Field

$

766 P¢r&tan Wool 5' >: 7'3" SIJarDeep

s

2.250

2.2s,r

s

265

265

lnsurence Ust

s

1.800

1,800

Insurance, Li$!

261:i Caucasian wool rug 37' x 6'2" deep
blue ftelcl WI vMd me<iallion&

$

1,500

1,500

Insurance list

27c n,ni~ wool tog

$

s-so

950

lns.urenoe List

$

7,500

7,500

bl11e rectangular field with red wien
11oratl1!s repetitivt:
26i Angollan wool Mat 2' x 3'6" llKI

I

-26!!

sel'rated border wt 3 oroi!./\ge
9eomeirle8
Persian l<ilim rug. 4'6" x 6'4" Rose &
gold fielel w/ bluo & Ivory lloriate

4'4" x 6'2"Sky bh,,e

---

Insural\Cf! ist

_,,

11'1$Uftll'ICI!! l!st; Ubraiy
under desk?

cartoocne wl omate old rooo and
ivory 111edallio11
271 Herlz Rug Roumanar 7'3" ,c 18':r

272 Sterifcarpet

~273

.
.
.

-

267

~-288

$

75,000

75.000

.

290

.

294 ExclusM, RetoltG

.

L29:

)C,

i
I

s

. stoR,room. FINO
X

X

gifts

.x

X

I

I\

~S_K_

785058_1
h:lpds

I lns.urance Ust--in

I

Outdoor Furniture:

otMr·
289 Jewelry ill Sondra's po&eeesion

10,uran ce t.lSi~:in
,,toreroom, FINO

i

Page 9
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inaurance List
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l

-··262
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PROPERTY AND DEBT SCHEDULE

CASE TITLE:
CASE NO:
DATE OF MARRIAGE:

Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor
CV-2011--0000525
0/8/19613
MA'RKET

IY&.!
'f(>.

VAi.VE

PROPf!RTY OE$CRl?Tl0N

LIENS

38,581

(38,:>111)

$

(36,561

$

40,000

(40,Wll)

$

(40,000)

$

(18,000)

B of A Visa tt971lil {Sondra's!

$

18,000

(1&]00)

Oalta Amex #3006

$

4,uvv

Amencsn Express Acct lf.,.3-82002
(In BOb'~ nam&)

$

3,046

(4,000)
(3,048)

X

F

Americ:an Eli:prll&& Centurion Card
(n 13ob's name) Acct#•. M1004

$

6,172

(8,172}

fX

K

-l>t~

L

Sltl!S 3156A
8&1IC..lli'!lll~Wfte.·

p
Q

T

u
V

w

i:Eh

*

.

$

C

0

IU!MARI\&

.
Llabillti&&
Well& Far90 Acct # ...0590 (in
R\lbert's name only)
B \lf A Amex-ll'll54e/1&32 (Sondra'$)

0

JE

!j

WIFE!

HUSBAND

C/S

-

297

B

21579-001

COMPLAINT FILED; 1/25/2011
CH'S EVALUATION AND ALLOCATION
TO
lo

EQUITY

296

A

CH FILE NO.:

~

..

-

Allotney$ Fees - Scot LudWig
~teveM Pierce Ass0o1a1e11

e.

$

--.

X

,s of 10/10/1,
11s. of 9t1!jl! 1 U;sd to
pay Sondra's amimey fees

I

,~
(390,000)

390.000

..

-~

-

)(

$

25,000

(25,000)

$

1,000

(f;DOO)

X

expo~·fees

X

expert fees

I

t·-

pen;ona!

(7,600)

7,500

-

entity

,.

$ 1,00Q QOO

$

Stevesevem
US Bank
Doctor - SF· S0nt1r11
Remaining lees owed to CoshoHumphrey

-· ·~ -~

I& of 10/10/11

~

I

IX

.

X

.

X
TOTAL ASSl::TS
u,,-,-ERENCE

96,(3$,396

64,91Z.641

31,!i23,755

.

Proof

$

115,972

40,4u&

(17,578)

17,578

{35.1!18)

AMOUNT TO EQUALIZE

EQUAUZEO COM. PROPERTY

7S.l>l:i4

$

57.986

$

57,966

185058_8
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SECOND A.lvIENDMRNT TO THE RESTATED AGREEMENT OF

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

OF
ROKAN PARTNERS, AN IDAHO LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
In accordance with paragraph 11.15 of the Restat:ed Ag:reement of Limited
Partnership {"Restated Agreement"), the undersigned, being all of tb.e Partners (collecth•ely "Partners"), adopt this Second Arnend.meni to t.he Restated AgreernQnt
(this "Amendment''), effective April_, 2012.

RECITALS - PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
A.
Rokan Co:rporation 1 a Delaware corporation, is the General Partner of
the Partnership.
B.

Robert A Kantor ("Robert") is the Ptesident of Rokan Corporation.

C.
Robert and Sondra L. Kantor ('Sondra") entered into a Property Set•
tlement Agreement effective March_, 2012 ("Property Settlement Agreement").
D.
Certain terms of the Property Settlement Agreement require that the
Partners amend the Restated Agreement.

RECITAL- RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERABILITY
E.
The Partners desire to amend and supplement the Agreement to
change the restrictions on transferability of their respective Percent In Interest.

AMENDMENTS-PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
NOW THEREFORE, Rokan Corporation, Robert and Sondra agree to the fol~
lowing amendments to the Restated Agreement.
1.
The Partners amend Exhibit A to the Restated Agreement to provide
that the Partners and their respective Percentage Interests are as follows:

Rokan Cru,>oration

Robert
Sondra
Geoffrey F. Kantor
A:ron B. Kantor
SECOND AMENDMENT TO RESTATED AGREEMENT
813706~

6%
44%
44%
2%

2%

RI !0:

P.

No.

Joshua M. Kantor

2%

2.
The Partners amend paragraph 5.1 to provide that, in addition to the
other requirements of paragraph 5.1, the General Partner shall not admit o:r substitute a Partner without the written consent of all Partners.
3.
The Partners amend paragraphs 3.2.5, 3.2.7, 5.1 and 5.3 to provide
that, in addition to the other :cequ.irements of paragraphs 3.2.5, 8.2.7, 5.1 and 6.3,
neither Rokan Corporation, no:r Robert nor Sondra shall receive directly or indirectly :any compensation. from Rok.an Partners other than as stated in the Property Settlement Agreement.

4.
The Partners amend paragraph 5.1 to provide that, in addition to the
other requirements 0£ para.graph 5.1, there can be no person other than Robert or no
entity other that Rokan Corporation managing Rokan Partners without the written
consent of at least 60% of the interests held by the Partners.
5.
The Partners amend paragraphs 3.2.5 and 3.2.7 tC> provide that, in a.dditio:n to the other requirements of paragraph 3.2.5 and 3.2. 7, distribution~ to Robert and Sondra shall be made as stated in paragraph 2.12 of the Property Settle·
ment Agreement. The Partners have attached a copy of paragraph 2.12 of the Prop·
erty Settlement Agreement
Amendment as Exhibit 2.

true

6.
The Partners amend paragraph 5.l(h) to provide that, in addition to
the other requirements of paragraph 5.l(h), the General Partner cannot amend the
Agreement in any way that would injure any Partner without Sondra's written consent.
7.
The Partners amend Article VIII to provide th.at. in addition to the
other requirements of Article VIII, prior to the sale of any asset of Rokan Partners,
Robert shall provide written notice to all of the Partne,..s, as much in advance aa
possible under th8 circumstances. including all details of the proposed sale.

8.
Robert and Sondra agree to convey the assets, subject to the liabilities,
listed on the attached Exhibit I to the Partnership and the Partnership acc:epts
such assets and liabilities as. assets and liabilities of the Partnership.
9.
The Partners agree that the foregoing amendments shall be applied in
the broadest possible way to give effect to Robert and Sondra's intent as expressed
in this Amendment and in the Property Settlement Agreement. If there is a conflict
between any te:r:m of the Restated Agreement and this Am.endrnent or the Property
Settlement Agreement, this Amendment or Property Settlement Agreement will
take precedence.

SECOND AMENDMENT TO RESTATED AGREEMENT
818'700_2
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SBLL ROKAN PARTNERS' SHARE OF ROKAN
'VENTURES

To; Sondra Kantor and Stanley Welsh, attorney of record in.1h.e Divorce proceedinss:
From: Robert A Kantor, 'President Rok.an Corporation'

A fu1I copy of the purobase and sale agreement 'Will be furnished to Sondra K811.tor and
h.er attorn~B as it is: fi.mshed. This sale is a result ofRokan. Ventures r&fusal· to particip11te
in any further real est.ate deals so long as Rokan Partners re:rnaill$ an o-wner/participant.
· ·· · - ·· ~·· · ··-(a G8f)Y ~~ lettet.from Michael Page willkprovided). IfRokan Partners refuses 1o
sell its intwesti Rokan Ventures will just cease to do any additional transactions and \viU;.------be liquidated over some period of time.
The cash price pald fortbt .intet~stbo,ug..'~i.d is (or will be), in the opinion of Robert
Kanto:r, the maximum possib1o.·valtie,a.f'&o-1am Partner's sbate of the underlying assets of
Rokan Ventures witb ~ ~~flt~ the $ale of a minority interest. In addition; Rokan
Partners will be assigned its pro•rata.
every profits interest O'Ytned by Rokan

snare of

Ventures at tho tilno th.e transaction becomes effective.

Because of 1hi; continuing requitement of Rokan Pmtners for cash, the proceeds from this
sale wifl assist with the ability of Rokan Partners to make capital distributions to the
o\l'II'.le(s.

I

I
9·d
- - - ---- -- -- --- -

---- - - ----- - - -

9£LL8Z680l
- - ---- ---- - - --
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REDEMPTION AND FULL LlQUlDATION AGREEMENT
ANO AUTHORIZING RESOLUTION
ROKAN PARTNERS, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
an Idaho limited partnership

and
ROKAN VENTURES, LLC
an Idaho limited liability company
THIS REDEMPTION AND FULL LIQUIDATION AGREEMENT ANO AUTHORIZING

RESOLUTION ("Agreemenr) Is affective as of January 1, 2013 (~Effective Date'') by and
between Rokan Ventures LLC, an Idaho limited liability company ("Company") and Rokan
Partners, Umlted Partnership, an Idaho llmited partnership ("Rokan Partners").

RECITALS
A,

Rokan Partners currently holds a 24.80% membership interest in Company.

B.
Company desires to distribute to Rokan Partner& · a cash paymeni and a
membership interest in each of the following entitles (!iac::h of which Is an Idaho limited llablllty
company}: RV Hood River LLC, RV Boise Bend LLC, RV Rokan Americana LLC, and RV Idaho
BB LLC (collectlvety, the ·Rv Companies"), In full redemption and complete liquidation of
Rokan Partners mel'!'lbership Interest In the Company.
C.

The membership interest to be distributed to Rokan Partners in each of the RV

Companies Is set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto (collectively, ''Distributed Interest").

NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufflclency for
wt:iich are hereby acknowledged, th8 parties hereto agree a$ follows:
1,
Treatment of Distrtbutions. The Distributed Interests In the RV Companies and
the Cash Payment (as defined below) to Rokan Partners, as provided in this Agreement, shall
be considered a full redemption and compiet& Hquidatlon of all of Rokan Partners membership
Interest in the Company.

2.
Distributions of Memb!rJ;hip Interest. Company hereby agrees to distribute to
Rokan Partners the Distributed Interest and Cash Payment (as &et forth below) in complete
liquidation of Rokan Partners interest In Company:
(a)

The Oisb1buted Interest in each of the RV Companies, as set forth on

Exhibit A attached hereto.

(b)
Ca$h payment In the amount of $41.675.48 ("Cash Payment") to be paid
concurrently herewith.

REOEIV'J'TlON AND LIQUIDATION AGREEMENT~ 1
1674242V4 {11239-11)

1--."C-"
698

l 10:

AM

FAX No.

P. 035/054

~
3.

Acceptance of

DistobuUoo.

Rokan Partners hereby accepts the Distributed

Interest in the RV Companies and the Cash Payment In full redemption and complete liquidation
of Rokan Partners interest in Company.

4.
Substitute Member. It is agreed that Rokan Partners wilt be deemed to be a
"substitute member" of each of the RV Companies With regard to the Distributed Interest for all
purposes of the Operating Agreement for each RV Company.

5,
r~lgn (I) as

~signatjgn.

Concurrently herewith, Robert Kantor ("Kantor") does hereby

a Manager of th& Company; and Oi) as registered agent of the Company. Kantor
agrees to execute any and all other documents necessary or convenient to carry out such

resignations. Within five {5) business days after the Effective Date, Michael E. Page ("Page;,
as the Man21ger of Company, shall caU$$ the. Articles of Organization flied with the Idaho
Secretary of State for Company to be amended to reflect the withdrawal of Rokan Partners as a
Manager and the reslgnatlon of Kantor as the registered agent of Company.
6.
Assignmgnt. Concurrently herewith, the Company, as the manager of each of
fue RV Companies, ehall execute an assignment to transfer the Distributed Interest to Roken
Partners. effectl\te January 1, 2013.
7.
Member's Interest. Effective January 1, 2013, the books and records of each RV
Company shall reflect the (i) Distributed Interest to Rolcan Partners; and (ii} Rokan Partnf:)rs
membership interest of each of the RV Companies pursuant to the schedule attached hereto as
Exhibit A.

s.
Amerodment to Operating flgreement for Company. The Operating Agreement of
the Company shall be amended c·Arnendment Provisions; to provide that (i) Page, as the
sole remaining Manager of the Company, Is authorlted to act ae the sole Manager of Company,
with full authority, and any provisions In the Operating Agreement of the Company that require
both Managers to approve or authorize any matters shall be amended provide that the sole
Manager shall be entitled to approve or authorize such matters; QI) replace EXhfbtt B of the
Operating Agreement (Peroentage Interests) with post..cfistribution Membership Interests of
each member as set forth in Exhibit B attached hereto; and (iii) require that all management
fees paid directly or indirectly by the RV Companies to the Company will be allocated solely to
the Company and. Rokan Partners shall not have any right to such management fees. Each of
the Members of the Company, by their consent to this Agreement, agree (i) that the Amendment
Provisions shall be binding on all of the Members of the Company as of the Effective Date; (ii) to
the extent of a conflict between the Operating Agreement and the Amendment Provisions, the
Amendment Provisions shall control, and {Ill) to promptly execute and deliver an amendment to
the Operating Agreement to effectuate the Amendment Provisions.
9.
USDG Note - Companv. Pursuant to Section 4.9 of the Operating Agreement of
the Company, the Company Is the holder of that certain U.S. Digital Gaming ("Usoo•) Note{s)
and related USDG assets ("USDG Assets") that are being carried on the books and records of
the Company. The USDG Assets are held by Company, as nominee, for the benefit of the
Rokan Partners and the Michael E. Pago 2008 Revocable Trust ("Page Trust"), one-half each.
Rokan Partners and Page Trust do hereby authorize the Company to distribute the USDG.
Assets to Rokan Partners and Page Trust (one-half each), or alternatively continue to hold the·
USOG Assets ag nominee solely for the benefit of Rokan Partnere and Page Trust. Rokan
Partners agrees and Instructs the Company to pay one--half (1/2) of the note payabte by Rokan
Partners (approximately $22,500) dlreetly to the Page Trust from ihe Cash Payment to be paid
to Rokan Partners under Section 2(b) above.
REDEMPTION ANO LIQUIDATION AGREEMENT. 2
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10.
f\nacgnda Mitters. Company is a party to certain litigation flied by Stiwlyn Inc.,
as plaintiff, against the Company and other parties named ~ i n1 in the District Court of Blaine
County, Idaho andJor U.S. District Court. The parties commonly refer to liiUch litlgation as
•Anaconda Litigation". Rokan Partners hereby agrees to remain l'lable for its proportionate
shat& (based on its prior Pereentage Interest of Company 24.80 percent) of any liablltty, claims
or costs Incurred.by Company arising from or ln connection with the Anaconda Litigation to the
extent such oosts exceed the $75,000 currently reserved by the Company rAnaconde
Reserve;. If the cost& of the Anaconda Litigation exceed the Anaconda Reserve, Rokan
Partners authorizes the RV Companies to pay its proportionate share of the Anaconda Litigation
costs directly from Rokan Partners distributions from the RV Companies. If the total cost of the
Anaconda Litigation is less than the Anaoonda Reserve, the Company WIii pay to Rokan
Partners its proportionate share of the remaining Anaconda Reserve.
11.

Cootlnuation of Business:

(a)
The business of Company shall be coritlnued by It.a Members and the
business of RV Companies shall be continued by its Members.

(b)
Rokan Partners expressly acknOwledgei- and agrees that It will have no
further rights to any profits or disiributlons cf the Company from any source (except as
expressly provided herefn with regard to the USDG Assets and Anaconda Litigation).

(c)
Rokan Partners acknowledges tha1 it wlll have no ftlrther or ruture Interest
in the business operations or future projects of the Company.
·(d)
For a period commencing on the Effective Date of this Agreement and
continuing for twenty-four (12) calendar months thereafter, Rokan Partners sigrees to continue
to use the Company, and/or its subsidiaries, to proVide property and entity management
services for an projects currently being managed by Ventures andfor Its subsidiaries unless
such termination Is for cause as per the Individual management agreements. The fee and
payment structure for suoh property management services shaU remain as in affect on the
Effective Date. Provided, however, if Rokan Partners sells any of Its existing project(s) to an
unrelated third party during suoh 24-month period, such third party buyer will not be required to
retain the Company for property management services.

12.
Release. Except as provided herein With respect to the USDG Assets and the
Anaconda Litigation:
(a}
The Company and Rokan Partners hereby release each other and their
respective shareholders, members, managers, officers and emp1oyees from eny and an claims,
damages, liabllltles or causes of action, whether known or unknown, arising out of the Company
and/or the relationship among the Company and Rokan Partners.
(b)
Rokan Partnera ac:eepts the Cash Payment and Distributed Interest in full
and total satisfaction of its membership Interest in the Company, aod hereby waives any and all
clalms it may have ag1::1lnst the Company, including without limitation its members, mam~gers
and employeee.

Rl!:DEMPTION AND LIQUIDATION AGREEMENT· 3
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Consent to Transfer RestrjQlioos. The Manager of the Company, as the Manager

of the RV Companl&s, hae obtained all consents and approvals required from the Members of
RV Companies for the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, and for Rokan Partners
shaff be treated as a Substitute Member of RV Companies as to the Distributed Interest.
·

14.

Gener@I Pr.ovisigo:

(a}
This Agreement may be executed in one or more duplicate counterparts,
eac;h of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which tog~her shall constitute one
and the sam& instrument. Facsimile transmission of any signed original of this Agreement
and/or retransmission of any signed facslmlle transmission shall be the same as ~Hvery of an
original.
(b)

If any action is inst!Med hereafter to enforce any of the te1TTis of this

Agreement by the partJes hereto, or If any party hereto Is required to a$sert the terms of this.
Agreement a& a defense to any action, the prevaiHng party in such action shall be entitled to
recover from the other party a reasonable sum for its attorney's fee8, plus reasonable costs and
expenses of prosecuting or defending the action.
(c)

This Agreement shall be governed and construed ln accordance with the

laws of the State of Idaho.
(d)
Each party agrees to take such further actions and execute such ·
instructions and documents as are necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agr&ement.

[Signature Page to Folluw]
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Agreement effective 1s of
the Effectlve Date.
COMPANY:

ROKAN VENnJRES LLC,
an Idaho limited HabUity company

By:~:;;.;,..
....
P-ag"""e-,-Ma-na_g_e_r_ _ _ __

ROKAN PARTNERS:

ROKAN PARTNERS, an Idaho limited
partnership

By:

ROKAN CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation, Its General Partner

By:
KANTOR:

ReOEMPTION AND LIQUIDATION AGREEMENT· 5
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•
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Consent and Approval of Members

The Members of the Company do hereby consent to and approve the foregoing
Agr&ement

Mlohael E. Page, Trustee of the Michael
Page 2008 Revocable Trust

e.

'

ffMce,.1.ff. ~(JyJ
~onioa Hanson

~-

Tony St. George
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EXHIBIT A
New Percentage Interests for RV Companies

.

S0.000%

7.-440%

3.000%
1.050%
2.640o/o
0,000%

80.600%

19.964%

2.416%

6hll!! d Rokllln Vanttnl

RV Hood Rl\ler

M.000%

RV Boise Bend
RV Rokan Americana
RV Idaho BB

88.000%

~

21.824%

25.270%

53.536%
22.000%
58.121%

,,.
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EXHIBIT B
New Percentage Interests for Rokan Ventures

e.7%
an P.t.rwn LP
tge,

1l>fl'/

JoMSotro

Total
Total minus redeemed partners

46.7%
24.8%
11,8%

3.°"
100.0%

12.05%
63.30%
0.00%
1B.:M%
0.00%

100.

72.
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ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION
OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST
{RV ROKAN AMERICANA)
THIS ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST
{"Assignmtnt; Is entered into effective as of the 1ct day of January, 2013 ("Effective

Date"), by and between RV Rokan Americana LLC, an Idaho limited liability company (·Rv
Rokan Amertcanaj, Rokan Ventures LLC, an Idaho limited liability company {"Ventures")
and Rol<an Partners Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership ("Rokan Partners").

RECITALS
A.
Rokan Partners holds a 24.80 percent membership interest In Ventures (the
"Rokan Partners Membership Interest") pursuant to the Operating Agreement of
Ventures, effective as of January 1. 2011 (the "Ventures Operating Agreement").
B.

Ventures, Rokan Partners, and Wali Investments LLC ("Wali") are the

members of RV Rokan Amerioana pursuant to that certaln Operating Agreement effective
as of December 1, 2011 ("RV Rokan Americana Operating Agreement;;

c.

Rokan Partners and Ventures entered into that certain Agreement for

Redemption, Uquldation and Partial Distribution and Authorizing Resolution effective as of
January 1, 2013 tDistrlbution Agreement") whereby Ventures agreed to distnbute 10
Rokan Partner& a 7.440 percentage membership interest In RV Rokan Americana ("RV
Distributed lnterest'1 in distribution and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership
Interest.

D.
Ventures desires to assign to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed Interest. as
a redemption and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership Interest, and .Rokari Partners
desires to accept ttie RV Distributed Interest, as a redemptiol) and llquidatlon of its interest
ln Ventures, and to assume all the rights and obligations arising under the RV Operating

Agreement.

AGREEMENT
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and conditions
contained herein and recitals set forth above, which are incorporated herein, and other good
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged,
the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.
Assignment. Effective as of the Effective Date, Ventures hereby assigns
and conveys to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed Interest, together with any and all other
rights with respect thereto arising under the RV Operating Agreement. Ventures covenants
and warrants to Rokan Partners that the RV Distrfbuted lntere$t is free and clear of any

encumbrances or claims of any third party.
2.
Assumption. Effective as of the Effective Pate, Rokan Partn~rs hereby
assumes the RV Distributed Interest, together with any and all rights with respect thereto

arising under the RV Operating Agreement.
AsSl<ilNMeNT AND ASSUTdlPTlON OF l\llEI\IIBERSHIP INTERESi .. 1
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3.
RV Rokan Americana Consent RV Rokan Americana hereby (i) consents
10 the assignment of the RV Distributed Interests
Rokan Partners, and (ii) agrees that
Rokan Partners shall be deemed to be a "substitute member" of RV Rokan Americana as to
the RV Distributed Interest.

to

4.
Attorneys' Fees. In the event of any controversy, claim or action being flied
or instituted between the parties hereto to enforce or Interpret the terms and conditions of
this Assignment or doeument.s related thereto, or arising from the breach of any provision
thereof, the prevalling party will be entitted to receive from the other party all cosl'S,
damages, and expenses, Including reasonable attorneys' fees through all levels of action,
incurred by the prevailing party, whether or not such controversy or claim ls litigated or
prosecuted to Judgment The prevailing party will be that party who is awarded Judgment as
a result of trial or arbttration, or who receives a payment of money or other concession or
agreements from the other party In settlement of claims asserted by that party,
5.

Succession. This Assignment shall be binding upon and shall lnure to the

benefit of the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties.

6.
Governing Law. This Assignment shall be governed by and construed In
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho.
7.

Time. Time is of the essence of this Assignment.

8.
Counterparts. This Assignment may be executed In any number of
counterparts, and once so executed by all parties hereto each such counterpart shall be
deemed to be an original instrument, but all counterparts together shall constitute but one
agreement.

[End of Text]
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Assignment
effective as of the Effaotiva Date.

COMPANY:

ROKAN VEN'rURES LLC,
~n Idaho limited liability company

By:~~-·-·-

e1E.Page

M ager
ROKAN PARTNERS:

ROKAN PARTNERS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership

By:

By:

RVtDAHO:

RV ROKAN AMERICANA LLC,
an Idaho limited liablllty company
By: Rokan Ventures LLC, Manager

e, Manager
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ASSIGNMENT ANO ASSUMPTION
OF MEMBERSHIP INT!REST
(RV IDAHO BB)

THIS ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION OF MEMBERSHlP INTEREST
('"Assignment) Is entered into effective as of the 1• day of January, 2013 ("Effective
Date"), by and between RV Idaho BB LLC1 an Idaho limited Uabtrity company ("RV Idaho"},
Rokan Ventures LLC, an Idaho limited liability company ("Ventures") and Rokan Partners
Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership ("Rokan Partnersj.

RECITALS
A.
Rol<an Partners holds a 24.80 percent membership interest In Ventures (the
"Rokan Partners Membershtp Interest") pursuant to the Operating Agreement . of
Ventures. effective as of January 1, 2011 (the "Ventures Operating Agreement").

B.
Ventures, John Alan LLC and Wali Investments LLC ("Wall") are the
members of RV Idaho pursuant to that certain Operating Agreement effective as of January
1, 2011 ,:'RV Idaho Operating Agreement");
C.
Rokan Partners and Ventures entered into that certain Agreement for
Redemption, Liquidation and Partial Distribution and Authorizing Resolution effective as of
January 1, 2013 ("Distribution Agre&ment") whereby Ventures agreed to distribute to
Rot<an Partners a 19.964 percentage membership Interest in RV Idaho ("RV Distributed
lnter-ast") In distribution and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership Interest.
D.
Ventures desires to assign to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed Interest. as
a redemption and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership Interest, and Rol<an Partners
destres to accept the· RV Distributed Interest, as a redemption and liquidation of Its interest
in Ventures, and to assume all the rights and obligations arising under the RV Operating
Agreement

AGREEMENT
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and conditions
contained herein and recitals set forth above, which are lncorpomted herein, and other good
and.valuable conslderatlon, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged,
the parties hereto agree as foHowG:

1.

Assignment. Effective as of the Effective Date, V&ntures hereby assigns

and conveys to Rak.an Partners the RV Oistrlbuted Interest, together with any and all other
rights With respect thereto arising under the RV Operating Agreement. Ventures covenants
and warrants to Rokan Partners that the RV Distrlbuted Interest ls free and clear of any

encumbrances or claims of any third party.

2. ·
Assumption. Effective as of the Effective Date, f(okan Partners hereby
assumes the RV Distributed Interest, together with any and all rights with respect thereto
arising under the RV Operating Agreement.
ASSIGN\'IEm AND ASSUM?TION OF MEMB!RSHIP lw-mRESi -1
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3.
RV Idaho Consent. RV Idaho hereby (Q consents to the assignment of the
RV Distributed Interests to Rokan Partners, and (if) agrees that Rokan Partners shall be
deemed to be a "substitute member" of RV Idaho as to the RV Distributed Interest

..

4.

Attomeys' Fees. in the ·event of any controversy, claim or action being filed

or instituted between the parties hereto to enforce or Interpret the terms and conditions of
this Assignment or documents related thereto, or arising from the breach of any provision
thereof, the prevailing party will be entitled to receive from the other party an costs,
damages, and sxpen$e&, includlng reasonable attorneys' fees through all levels of action,
incurred by the prevailing party, whether or not such controversy or claim is litigated or
prosecuted to judgment The prevailing party wlll be that party who is awarded Judgment as
a result of trial or arbitration, or who receives a payment of money or other concession or
agreements from the other party in settlement of cla\ms asserted by that party.

5.
Succession. This Asslgnment shall be binding upon and shall Inure to the
benefit of the heirs, personal representatives. successors and assigns of the parties.
6.
Governing Law. This Assignment shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho.
7.

Time. Time is of the essence of this Assignment.

8.
Counterparts. This Asslgnment may be executed In any number of
counterparts, and once so executed by an parties hereto each such counterpart shall be
deemed to be an orlg\nal instrument, but all counterparts together shall constitute but one
agreement.

[End of Text]
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Assignment

effective as of the Effective Date.

COMPANY:

ROKAN VENTURES LLC,
an Idaho limited llabiOty company

ROKAN PARTNERS;

ROKAN PARTNERS LIMITED
PARTNERSHlP, an Idaho limited partnership

By:

Rokan Corporation, a Delaware
corpor
n, its General P. rtner

By:

RVIDAHO:

RV IDAHO BS LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company

By: Rokan Ventures LLC, Manager
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ASSIGNMENT ANO ASSUMPTION

OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST
(RV HOOD RIVER)
THIS ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION OF MEMBERSHIP
("Assignmenr) is entered Into effective as of the 1st day of January, 2013
Date"), by and between RV Hood River LLC, an Idaho limited llablllty company
River"), Rokan Ventures LLC, an Idaho limited liabil!ty company ("Ventures")
Partners Limited Partnershlp, an Idaho limited partnershlp (''Rokan Partners"}.

INTEREST
( effecttve
("RV Hood
and Rokan
0

RECITALS
A.
Rokan Partners holds a 24.80 percent membership Interest In Ventures {the
''Rokan Partners Membership Interest") pursuant to the Operating Agreement of
Ventures, effective as of January 1,· 2011 (the "Ventures Operating Agreement'').

B.
Ventures. John Alan LLC, The Michael Edward Page 2008 Revocable Trust,
Rokan Partners, and Wali lnvestrnents LLC are the members of RV Hood River pursuant to
that certain Operating Agreement effective as of August 24, 2009 ("RV Hood River
Operating Agreement") and subsequent assignments;
·
C.
Rokan Partners and Venture& entered into that certain Agreement for
RedemptJon, Liquidation and Partial Distribution and Authorizing Resolution effective as of
January 11 2013 ("Distribution Agreement') whereby Ventures agreed to distribute to
Rokan Partners a 8.680 percentage membership interest In RV Hood River ("RV
Distributed Interest") In distribution and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership

Interest.

D.
Ventures desires to assign to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed Interest. as
a redemption and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membershlp Interest, and Rokan Partners
desires to accept the RV Distributed Interest, as a redemption and liquidation of its interest
in Ventures, and to assume all the rights and obligations arising under the RV Operating
Agreement

AGREEMENT
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and conditions
contained herein and recitals set forth above, which are Incorporated herein, and other good
and valuable comllderation, the receipt and sufficiency of w.hlch are hereby acknowledged,
the parties hereto agree as foll~:
1.
Assignment Effective as of the Effective Date, Ventures hereby assigns
and conveys to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed Interest, together with any and all other
rights with respect thereto arising under the RV Operating Agreement. Ventures covenants
and warrants to Rokan Partners that the RV Distributed Interest ls free and clear of any
encumbrances or claims of any third party.
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2.
Assumption, Effective as of the Effective Date, Rokan Partners hereby
assumes the RV Distributed interest, together with any and all rights with respect thereto

arising under the RV Operating Agreem~nt.
3.
RV Hood Rlver Consent. RV Hood R{ver hereby (i) consent. to the
assignment of the RV Distributed Interests to Rokan Partners, and (II) agrees that Rokan
Partners shall be deemed to be a -substitute member" of RV Hood River as to the RV

Distributed Interest

4.

Attomeys' Fees. In the event of any controversy, claim or actlon b&lng fifed

or instituted between the parties hereto to enforce or Interpret the terms and conditions of

this Assignment or documents related thereto, or arising from the breach of any provision
thereof, the prevailing party will be entitled to receive from the other party all costs,
damages, and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees through all levels of action,
incurred by the prevailing party, whether or not such controversy or claim is litigated or
prosecuted to Judgment. The prevailing party wilt be that party who le awarded judgment as
a result of trial or arbitratlon1 or who receives a payment of money or other concession or

agreements from the other party 1n settlement of claims asserted by that party.
5.
Succession. This Assignment shall be binding upon and shall inure to the
benefit of the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties.
6.

Governing Law, This Assignment shall be governed by and construed In

accordance with the laws of the Stats of Idaho.

7.

nme.

Time is of the etssence of this Assignment.

8,
Counterparts. This Assignment may be executed in any number of
counterparts, and once so executed by an parties hereto each such counterpart shall be
deemed to be an original instrument, but all counterparts together shall constitute but one
agreement.

[End of Text]
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Assignment

effective as of the Effective Date.

COMPANY:

ROKAN VENTURES LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company

41//

Sy:
~'-:,,,"E-.P-a.-g_e_ _ _ _ _ _ __
Manager
ROKAN PARTNERS:

ROKAN PARTNERS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership
By:

Rokan Corporation, a Delaware
corporatto

lts General Partner

By,
RV. HOOD RlVER:

RV HOOD RIVER LLC,
an Idaho limited llability company
By: Rokan Ventures LLC, Manager
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ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION
OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST
(RV BOISE BEND)
THIS ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST
("Assignm&nt") is entered into effective as of the 181 day of January, 2013 ("Effective
Date"), by and between RV Boise Bend LLC. an Idaho llmlt&d liability company ("RV Boise
Bendj, Rokan Ventures LLC, an Idaho limlted Oablllty company ("Ventures") and Rokan
Partners Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership ("Rokan Partners").

RECITALS
A.·
Rokan Partners holds a 24.80 percent membership interest in Ventures (the
"Rokan Partners Membership Interest") pursuant to the Operating Agreement of
Ventures, effective as of January 1, 2011 (the "Ventures Operating Agreement").
B.
Ventures, John Alan LLC and Wali Investments LLC ('Wan; are the
members of RV Boise Bend pursuant to that certain Operating Agreement effective as of
March 11 2011 ("RV Boise Bend Operating Agreement") and subsequent assignments:
C.
Rokan Partners and Ventures entered Into that certain Agreement for
Redemption, Liquidation and Partial Distribution and Authoriz:ing Resolution offective as of
January 1, 2013 ("Dl&b1bution Agreementu) whereby Ventures agreed to distribute to
Rokan Partners a 21.824 percentage membership Interest ln RV Boise Bend ("RV
Distributed Interest•) in distribution and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership

Interest

D.
Ventures desires to assign to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed Interest, as
a redemption and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership Interest. and Ro'kan Partners
desires to accep1 the RV Distributed Interest, as a redemption and liquidation of its Interest
In Ventures, and to assume all the rights and obligations arising under the RV Operating
Agreement.

AGREEMENT
NOW THEREFORE. In consideration of the mutual promises and conditions
contained herein and recitals set forth above. which are Incorporated herein, and other good
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of Which are hereby acknowledged,
the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.
Assignment. Effective as of the Effective Date, Ventures hereby assigns
and conveys to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed lnterast, together with any and an other
rights With respect thereto arising under the RV Operating Agreement. Ventures covenants
and warrants to Rokan Partners that the RV Distributed Interest ls free and clear of any
encumbrances or claims of any third party.

2.
Assumption. Effective as of the Effective Date, Rokan Partners hereby
assumes the RV Distributed Interest, together with any and all rights with respect thereto
arising under the RV Operating Agreement.
AsslGNMENT ANP ASSl!IIIPTION OF MEMBENSHJP
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RV Boise Bend Consent RV Boise Bend hereby (I) consents to the
assignment of the RV Distributed Interests to Rokan Partners, and (ii) agrees that Rokan
Partners shall be deemed to be a "substitute member" of RV Boise Bend as to the RV
Distributed Interest.

4.
Attornaya• Fees. In the event of any controversy, claim or action being flied
or Instituted between the parties hereto to enforce or Interpret the terms and conditions of
this Assignment or documents related therato, or arising from the breach of any provision
thereof, the prevailing party will be entitled to receive from the other party ali costs,
damages, and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees through all levels of action,
incurred by the prevailing party, whether or not such controversy or clalm is lltlgated or
prosecuted to judgment. The prevalllng party wm be that party who is awarded judgment as
a result of trial or arbftratton, or who receives a payment of money or other concession or
agreements from the other party In settlement of claims asserted by that party.
5,
Succession, This Assignment shall be binding upon and shall Inure to the
benefit of the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties.

6,
Governing Law. This Assignment shall be governed by and construed In
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho.
7.

--... ......

....... , ...-,.....

Time. Time is of the essence of this Assignment.

8.
Counterparts. This Assignment may be executed in any number of
counterparts, and once so executed by all parties hereto each such counterpart shall be
deemed to be an original instrument, but all counterparts together shan constitute but one
agreement.

[End of Text]
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Assignment
effective as of the Effective Date.

COMPANY:

ROKAN VENTURES LLC,
an Idaho limited liablJlty company

By: ~"-#,E.J,,.-;g-e_______
Manager
ROKAN PARTNERS:

ROKAN PARTNERS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership

By:

Rokan Corporation, a Delaware
corporaf
its General Partner

By:
RV BOISE BEND:

RV BOISE BEND LLC,
an Idaho limited llablllty company

By: Rokan Ventures LLC, Manager.
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ROKAN VENTURES LLC

October 29i 2012

Robert Kantor

Rokan 1Partners
PO Box 1271
Ketchum, ID 83340

Dear Bob,

over the past two years our relationship has s"'ccessfully syndicated the Hood River, Boise Bend
and Idaho BB properties, along with continuing to operate our property and entity management
business~. During that same period of time the financial health end corporate governance of Rokan

Partners has deteriorated to a point where I am no longer comfortable creating new
ventures/syndications in partnership with Rokan Partners. Unfortunately, that leaves us with two
options for moving forward;
1) The first and preferred option is to buy Rokan Partners out of Rokan Ventures. The

purchase price would consist of a share of the individual upside companies that Rokan
Ventures LLC owns, and a cash payment representing your proportional share of the
remaining equity in the company.
2.) The second option would be 1:o dis.solve the company according to the terrni. of the
operating agreement

Whlle both options result In the same effective position for Rokan Partners, the first option ls
easier on the long term employee1, of the company( our ongoing relationship; and the continued
management of the con:ipanies in the portfolio, many of which are controlled by Rokan Partners. It Is
my hope that we can successfully work through these Issues in a timely basis and look forward to
continuing our relationship on a stronger foundation.

Rokan Ventures LLC

PO Box 1271., Ketchum> Idaho 83340 • 208 .726.1780
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~

Drage Clerk District
Coun E,1;;.me Count . Idaho

_iuL ynr,

DENNIS P. WILKINSON, ESQ.

Idaho State Bar #6023
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & ANDERSON, PLLC
3480 Merlin Drive
P.O. Box 50160
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone: (208) 525-8792
Facsimile: (208) 525-5266
Attorney for Defendant, Sondra Kantor.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
ROBERT ARON KANTOR,
Plaintifti'Counterdefendant,

vs.
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-734

DEFENDANT~s RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

· COMES NOW, Defendant/Counterclaimant, ("Sondra") by and through_ her attorneys of
record, the law firm of Thompson, Smith, Woolf & Anderson, pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby submit this Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Amended Counter/claim filed by the Plaintiff. As
demonstrated below, there are genuine issues of material fact relating to Sondra's Counterclaim
and the Plaintiffs Motion should be dismissed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This controversy stems from tenns contained in a Property Settlement Agreement
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entered between the parties on or about April 25,
parties divorce case in Case No.

Judgment was entered

the

on April 30, 2012, largely based on the terms

contained in the PSA. The PSA, among other things, contained essential terms related to
property division, the sale of a home and the parties' respective interests in certain business
entities.
On October 11, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint with the District Court alleging

Breach of Contract and Injunctive Relief On August 9, 2013, Sondra filed an Amended Answer
and Counterclaim alleging Breach of Contract/Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealtng related to the home owned by the parties (set out in paragraphs 19-31 of the PSA) and to
Rokan Ventures (set out in paragraphs 32-40 of the PSA). The Plaintiff filed this present Motion
for Partial Smnmary Judgment, Re: Amended Counterclaim, seeking a finding from this Court
that there is no factual controversy related to Sondra's Counterclaim alleging that the Plaintiff
violated the terms of the PSA with respect to Rokan Partners and Rokan Ventures.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
There are two sections of the PSA that directly address the parties' agreement regarding
Rokan Partners and Rokan Ventures. Paragraph 2 of the PSA states as follows:
2.

"ROKAN PARTNERS: The parties own an interest in Rokan Partners, an Idaho

limited partnership. The parties agree that the ownership in Rokan Partners shall be as follows:
*

Rokan Corporation, a Delaware corporation: 6%

*

Robert: 44%

*

Sondra: 44%

*

Geoffrey F. Kantor: 2%

*

Aron B. Kantor: 2%

RESPONSE TO PLAWTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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Joshua M. Kantor: 2%
Rokan Corporation is the sole general partner of Rokan Partners.
2.02

Robert is the president of Rokan Corporation.

2.03

All stock in Rokan Corporation is owned by Century Trust (in a trust agreement

dated January 1, 2006).
2.04

Rokan Partners owns an interest in PK Ventures LLC reflected in the operating

agreement dated January 1, 2012.
2.05

Rokan Partners shall own any interest in all of the entities attached in the

described Property and Debt Schedule (hereinafter "PDS") where the remarks have the initials

RP.
2.06

It is the intent and the agreement of the parties that except as specifically provided

herein, all interest in all other real estate including but not limited to syndications where the
parties have direct or indirect ownership interest shall be assigned to Rokan Partners.
2.07

Robert and Sondra shall not sell, transfer, encumber, or in any way convey their

interest in R.okan Partners unless both parties agree to the sale or conveyance.
2.11

The management of Rokan Partners is by Rokan Corporation. Robert is the

president of Rokan Corporation and is thus managing Rokan Partners. There shall be no other
person or entity managing Rokan Partners without the written consent of Sondra and Robert.
2.12

Except for what is reasonably necessary for operations ofRokan Partners, Robert

shall cause Rokan Partners to distribute the available cash of Rokan Partners. The parties
acknowledge that there is a requirement for pro rata distributions to all partners.
Notwithstanding, Robert agrees that each month cash available to be distributed to Robert or
Sondra shall be distributed as follows: the first $6,000 available shall be distributed to Sondra,

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
721

:42 AM

FAX No.

P. 005

next $6,000 available to be distributed to Robert, the next $4,000 available shall be
distributed to Sondra, the next $4,000 available shall be distributed to Robert and thereafter
available cash shall be distributed equally to Robert and Sondra. Provided further, that if in a
month Sondra has received more than Robert, the next month before going through the priority
of distribution set forth herein, Robert shall receive the first amount to equalize distribution from
the prior month. Further notwithstanding the above provisions, Robert shall use best efforts to

ensure that Sondra receives $6000 from Rokan Partners on the first day of each month beginning
June 1, 2012." 1

As set forth above, Sondra owns a 44% interest in Rokan Partners. Rokan Partners
owned a 25% in Rokan Ventures. Paragraph 16 of the PSA sets out the following:

16.

"ROKAN VENTURES:
16.01 RokanPartners owns 25% ofRokan Ventures.
16.02 Any new commercial real estate syndications or other commercial real

estate activity that Robert intends to, or does, become involved in shall be done in Rokan.
Ventures provided that any activity that Rokan Ventures declines shall not be done in Roka.n
Ventures.
16.03 To the extent agreed upon with the other members ofRokan Ventures;
Robert may receive a salary or guaranteed payment from Rokan Ventures. Any salary or
guaranteed payment in excess of $60,000 paid or payable to Robert by Rokan Ventures shall be
paid to Rokan Partners and become an asset ofRokan Partners."
On or about February 26, 2013 1 the Counterdefendant sold Rokan Partner's interest in

1

Affidavit of Sondra Kantor in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment hereinafter rcfened to
as "Kantor Aff'' at Exhibit A. Certain paragraphs were intentionally left out to include 2.08, 2.09, 2.10 and 2.132.20.
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the effective date of the sale being January 1, 2013. 2 The benefit

of the PSA, at the time of bargaining, to Sondra was that she would realize income generated
through the Counterdefendant's work at Rokan Ventures. 3 She would receive that benefit
through her ownership interest in Rokan Partners which in tum had an ownership interest in
Rokan Ventures. 4
The essence of the Counterclaim is that by selling Rokan Partners' interest in Rokan
Ventures the Counterdefendant has defeated the purpose of paragraph 16.02. The purpose of that
particular paragraph from Sondra's perspective was that the Counterdefendant would continue to
generate income through Rokan Ventures which in turn would benefit Rokan Partners. Now that
the interest has been sold, Sondra derives absolutely no benefit from any work that the
Counterdefendant might do in accordance with paragraph 16.02.

STA..~ARD OF REVIEW
Under Idaho law, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings> depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits. if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P.
56(c); see also Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583j
587 (1996). In applying this standard, the Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of
the non~moving party, and will draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the
record in favor of the party opposing the motion. McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 937
P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997). If the adverse party sets forth facts sufficient to establish that there is a
genuine issue for trial, the moving party is not entitled to summary judgment. Baxter v. Craney,
135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263,267 (2000).
2 Kantor Aff at paragraph 12;

Kantor Aff. E::dubit C.
Aff at paragraph 7.
' Pleue see Kantor Aff at Exhibit A paragraph 2.
3 Kantor
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The Summary Judgment Rule (LR.C.P. 56(b)) provides:

A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crosswclaim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in that party's favor as to all or any part
thereof. Provided, a motion for summary judgment must be filed at least 60 days
before the trial date, or filed within 7 days from the date of the order setting the
case for trial, whichever is later, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact relating to
the liability of the moving party and the moving party is thus entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Ktng v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 908-09, 42 P.3d 698, 701-02 (2002). In order to determine
whether judgment should be entered as a matter of law, the court must examine the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file. Roberts v. Wyman, 135 Idaho 690, 694, 23 P.3d
152, 156 (Ct. App. 2000).
Generally, when considering a motion for summary judgment, the court '"liberally
construes the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draws all
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.'" King, 136 Idaho at 909, 42 P .3d at
702 (quoting Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574, 576, 944 P .2d 709, 711 {1997)). A mere scintilla
of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts, however, is insufficient to withstand summary
judgment; there must be sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably return a verdict
resisting the motion. Harpole v. State, 131 Idaho 437,439, 958 P.2d 594, 596 (1998).

Moreover, a party opposing summary judgment cannot demand a trial simply because of
the Hspeculative possibility that a material issue of fact may appear at that time." Heath v.

Honker's Mini~Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 714, 8 P.3d 1254, 1257 (Ct. App. 2000). Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(e) is identical to its federal counterpart and, thus, federal law is instructive
in an analysis of whether summary judgment is appropriate in this matter. Id. at 713, 8 P.3d at

1256. It is not the intent of F.R.C.P. 56, nor is it the intent of I.R.C.P. 56, "to preserve purely
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v. Fed. Trade

663 F.2d 120, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Here, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in Sondra's favor, there are

genuine issues of material fact and summary judgment should be denied.

ARGUMENT
I.

The record establishes that the Property Settlement Agreement ("PSA") is a
binding contract between the parties whose purpose has been thwarted by the
Plaintiff's conduct.

In any contract action, a valid contract must first be established. A valid contract
must be "complete, definite and certain in all its material tenns, or contain provisions which are
capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 750·
751, 864 P.2d 194, 196 - 197 (Idaho App.,1993) (citing Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105
Idaho 346, 348, 670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983). Once a valid contract is established, the court can
determine what acts are to be performed by the contracting parties. Dale's Serv. Co., Inc. v.

Jones, 96 Idaho 662,664,534 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1975).
The basic elements of a contract are subject matter, consideration, mutual assent by all

the parties to all the terms, and an agreement that is expressed plainly and explicitly enough to
show what the parties have agreed. 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts§ 19 (2d ed.2009).
Formation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced

by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract. P.f). Ventures. 144 Idaho at 238. 159 P.3d at 875.
This manifestation takes the form of an offer and acceptance. Id. In a dispute over contract
formation it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove a distinct and common understanding
between the parties. Id~ Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 703, 779 P.2d 15, 17
(1989}. There must be a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the agreement. Hess v.
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'Wiieeler, 127 Idaho 151. 154, 898 P.2d 82, 85 (Ct.App.1995); see also MIF Realty L.P. v.
Rochester Assoc., 94 F.3d 752, 756 (8th Cir.1996). A contract must be complete, definite, and
certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being
reduced to certainty. Kohring. 137 Idaho at 99. 44 P.3d at 1154; Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp.•
105 Idaho 346, 348. 670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983). Every contract requires some consideration to be

valid. Sirius LC v . .Erickson, 150 Idaho 80,244 P.3d 224, Idaho 2010.
The PSA has all the required elements of a valid contract. There appears to be no dispute
between the parties that the PSA is in fact a valid contract. As such, the terms and conditions set
forth in the PSA are binding on both parties. This includes the contract read as a whole and also

the specific terms at issue in this litigation. 5
The Counterlcaim filed by Sondra alleges breach of contract and a breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.

6

Idaho law "implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing

when doing so is consistent with the express terms of an agreement between contracting parties."

Noak v. Idaho Dep't of Correction. 152 Idaho 305, 309, 271 P.3d 703, 707 (2012). "When it is
implied, '[t]he covenant requires that the parties perform, in good fai~ the obligations imposed
by their agreement., ,, Id. (quoting Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738. 750, 9
P.3d 1204. 1214 (2000}). Such a claim may only be asserted by parties to a contract. Id. "Even
then, one can maintain a claim for breach of the covenant only when he or she 'is denied the
right to the benefits of the agreement [the parties] entered into:" Id.

The actions taken by the Counterdefendant were not taken in good faith and clearly
Sondra was denied the right she had to the benefit of the agreement she entered into.

Aff. at E::tlu'bit A.
Please see Amended Counterclaim filed August 9, 2013, and on file with the Court.

5 Kantor
6
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The fundamental purpose of the PSA was violated when the Plaintiff sold
Rokan Partners' interest in Rokan Ventures.

A breach of contract is material or substantial if it "touches the fundamental purpose of
the contract and defeats the object of the parties in entering into the contract." Tentinger v.

McPheters, 132 Idaho 620, 622, 977 P .2d 234. 236 (Ct.App.1999), quoting Ervin Constr. Co. v.

Van Orden. 125 Idaho 695,699.874 P.2d 506, 510 {1993).
The fundamental purpose of the PSA as it relates to Paragraph 16 and the income to be
received by the Counterdefendant was that Sondra would receive a stream of income as a 44%
owner ofRokan Partners. 7 By his conduct the Counterdefendant gutted the obligation he created

by contract and essentially made paragraph 16.02 meaningless. 8 This is the essence of Sondra's

Counterclaim.
The Plaintiff' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment claims that Sondra's cause of action
relating to the Counterdefendant' s real estate activities relies solely upon paragraph 16 of the
PSA. 9 This is patently untrue.

Her cause of action relies primarily on the provisions of

paragraph 2 of the PSA giving her an interest in Rokan Partners. Paragraph 2 of the PSA gives
context to Paragraph 16.

Paragraph 16.02 merely provides a framework whereby Sondra

receives compensation due to her ownership in Rokan Partners as set out in Paragraph 2. When
the interest in Rokan Ventures was sold by Rokan Partners the Counterdefendant cut Sondra out
of any potential profits and violated the fundamental purpose of the agreement.

10

It is well established Idaho law that whether a contract was breached is a question of fact.

Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73,205 P.3d 1209, Idaho (2009). Likewise, whether the breach
7

Kantor Aff. at paragraphs 4 and 7.
s Kantor Aff. at paragraph 11.
9 See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment page 6.
10 Kantor Aff. at Exhibit A paragraphs 6, 7,8 and 11.
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was material is also a question for the finder of fact Id. The question for the finder of fact in
this case is whether the Counterdefendant' s conduct in gutting paragraph 16.02 to avoid paying
Sondra the agreed upon compensation constitutes a breach of the PSA.

The actions of the Counterdefendant clearly violate the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing as pleaded in the Counterclaim. Violation of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is tied to the performance of the contract, and a violation of the covenant occurs when
either party violates, nullifies, or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract. Boise Mode,

UC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99,294 P.3d 1111, Idaho (2013).
The PSA imposed a binding obligation upon the Counterdefendant in accordance with
paragraph 16.02 to continue to run his real estate business through Rokan Ventures. The only
reason to do this was so that Sondra would receive compensation as a member of Rokan
Partners. The sale clearly violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as it significantly
impaired the benefit of the contract that Sandy entered into.

B. Paragraph 16.02 ls an enforceable term and is not subject to the analysis
surrounding covenants not to compete.
The Counterdefendant argues that Sondra cannot being a cause of action against him
based on paragraph 16.02 "because the covenant not to compete is unenforceable and void."
Paragraph 16.02 of the PSA requires that the Counterdefendant conduct his real estate dealings
through Rokan Ventures. Toe proper analysis for the Court to conduct in this context is to
detennine whether the contract tenns are "complete, definite and certain in all its material tenns,
or contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Lawrence

supra.
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The Coooterdefendant does not argue that the term is ambiguous or uncertain. Rather, he
argues that the tenn is a covenant not to compete. When interpreting a contract the Court
detennines the intent of the contracting parties at the time that the contract was entered into and
does so by viewing the contract as a whole. Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251, 178 P.3d 616. When
looking at the PSA as a whole it is clear that the reason the parties entered into paragraph 16.02
was to provide Sondra with compensation associated with the Counterdefendants future real
estate work. This Counterdefendant had the added benefit of having the advice of counsel at the
time he entered it.

Looking at the contract term and understanding that the Counterdefendant received
numerous benefits as a result of the PSA it clearly is enforceable. In the employment context,
non-compete agreements should expressly limit the scope of activities the employee is prohibited
from performing. Pinnacle Performance, Inc., v. Hessing, 135 Idaho 364, 368~69, 17 P.3d 308,
312-13 (Ct. App.2001).
Restrictive covenants in an employment contract, though enforceable, are disfavored and
will be strictly construed against an employer. Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc .. 141 Idaho

415, 111 P.3d 100. A covenant not to compete is reasonable only if the covenant: (1) is not
greater than is necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate business interest, (2) is not
unduly harsh and oppressive to the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public. Freiburg at

116.
As a starting point, the Counterdefendant is not the employee of Sondra. This is not a
covenant not to compete subject to the traditional analysis associated with such contracts
between an employee and employer. The strict level of scrutiny applied to contracts between

employees and employers is not applied in other cases. For example, non-compete covenants
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ancillary to the sale of a business are not subject to as strict of a construction as those contained
employment contract. Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251, 178 P.3d 61
There is nothing in the record or surrounding the PSA that would lend itself to analyzing

it as a non-compete agreement. It simply as a matter of law is not such an agreement. The
provision when read in context was an agreement to conduct business through a particular entity
to benefit Sondra. The Counterdefendant has already wrongfully rid himself of the obligation to
compensate her as agreed upon when he sold the partnership interest in Rokan Ventures. He
now seeks to use his wrongful conduct as the basis to further shed his contractual obligations.

C. Damages.
The Counterdefendant argues that Sondra has no damages because the interest in Rokan

Ventures has been sold. The damages associated with the Counterdefendant's conduct are
expectation damages in connection with his continued real estate work through Rokan Ventures.

It is important to note that the Counterdefendant offers no other argument or basis for claiming
that Sondra has no damage.
His argument is based purely on his action in violating the contract by liquidating the

interest in Rokan Ventures. Now he asks this Court to reward hin1 for his wrongful conduct. As
a matter of law the Counterdefendant cannot breach the contract to set up a situation where he
can later benefit by claiming that Sondra has no damage.

CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons the Counterclaimant has good claims for breach of contract

and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. There are factual issues surrounding
those causes of action precluding a grant of summary judgment in this case. As such, the Court
must dismiss the Counterdefendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
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DATED this 4-aay of October, 2013.
THOMPSON, SMITH, WOOLF &

ANDERSON
By:~~==~==~---Dennis P. Wilkinson

Attorney for Plaintiff/C01.mter-Defendants
and Third Party Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their
name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by facsimile to them a true and correct copy of
said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage
prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile transmission.

DATED this

'3 ,

day of October, 2013.

Dennis P. Wilkinson

Scot M. Ludwig, Esq.
LUDWIG SHOUFLER
209 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702

D Mailed D Hand Delivered \Faxed

Facsimile: (208) 387-1999
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